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In recent years the Cold War has increasingly become a popular topic for museums, films, and 
television series. The sustained popularity of Cold War characters and events continue to bring 
the Cold War back into the contemporary world and to contemporary audiences. Films, series, 
and exhibitions which capture the Cold War serve to recall, reflect, and shape Britain’s cultural 
memory of the period. This thesis assesses a number of post-1989 cultural portrayals of the 
Cold War to explore how Britain remembers the conflict. It will demonstrate that the 
ambiguous nature of the Cold War and Britain’s role within it has caused challenges for 
constructing a British Cold War narrative. This thesis argues that this ambiguity raises 
questions of how to remember the conflict; this uncertainty leading to variations in portrayals. 
The ambiguity is reflected in portrayals focusing on key events and often dramatizing and 
exaggerating high points of the conflict, creating this sense of a dark and troubled period. The 
cultural memory of a troubled period is further enhanced by comparisons between the Cold 
War and the Second World War, demonstrating the influences of wartime memory on that of 
the Cold War. Wartime Britain is often contrasted as a time of victory in comparison to the 
Cold War as a period of decline for Britain and a difficult past to acknowledge. Equally, today’s 
world is also shown to shape Britain’s cultural memory of the Cold War, creating a sense of 
nostalgia for the certainty of the past. Through this exploration, this thesis contributes to the 
growing literature on Cold War memory and contributes to an understanding of the impact and 
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In April 2019, The National Archives launched their Cold War Season, beginning on the 
seventieth anniversary of the formation of NATO and culminating with a celebration thirty 
years after the Berlin Wall’s collapse.1 This celebration, ‘Fall of the Wall Late: Pop culture and 
the Cold War’, invited visitors to ‘an evening of music, dancing, retro videogames, exhibition 
tours and expert talks on the culture of this momentous Cold War era’.2 Designed to immerse 
visitors in the era, the event offered a nostalgic step-back in time to mark the ending of a 
conflict which lasted over forty years. The season of events included talks, activities, and 
workshops and The National Archives even created a Spotify playlist, which they declared on 
Twitter was designed ‘to set the mood for our new #ColdWarSeason.’3 Alongside this nostalgic 
submersion in Cold War culture, however, was The National Archives’ promotion of the 
season’s central exhibition, Protect and Survive: Britain’s Cold War Revealed; an interactive 
and immersive exhibition which revealed Britain’s own unique experience of the Cold War 
through examples of government ‘War Gaming’, espionage scandals, civil defence and culture. 
The National Archives painted the exhibition as an insight into ‘this turbulent era of secrets 
and paranoia’.4 The language used was carefully selected to promote intrigue, mystery and a 
notion of a dark and troubled period, almost in complete contrast to the nostalgic celebration 
of popular culture. The National Archives’ Cold War Season and exhibition is but one example 
 
 
1 The National Archives, ‘The National Archives announces Cold War season launching April 2019’, The National 
Archives, 6 December 2018 <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/about/news/the-national-archives-announces-
cold-war-season-launching-april-2019/> [Accessed 31 October 2019]. 
2 ‘Fall of the Wall Late: Pop Culture and the Cold War’, Eventbrite 
<https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/69416240845?aff=efbneb> [Accessed 24 October 2019]. 
3 The National Archives, ‘We’ve Put Together a Cold War Playlist to Set the Mood for Our New 
#ColdWarSeason Listen Now on Spotify: Https://Spoti.Fi/2Tbj8dS Iron Maiden, Duran Duran, Blondie...What’s 
Your Favourite #BunkerDisc? #FridayFeelingpic.Twitter.Com/ZYlsf54jbl’, (@uknatarchives, 15 March 2019).  
4 The National Archives, ‘Keeper’s Gallery: Protect and Survive: Britain’s Cold War Revealed’, The National 
Archives <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/about/visit-us/whats-on/keepers-gallery/> [accessed 24 October 
2019]. 
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of the rise in looking back to the Cold War and remembering the period; and one example of a 
Cold War narrative that could be found in British museums and popular culture in 2019. 
Narratives of the Cold War period vary across modern cultural reflections. However, each deal 
with the fundamental question of how to remember the Cold War and how to strike a balance 
between nostalgia and celebration and conveying a period of looming apocalyptic fear. The 
National Archive exhibition, in particular, epitomises this balance and the different approaches 
towards Cold War memory. 
1.1 Britain’s Cold War 
The Cold War was a prolonged and complex conflict which engulfed all aspects of life across 
the globe, from politics and warfare to economic and technological growth and cultural 
competition, all in the pursuit of establishing whether communism or capitalism was the 
stronger system. Memories of the conflict are therefore complex, each nation experiencing the 
conflict differently. In Britain, the Cold War has often been associated with Britain’s decline. 
As David Reynolds argues, despite some retaining of power through ‘imperial outposts and 
networks’, by the 1960s Britain’s ‘“fall” [was] clearly apparent’ and much scholarship since 
has focused on the Cold War as a backdrop to Britain’s changing role.5 This difference in focus, 
particularly when compared to other European countries which had a much more obvious role 
or direct experience of the Cold War through occupation or conflict, may account for a 
somewhat vague cultural memory of the period in Britain. Instead, the memory of the Second 
World War continues to hold prime position, not only in cultural and national memory, but 
crucially, in Britain’s national identity. Through an exploration of British dominant cultural 
portrayals of the Cold War this thesis argues that the vagueness surrounding Britain’s Cold 
 
 
5 David Reynolds, ‘Probing the Cold War Narrative since 1945: The Case of Western Europe’ in The Cold War: 
Historiography, Memory, Representation, ed. by Konrad H. Jarausch, Christian F. Ostermann and Andreas 
Etges (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2017), pp. 67 - 82 (pp. 69 - 71). 
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War experience has resulted in challenges for how to remember the conflict. In cultural 
reflections of the Cold War today a struggle to produce a single narrative is prominent. As a 
result, various narratives of the period have emerged, often with differing attempts to convey 
nostalgia alongside the image of a paranoid era. The continued influence of the memory of the 
Second World War helps to convey this sense of a turbulent era through constant comparisons 
between a victorious wartime Britain and a declining Cold War Britain. 
However, this is not to deny the impact and legacy of the Cold War which continues to shape 
our lives today. Depictions and narratives of the Cold War in academia, popular culture and 
museums continue to shape understandings and influence current political debates. Recent 
events including nuclear testing and fears of proliferation in Iran and North Korea, as well as 
the 2018 poisoning of the former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter, harp back to the 
Cold War era and understandings and perceptions of these events are undoubtedly grounded in 
the memories and legacy of the conflict. Yet despite this, our understanding of the legacy and 
memory of the Cold War in Britain is limited. Whilst scholarship on the memory of the Cold 
War in general is a developing area of study, it remains in its infancy.  
There is still much to be understood about how the Cold War is remembered across the globe. 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the limited work on Cold War memory studies by 
assessing the cultural memory of the conflict in Britain. It will explore the complexity of 
assessing the cultural memory of an extended period such as that of the Cold War and how 
memory operates, emphasising its fluid and developmental nature. This enables an analysis of 
how the Cold War is remembered in areas of modern British culture, namely film, television, 
and museum exhibitions. Common and repeated themes in Cold War narratives will be 
identified and questions as to why the particular themes of espionage, nuclear war and activism 
hold central positions within British cultural memory will be explored. What is it about these 
themes that people engage and connect with? How are these narratives told and what omissions 
4 
are made to create a narrative that audiences can relate to? These questions form the basis of 
this research. Yet, this thesis also seeks to demonstrate the complex and indeterminate place of 
the Cold War in British cultural memory, in particular its intertwined relationship with Britain’s 
memory of, and identity with, the Second World War. The strict periodisation of the two 
conflicts will be challenged by highlighting the need to explore Second World War and Cold 
War memory in connection to fully understand the legacy and impact of each on Britain.  
1.2 Cold War Historiography  
Cold War historical scholarship has primarily focussed on political and diplomatic history, with 
three main schools of thought framing debates; traditionalist, revisionist, and post-revisionist.6 
Much of this scholarship has explored the origins and collapse of the conflict, the ambiguity of 
the conflict’s beginning and end, and who was responsible.7 Further to this, historical research 
has tended to prioritise the roles of the USA and Soviet Union during the conflict. However, 
more recent scholarship has examined the roles of other European actors, including Britain.8 
Federico Romero argues for more research into Europe’s role in the global Cold War as it was 
‘a conflict spawned in and about Europe’.9 This thesis thus in part contributes to this need for 
a growing understanding of European Cold War history and Britain’s experience of the 
conflict. In addition to Europe, increasingly work on Africa, Asia, and Latin America is 
 
 
6 See Odd Arne Westad, ‘The Cold War and the International History of the Twentieth Century’, in The 
Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I, ed. by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 1 – 19 (pp. 3 - 8) for a detailed analysis of the development of Cold War 
historiography; See also Rosanna Farbøl, ‘Commemoration of a Cold War: The Politics of History and Heritage 
at Cold War Memory Sites in Denmark’, Cold War History, 15. 4 (2015), pp. 471 – 490 (p. 472) 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2015.1028532> [Accessed 21 November 2016]; Holger Nehring, ‘What 
Was the Cold War?’, The English Historical Review, 127. 527 (2012) pp. 920 – 949 (pp. 920 - 921) < 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/ces176> [Accessed 22 January 2020]. 
7 See Farbøl, ‘Commemoration of a Cold War’, p.472; Nehring, ‘What Was the Cold War?’, p. 920. 
8 See Anne Deighton, ‘Britain and the Cold War, 1945-1955’, in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 
I, ed. By Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 112 - 
32; David Reynolds, ‘Great Britain’, in The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives ed. 
by David Reynolds (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 77 - 95. 
9 Federico Romero, ‘Cold War historiography at the crossroads’, Cold War History, 14. 4 (2014) pp. 685 – 703 
(p. 701), <https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2014.950249> [Accessed 20 July 2021].  
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emerging.10 Odd Arne Westad’ s book, The Global Cold War, particularly argued the centrality 
of the global south to the Cold War, demonstrating that especially from the perspective of the 
South, East-West competition during the Cold War saw a ‘continuation of colonialism through 
slightly different means’.11 However, as will become apparent throughout this thesis, British 
involvement in the global south during the Cold War is often only mentioned in passing in 
cultural productions, its role in empire and decolonisation often omitted. Whilst the Cold War 
past of nuclear holocaust, activism and espionage is acknowledged, Britain’s colonial past and 
involvement in other countries is more destabilising and thus omitted. For example, Graham 
Dawson and Stephen Hopkins have highlighted that British engagement with the conflict in 
Northern Ireland has ‘been limited, lacking, frequently problematic, often troubled’.12 They 
argued that this is partly the result of the UK State denying its ‘role ( … ) as a protagonist in 
the conflict’.13 Britain’s relationship with its colonial past often being actively forgotten. The 
Cold War in contrast is more easily recalled even as a time of Britain finding a new role in the 
world, claiming a role through espionage and nuclear power. Decolonisation remains a troubled 
memory of controversy and blame and is thus often omitted from representations of the Cold 
War. The Second World War instead offers a narrative of glory and bravery for British memory 
and national identity. Paul Gilroy, in Postcolonial Melancholia, argued that the unfaltering 
 
 
10 See Farbøl, ‘Commemoration of a Cold War’, p. 472; For examples of work on the Cold War in Latin 
America, Africa, and Asia  
see: Christopher N. Darnton, Rivalry and alliance politics in cold war Latin America (Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 2014); Elizabeth Schmidt, Foreign intervention in Africa: from the Cold War to the 
War on Terror (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Tsuyoshi Hasegwa (ed.) The Cold War in East 
Asia, 1945-1991 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2011). 
11 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 396. 
12 Graham Dawson and Stephen Hopkins, ‘Introduction The Northern Ireland Troubles in Britain: impacts, 
engagements, legacies and memories’ in The Northern Ireland Troubles in Britain: Impacts, engagements, 
legacies and memories ed. by Graham Dawson, Jo Dover and Stephen Hopkins (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2017), pp.1 – 18 (p. 1). 
13 Dawson and Hopkins, ‘Introduction The Northern Ireland Troubles in Britain’, p. 3, 6, see also footnote 23 on 
p.6. 
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memory of wartime Britain ‘reflects Britain’s inability to mourn its loss of empire’.14 The 
troubled past of decolonisation being neglected in favour of wartime memories of bravery and 
unity, and even Cold War memories of nuclear fear and espionage.15 
The Cambridge History of the Cold War series, equally expanded study of the Cold War 
beyond the usual diplomatic and military boundaries.16 The diplomatic focus of Cold War 
studies has been increasingly matched by cultural and social histories of the Cold War, looking 
at culture during the conflict itself.17 British cultural Cold War studies have increased, 
including Matthew Grant’s, ‘Images of Survival, Stories of Destruction: Nuclear War on 
British Screens from 1945 to the Early 1960s’, and Tony Shaw’s, British Cinema and the Cold 
War.18 Yet despite the development and expansion of Cold War scholarship, there has been a 
limited focus on the Cold War in regard to memory studies.  
Existing Cold War memory studies have tended to approach the topic from varying 
perspectives and sources. This scholarship includes that of Igor Torbakov, who looked at the 
 
 
14 Paul Gilroy, Postcolonial Melancholia, (Columbia, Columbia University Press, 2005) <EBSCOhost, 0-
search.ebscohost.com.serlib0.essex.ac.uk/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=224606&site=ehost-live.> 
[Accessed 14 June 2021], pp. 79, 91. 
15 I will later turn to considering Gilroy’s notion of Britain’s unwavering wartime memory in the context of  
how the Cold War conflict is not able to provide the same stability and pride, or national identity. This is 
particularly raised in Grace Huxford’s work on the forgotten war in Korea. (see later discussion on p.9) 
16 See, Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.) The Cambridge History of the Cold War, 3 vols 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); See also, Matthew Grant, and Benjamin Ziemann, ‘Introduction: 
the Cold War as an imaginary war’, in Understanding The Imaginary War: Culture, Thought and Nuclear 
Conflict, 1945-90, ed. by Matthew Grant and Benjamin Ziemann (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2016), pp. 1 - 29 (pp. 10 - 11); Nehring, ‘What Was the Cold War?’, p. 921. 
17 Jonathan G. Hogg, British Nuclear Culture: Official and Unofficial Narratives in the Long Twentieth Century 
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016); Tony Shaw, Hollywood’s Cold War (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2007).  
18 Matthew Grant, ‘Images of Survival, Stories of Destruction: Nuclear War on British Screens from 1945 to the 
Early 1960s’, Journal of British Cinema and Television, 10. 1 (2013), pp. 7 - 26 
<https://doi.org/10.3366/jbctv.2013.0119> [Accessed 22 January 2020]; Tony Shaw, British Cinema and the 
Cold War: The state, propaganda and consensus (London: I.B Tauris, 2001); see also Tony Shaw, Cinematic 
Terror: A Global History of Terrorism on Film (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015).  
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memory and legacy of the Cold War from an Eastern-European regional perspective,19 whilst 
other studies, including those of Jon Wiener and Rosanna Farbøl, have taken a national focus.20 
Each study however drew strongly on the significance and use of memory for national history, 
identity, and even modern political decisions. Whilst this thesis will focus more on cultural 
memory and less on political debate, the significance of modern politics in influencing memory 
will be acknowledged. These examples not only provide evidence of a move towards exploring 
the memory of Cold War experiences, and the importance of doing so on a regional or national 
basis; they are also highly indicative of the importance of looking at post-Cold War memory 
in order to gain an understanding of how memory is used in today’s world and the social and 
cultural legacy of the period, an aim shared with this study on British cultural memory of the 
Cold War.  
A far wider approach to Cold War memory has been utilised in David Lowe and Tony Joel’s 
work, Remembering the Cold War: Global contest and national stories, which undoubtedly 
provided a basis on which to develop future Cold War memory studies.21 As they stated the 
contemporaneity of the Cold War and the expectation of new sources means there is unlikely 
to be a definitive account of Cold War memory.22 What their work established however, was 
an overview of acts and sites of Cold War remembrance in various parts of the world, 
demonstrating the vast and often conflicting messages depicted both within and between 
nations. The study also provided a framework on which to build future studies. The ‘broad-
brush’ approach of their work gave vast coverage of Cold War memory, but also left significant 
 
 
19 Igor Torbakov, ‘History, Memory and National Identity: Understanding the Politics of History and Memory 
Wars in Post-Soviet Lands’, Demokratizatsiya: The journal of Post- Soviet Democratization, 19. 3 (2011) pp. 
209 – 232. 
20 Jon Wiener, How We Forgot the Cold War: A Historical Journey across America (Berkley and Los Angeles, 
CA: University of California Press, 2012); Farbøl, ‘Commemoration of a Cold War’. 
21 David Lowe and Tony Joel, Remembering the Cold War: Global Contest and National Stories (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2013). 
22 Lowe and Joel, Remembering the Cold War, p. 4. 
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gaps which need further development. Indeed this, they argued, was the anticipated outcome 
of their work. Lowe and Joel hope that other scholars will explore different avenues of memory 
of the period, specifically through film, museums, literature, and newspapers, for instance.23  
More recently, Konrad H. Jarausch, Christian F. Ostermann and Andreas Etges published an 
edited collection of essays which explored aspects of ‘history, memory, and representation of 
the Cold War’ in various countries, capturing again an international perspective of Cold War 
memory using a cultural approach.24 The subjects addressed varied from how the Cold War is 
conveyed in history text-books across Germany, France and Britain, to essays on espionage in 
fiction and cinema, Vietnamese memories of the American War and chapters relating to the 
Berlin Wall, among others. Unlike Lowe and Joel’s ‘broad brush’ approach, the edited 
collection, The Cold War: Historiography, Memory, Representation, provided focused essays 
written by various experts on the topics covered. This allowed for more detail on specific sites 
and themes than was possible in Lowe and Joel’s work, whilst still providing a broad overview 
of how the Cold War affected different parts of the world. 
Literature on aspects of Britain’s Cold War is gradually emerging. Within Lowe and Joel’s 
work, references to British memory looked briefly at sites such as Greenham Common, 
Kelvedon Hatch Nuclear Bunker, and The National Cold War Exhibition, amid other sites.25 
These were, however, discussed briefly and in a framework of global remembering. Further to 
this, Wayne D. Cocroft’s chapter, ‘Protect and Survive: Preserving and Presenting the Built 
Cold War Heritage’ in The Cold War, explored the existence of and preservation of Cold War 
 
 
23 Lowe and Joel, Remembering the Cold War, pp. xvii, 10, 224. 
24 Konrad H. Jarausch, Christian F. Ostermann and Andreas Etges, ‘Rethinking, Representing, and 
Remembering the Cold War: Some Cultural Perspectives’, in The Cold War: Historiography, Memory, 
Representation, ed. by Konrad H. Jarausch, Christian F. Ostermann and Andreas Etges (Berlin: De Gruyter 
Oldenbourg, 2017), pp. 1 - 18 (pp. 4, 15 - 16). 
25 Lowe and Joel, Remembering the Cold War, pp. 47 - 48, 58 - 59, 170 - 171. 
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sites and objects. Whilst this looked primarily at the UK, comparisons were drawn with 
Germany and the Baltic countries.26 Cocroft has written extensively on Cold War sites and the 
preservation of such sites, taking an archaeological approach to the remembering of the Cold 
War.27 Lastly, Grace Huxford’s work The Korean War in Britain, addressed the ‘forgotten’ 
memory of the Korean War. Huxford addressed how the Korean War moved from generating 
moments of panic and interest to a largely forgotten war by the armistice in 1953. Through 
analysing life writing and other sources, Huxford explored notions of citizenship, selfhood and 
forgetting, demonstrating that despite its forgotten status, the Korean War was central to 
notions of selfhood, citizenship, and understandings of conflict in the post-1945 period. 
However, Huxford argued that the prevailing memory of the ‘long Second World War’ meant 
that  the Korean War did not provide the same usable narrative of good vs. evil, memories of 
the Second World War having been ingrained in national identity. The Cold War could not 
provide such a narrative. Huxford thus placed the memory of the Korean War within that of a 
wider British Cold War memory.28 In an earlier article, Huxford described the lack of analysis 
of Britain’s experience of the Korean War being due, in part, to the ‘difficulty in mapping the 
Cold War’s impact on Britain, oscillating as it did between short-lived panics and longer-term 
low-level anxieties’.29 Consequently, Huxford drew conclusions on the ambiguity of Britain’s 
remembering of the Cold War. This thesis builds on and develops this existing literature on 
 
 
26 Wayne D. Cocroft, ‘Protect and Survive: Preserving and Presenting the Built Cold War Heritage’, in The Cold 
War: Historiography, Memory, Representation, ed. by Konrad H. Jarausch, Christian F. Ostermann and Andreas 
Etges (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2017), pp. 215 - 238.  
27 See for example Wayne D. Cocroft and Roger J. C. Thomas, Cold War: Building for Nuclear Confrontation 
1946-1989, ed. by P. S. Barnwell (Swindon: Historic England, 2003).  
28 Grace Huxford, The Korean War in Britain: Citizenship, Selfhood and Forgetting (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2018), p. 5. 
29 Grace Huxford, ‘The Korean War Never Happened: Forgetting a Conflict in British Culture and Society’, 
Twentieth Century British History, 27: 2 (2016), pp. 195 – 219 (p. 199).  
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Britain, focusing on a range of cultural media to assess Britain’s cultural memory of the conflict 
and the development of this memory. 
This analysis therefore meets the need for continued exploration into Cold War memory by 
using a cultural memory approach, combining the use of film with the analysis of museums 
and historical sites. In particular this enables a far more in-depth and extensive study of the 
increasing presence and significance of the Cold War in modern Britain. The thesis will 
demonstrate the changing nature of this memory, how it has developed since during the Cold 
War itself and continues to be reshaped and reworked, building on our understanding of the 
impact and significance of the Cold War for Britain. In addition, the study will provide a nation-
specific investigation of Britain’s Cold War memory, adding to national studies and the 
emerging literature on Britain and the memory of the Cold War and its legacy. 
1.3 Sources and Methodology  
This assessment of Britain’s cultural memory of the Cold War is conducted through an 
exploration of British cultural sources, specifically a selection of post-1989 British films and 
television series, in addition to British museum exhibitions depicting the Cold War period, or 
a specific aspect of the conflict. Some attention will also be given to Cold War themed novels 
such as John le Carré’s original Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy novel and his more recent A Legacy 
of Spies.30 Whilst cultural portrayals from the Cold War itself are also acknowledged, the focus 
of this research is how memory has developed and how the Cold War is remembered in British 
culture today. A British focus enables the concentration of this thesis on how Britain’s 
experience and memory of the Cold War is imagined, reflected, and communicated, for 
primarily British audiences. This allows for crucial considerations of the modern influences on 
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these portrayals and why the Cold War is remembered in a particular way. The sources have 
been selected based on their focus on Cold War themes and narratives from an exclusively 
British perspective. Analysis is limited to British films and television series, and some novels, 
to concentrate on the British understandings and memories behind the creation of these cultural 
reflections, as well as the reviews and consumption of these by primarily, though not limited 
to, British audiences. It must of course be acknowledged that cultural products from other 
countries, especially from Hollywood in the USA, also provide significant contributions to 
cultural memory of the Cold War in Britain. In particular, recent years have seen the popular 
release of Bridge of Spies (2015) and The Man From U.N.C.L.E (2015). Equally, the German 
television series Deutschland 83 proved popular in Britain, with a sequel released in the UK in 
March 2019.31 It must also be noted that whilst this thesis explores British cultural memory, 
the museum exhibitions and sites used are based in England. This is largely a result of the 
selected sites being popular and well-known sites or key national museums such as the Imperial 
War Museum and The National Archives. The sources used are thus specifically chosen for 
their wide-reach and the narratives they portray, in order to provide detailed comparisons. The 
cultural portrayals which are consulted in the thesis include adaptations of Cold War popular 
fiction such as the Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy film remake in 2011 and recent television dramas 
which sought to capture the aesthetics and paranoia of the Cold War world, such as The Game 
and The Hour.32 In addition to these, numerous Cold War museum exhibitions are analysed 
including those at The National Archives, RAF Cosford Museum, the Imperial War Museum 
London and those located in various nuclear bunkers. The prominence of these cultural forms 
 
 
31 Bridge of Spies, dir. Steven Spielberg (20th Century Fox, 2015) [Motion picture]; The Man from U.N.C.L.E., 
dir. Guy Ritchie (Warner Bros., 2015) [Motion picture]; Deutschland 83, Channel 4, 3 January 2016 - 14 
February 2016 (release date for the UK, first released in the U.S, followed by Germany in 2015); Deutschland 
86, Channel 4, 8 March 2019, 21:00. 
32 Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, dir. by Tomas Alfredson (StudioCanal, 2011) [Motion picture]; The Game, BBC 
Two, 30 April – 4 June 2015, 21:00; The Hour (Series 1), BBC Two, 19 July 2011- 23 August 2011; The Hour 
(Series 2), BBC Two, 14 November 2012 - 13 December 2012, 21:00.  
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in society, both as instruments of education and entertainment, provides a window into how 
such cultural depictions reflect, but also shape or even distort, how the Cold War is remembered 
and understood. In particular, the visual nature of these sources provides insight into how the 
Cold War period is recollected. Aesthetics and mise-en-scène can be analysed to understand 
how the visitor or audience can be immersed in the Cold War period and how they engage with 
these visual recollections. The use of these cultural forms also enables assessment of whether 
developments and concerns since the end of the Cold War have shaped how the period is 
portrayed and perceived. This can especially be gauged from what is included and omitted from 
selected Cold War narratives.  
The exploration of these sources aids a cultural history and cultural memory approach to assess 
how the Cold War is remembered in Britain today. This thesis is a work of cultural history with 
a focus on representations. Peter Mandler has criticised a focus on representations in cultural 
history, stressing instead the need to explore and demonstrate the ‘throw’ of cultural sources, 
looking at ‘the conditions not only of its production but also of its distribution and reception’.33 
This thesis makes brief observations of the reception of films, television series and exhibitions 
through reviews, however, the prime focus is on representation and what the production and 
narrative of these representations demonstrate about the memory of the Cold War in Britain. 
Christine Grandy and others,34 have defended the significance of representation, Grandy raising 
the challenge of how we explore the ‘throw’ of such cultural sources as Mandler suggests.35 
As Grandy highlights, there is often an absent audience in cultural history, providing a 
 
 
33 Peter Mandler, ‘The Problem with Cultural History’, Cultural and Social History, 1. 1 (2004), pp. 94 – 117 
(p. 96) <https://doi.org/10.1191/1478003804cs0002df> [Accessed 14 June 2021]. 
34 Geoff Eley, ‘Finding the People’s War: Film, British Collective Memory, and World War II’, The American 
Historical Review, 106. 3 (2001), pp. 818 – 838 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2692326> [Accessed 22 January 
2020]. 
35 Christine Grandy, ‘Cultural history’s absent audience’, Cultural and Social History, 16. 5 (2019), pp. 643 – 
663 (p. 658) <https://doi.org/10.1080/14780038.2019.1680226> [Accessed 14 June 2021].  
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challenge for historians. Whilst culture is constantly consumed in the modern age, Grandy 
points to the fact that very few people note the effect of their response to that culture. Instead, 
Grandy makes the case that perhaps ‘the silences of majority audiences ( . . . ) also point to the 
complacency of pleased acceptance and privilege’.36 In this case, the lack of audience response 
or opposition could simply indicate the acceptance and normality of the representations 
witnessed by audiences. Grandy further highlights that ‘The vast industry that measures 
audience response tells us that culture matters’, referring to data collection from social media 
companies.37 As a result, this thesis focuses on and argues the significance of Cold War cultural 
representations over a focus on reception. The fact that Cold War themed films, television 
series and exhibitions continue to increase and be produced and consumed, demonstrates an 
appeal and significance to exploring the draw to these sources and what they demonstrate about 
British cultural memory of the Cold War.  
Jan and Aleida Assmann’s framework of cultural memory being ‘founded on ( . . . ) material 
representations’ is essential to this study.38 This thesis utilises film, television series, novels 
and exhibitions to consider how the Cold War is portrayed, imagined and understood. These 
sources are not literal reconstructions but representations of the Cold War and are significant 
as they shed insight not only into the time portrayed but also the time in which they are 
produced. Geoff Eley employs a similar methodology in his article, Finding the People’s War. 
In analysing Second World War themed films in post-war Britain, Eley demonstrates how the 
films highlight sentiments in the post-war period. Eley’s work shows that cultural sources such 
as film enable a ‘close reading’ of social and everyday life, through how they are constructed 
 
 
36 Grandy, ‘Cultural history’s absent audience’. p. 649, 658.  
37 Grandy, ‘Cultural history’s absent audience’. p. 659. 
38 38Aleida Assmann, ‘“Re-Framing Memory: Between Individual and Collective Forms of Constructing the 
Past”’, in Performing the Past: Memory, History and Identity in Modern Europe, ed. by Karin Tilmas, Frank 
van Vree, Jay M. Winter (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010) pp. 35 – 50 (pp. 41 – 42). 
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and through contextualising their production, enabling an ‘anthropological analysis’.39 In this 
instance, cultural representations are significant as they can be read as texts which inform on 
the topic reflected as well as the time in which it was created, and highlight sentiments, thought 
and notions of how events such as the Cold War are remembered in the post-1989 world. 
Equally, as Rhiannon Mason demonstrates, museums too can be read as cultural texts. As 
Mason states, the textual approach ‘involves reading an object of analysis like a text for its 
narrative structures and strategies’.40 This thesis equally focuses on cultural texts and 
representations, what they demonstrate about the Cold War narratives that dominate, what is 
forgotten and how the sources reflect contemporary thought, understanding, and in turn, 
memory. Pierre Nora too, in his argument that history has supplanted true memory, points to 
history as a ‘representation of the past’; the fear of forgetting causing modern society to archive 
and seek an organised history to remember the past and form identities and understandings. 
These representations being a ‘reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete’.41 Material 
representations thus identify the history and “memory” individuals, groups and nations have 
chosen to remember and what has been forgotten, a key focus for this exploration of Britain’s 
memory of the Cold War. 
Whilst this thesis does not focus primarily on the audience reception of these cultural 
representations, they are analysed on the basis that each one is produced with an imagined 
audience in mind and it is this audience, imagined by curators and directors, which is included 
in this analysis. It is thus necessary here to consider who is remembering the Cold War in post-
1989 Britain and the intended audiences of cultural productions and material representations 
 
 
39 Eley, ‘Finding the People’s War’, p. 829.  
40 Rhiannon Mason, ‘Cultural Theory and Museum Studies’, in A Companion to Museum Studies, ed. by Sharon 
Macdonald (Oxford: Oxford Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 17 – 32 (p. 26).  
41 Pierre Nora, ‘Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire’, Representations, 26 (1989), pp. 7 – 24 
(p. 8), < https://doi.org/10.2307/2928520> [Accessed 20 July 2021]. 
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of the conflict. For many generations, looking back on the Cold War today, means looking 
back at their own personal history, those who grew up during aspects of the Cold War. Whilst 
some may remember the high points of the 1960s, younger generations would have grown up 
during Détente or the Second Cold War of the 1980s. For these generations, memories of the 
conflict will be shaped and influenced by their own experiences, particularly if they 
experienced events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis or the fear of Pershing II Missiles being 
located in Britain. However, alongside these audiences are those who grew up post-Cold War, 
born in the late 1980s or 1990s, having no lived experience of the conflict or fear of nuclear 
holocaust. For these generations, cultural productions will be their source of knowledge and 
understanding about the conflict, shaping the memory that is produced and shared. It is these 
audiences that writers, directors and curators are creating and tailoring representations of the 
Cold War to. Consequently, whilst focussing on representation over reception, this thesis 
acknowledges the intended audiences of Cold War cultural representations and how this may 
impact the shaping and communicating of Cold War memory. 
Part of the cultural consumption around the Cold War period is the adaptation, reinterpretation 
and visitation of nuclear sites and nuclear bunkers; Cold War tourism in many ways being a 
form of dark tourism through revisiting the fears of nuclear holocaust. The appeal and attraction 
to Cold War cultural representations can itself be indicative of how the Cold War is 
remembered. In chapter four, the literature of dark tourism is employed to consider the appeal 
to Cold War and nuclear narratives. Dark tourism studies vary in their definitions. Whilst A. 
V. Seaton, in 1996, used the term thanatourism, relating to a reflection on death, Thomas Blom, 
in 2000, used the term morbid tourism to define an attraction to the unknown.42 John Lennon 
 
 
42 A. V. Seaton, ‘Guided by the dark: From thanatopsis to thanatourism’, International journal of heritage 
studies, 2. 4 (1996), pp. 234 - 244 (p. 235), <https://doi.org/10.1080/13527259608722178> [Accessed 23 March 
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and Malcolm Foley also used the term dark tourism yet argued that it is a product of post-
modern society.43 However, Avital Biran and Yaniv Poria subsequently argued that the 
application of dark tourism is too broad and varied and that the word ‘dark’ can have different 
scales. They instead argued for a focus on how visitors perceive sites.44 In exploring and 
acknowledging the literature on dark tourism, this thesis seeks to explore the appeal to Cold 
War and, in particular, nuclear sites and narratives. 
The cultural memory approach employed throughout this thesis focuses on the work of Jan and 
Aleida Assmann. Their work has contributed to a growing literature and debate surrounding 
approaches to memory studies. In particular, their focus on cultural memory built on one much 
debated concept in the literature, that of ‘collective memory’ or ‘la memoire collective’, 
established by French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs in 1925. Halbwachs argued that 
individuals recall their own memories in society through conversing with others or within 
‘social frameworks’, referring to the various groups an individual may belong to such as class 
and family.45 As part of this sharing of memories Halbwachs argued that memory was not 
solely individual but ‘collective’, as the views and perspectives of others, as well as existing 
social thoughts and discourse, alter and influence individual memories. Halbwachs however 
made clear that it is only individuals who are capable of remembering.46 Halbwachs’ work 
therefore moved considerations of memory into a social perspective, its significance lying in 
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44 Avital Biran and Yaniv Poria, ‘Reconceptualising dark tourism’, in Contemporary Tourist Experience: 
Concepts and consequences, ed. By Richard Sharpley and Philip R. Stone (Abingdon, Routledge: 2012), pp. 59 
– 70 (p. 70). 
45 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, ed., and trans. by Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), p. 38. 
46 Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, pp. 39-40, 51, 188-189. 
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the acknowledgement that individual memories are not formed irrespective of external social 
influences. 
J. Assmann and A. Assmann have specifically added to the literature on cultural memory. J. 
Assmann looked at the distinction between ‘communicative memory’, meaning ‘everyday 
interaction’, and ‘cultural memory’, which is established in objects and artefacts forming 
representations of the past. J. Assmann identifies that these material representations reflect past 
events which are remembered differently in each contemporary context.47 This expanded on 
Halbwachs’ work and emphasised the separate ‘cultural memory’.48 Both J. and A. Assmann 
favour a clearer delineation of collective memory, A. Assmann suggested that whilst 
Halbwachs’ work is crucial, it needs to be further broken down to avoid ‘vagueness’, and 
offered three alternative formats: social, political and cultural memory. Social memory 
meaning ‘the past as experienced and communicated’, with political memory and cultural 
memory being ‘founded on durable carriers of symbols and material representations’, political 
memory helping to create national histories and identities.49 Finally, A. Assmann divided 
cultural memory into canon or active memory, which keeps the ‘past as present’, such as a 
museum, and the archive or passive memory, which keeps the ‘past as past’, such as an archive 
or warehouse.50 The idea of canon or active memory is most relevant for this study, with 
museums and audiovisual representations choosing which aspects of the Cold War to preserve 
for cultural memory. This more acutely defined description of cultural memory benefits this 
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study, highlighting the significance of objects and institutions as carrying memory in a 
collective or wider society. As J. Assmann has stated, cultural memory is simply another ‘form 
of collective memory’ as it is shared and presents ‘a collective, that is, cultural, identity’.51 It 
is this collective cultural memory and identity with the Cold War which this thesis is interested 
in. 
Popular culture, and film in particular, has often been utilised in assessing cultural memory of 
previous conflicts. For example, Geoff Eley’s work on depictions of the Second World War in 
post-war Britain, employed film to assess how contemporary culture re-shaped and presented 
narratives of the war.52 Both Marco Ferro in Cinema and History and Pierre Sorlin in The Film 
in History also advocated the ability of film to inform about the time in which they were 
produced, as well as the time depicted.53 Academics increasingly justify the study of film and 
television as being crucial in the twenty-first century, where a ‘media-dependence’ is 
escalating.54 Robert A. Rosenstone’s argument, that the importance of film for historical study 
lay in the fact that it is through this medium that the majority of people learn about the past, is 
particularly significant for the study of popular culture in evaluating cultural memory.55 In 
assessing cultural memory of a historic event such as the Cold War, it would therefore be 
neglectful not to evaluate the key media which form cultural understandings and in turn 
memories of events. The increasing number of Cold War dramas and films produced is itself 
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indicative of a public interest in these narratives and thus their role in shaping cultural memory 
of the conflict cannot be ignored.  
As Astrid Erll has termed it, ‘the medium is the memory’ meaning each form of media would 
present the past in different ways, which in turn would shape understandings and memories of 
the past.56 Film and television for example, not only present a narrative of history, but also 
make the audience feel emotionally involved,57 inevitably shaping the viewer’s response and 
understanding of the historical narrative presented to them. This thesis consequently assesses 
film and television, with consideration given to their creative boundaries and ability to elicit 
emotional connections to the past, and the effect this can have on memory. This is achieved 
both through analysis of how the narratives are selected and portrayed in these media, but also 
reviews, to gauge the effects of these narratives on their viewers, and how they have been 
received and understood. This relationship between the audiovisual media and audiences was 
emphasised by Stuart Hall on the analysis of television and his ‘encoding-decoding’ model.58 
Hall proposed that whilst the producers may create or encode a drama with a specific message 
in mind, the viewer’s decoding of that drama may differ due to new and existing knowledge, 
background, and other influences; this can also be applied to film.59 The viewer is thus not 
passive but rather critical to how television programmes, and equally film, are decoded and 
understood. Contextualisation and exploration of the influences surrounding production and 
reception are therefore key to assessing cultural memory.  
 
 
56 Erll, Memory in Culture, p. 115. 
57 See Rosenstone, History on Film/ Film on History, p.18; Alison Landsberg, Engaging the Past: Mass Culture 
and the Production of Historical Knowledge (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), p. 10. 
58 Stuart Hall, ‘Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse’, Paper for the Council of Europe Colloquy 
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Eley has similarly defended this view in his remark that film ‘provides a screen for 
contemporary anxieties and dilemmas’.60 As Eley’s argument highlights, audiovisual media 
are an ideal source for exploring how the contemporary world may have affected depictions 
and understandings of past events, such as the Cold War. As has been widely acknowledged, 
film and television, just like written history or museum exhibitions, are selected reconstructions 
of the past, and not simply reflections of history.61 In this sense films and television productions 
are very much products of their own time. However, this is part of a wider process, and Marnie 
Hughes-Warrington has argued the need for clarity in that such media representations are not 
simply about the present in which they were produced but argued for the acknowledgment of 
their ‘temporal heterogeneity’. This approach suggested that analysis needs to collectively 
consider the past depicted, the time in which the film or drama was produced, and the time in 
which it is viewed.62 Whilst determining the time of the film or drama’s viewing may be 
difficult, the period of its release can be contextualised. Overall, this provides a more detailed 
analytical approach for film and television, which explores the various influences on the 
production of both the history it attempts to recreate, and the influences of the contemporary 
world on production and reception.  
The approaches to assessing film and television share some similarities with the assessment of 
museum exhibitions. Museology, the study of the history, role and classification of museums,63 
has in recent decades progressed from a focus merely on collecting and preserving artefacts, to 
exploring the purpose and role of the institutions, the study of which is known as ‘new 
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museology’.64 This also coincided with a rise in the establishment and attendance of 
museums.65 Peter Vergo’s New Museology, provided a basis of this new outlook and 
assessment of museums, arguing that issues were found with the previous focus of the 
discipline on ‘museum methods’.66 Instead, Vergo’s edited collection of articles offered varied 
ways of exploring and understanding museums, and importantly, understanding the 
relationship between museums, curators and visitors.67 Scholars advocating ‘new museology’ 
have pointed to the significant role of the visitor, and the emphasis of this new scholarship on 
benefitting and appealing to the needs of communities.68 
However, museums are increasingly seen as commodities and leisure institutions, and visitors 
as customers. This has significantly altered perceptions as to the role of such institutions and 
what is expected from them. 69 Whilst still very much viewed as places of education, museums 
are increasingly sought as sources of entertainment. This development has placed new demands 
on museums and historical sites and could be seen to influence historical representations, either 
through the use of modern technology, or to the extent of dramatising history to meet 
entertainment demands.70 In addition to this, a recent memory boom, following trends in family 
and public history, has resulted in museums also being seen as places for people to find an 
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understanding of their past and their identities.71 These new perceived roles for museums, based 
on the needs of society, highlight the increasing influence of the visitor in determining what 
museums display and how, and the significance of museums in shaping people’s cultural 
identities and memories, highlighting their significance. 
Sharon Macdonald and Sir William Henry Flower have remarked that the methods and 
techniques of display are of great significance in how the visitor interacts with an exhibition, 
advocating that scholars take into consideration the aesthetics of display, the artefacts used, 
and the use of reconstructions, when assessing the process behind museums.72 Much like the 
ways mise-en-scène and camera shots shape how film and television is received and decoded, 
the display of museums is of equal importance. In addition to this, both Ludmilla Jordanova 
and Patricia Gillard have explored the visitor’s experience. Jordanova has argued that what is 
displayed and how it is presented is only part of what visitors take from the experience, instead 
she added that the imagination of the individual further translates the ‘knowledge’ offered by 
the museum.73  Equally, Gillard remarked on the development in scholarship of looking at the 
visitor as having an ‘active’ as opposed to ‘passive’ role, and that individuals will interpret 
exhibitions and sites on the basis of personal knowledge and experience.74 Similarly to Hall’s 
methodology for analysing television programmes, this perspective follows much the same 
encoding-decoding principle - that the institution and curator have aims and particular 
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messages to provide, yet the individual will interact with these concepts based on their own 
knowledge and experience.75 
Further challenges discussed by academics of ‘new museology’ are drawn from the emphasis 
on communities, namely, how to define them. Most academics have agreed that globalisation 
and multi-culturalism have brought new challenges to museums and historical sites; whilst 
museums tended in the past to offer a national history or memory, this has become fragmented 
by the complexity of modern society.76  The increasing diversity and looking to public history 
has led academics and museum professionals alike to look at methods such as co-production 
and co-curation, to work with communities and create reflective and diverse narratives.77 It is 
crucial to acknowledge that communities visiting museums and historical sites have grown, 
and continue to become, more complex and heterogeneous.78 Consequently, such institutions 
now, more than ever, have to balance differing generational, social or cultural perspectives and 
memories of events, and even ‘rival histories’ are produced, for various groups and needs in 
society.79 For example, rather than attempt an overall or national history of the Cold War, many 
museums seem instead to focus on certain themes and events in order to, either appeal to 
specific groups, or focus on more general audiences who may be able to relate to certain themes 
and aspects of the Cold War period. How exhibitions are designed to appeal thus influences 
the history depicted.  
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Particularly in regard to exploring the Cold War themed exhibitions there is a degree of visitor 
observation in acknowledging how audiences may respond or relate to the curated cultural 
productions of the Cold War. Whilst the focus of this work is representations of the Cold War, 
there are some observations of how audiences and visitors are guided and how they may 
respond to the representations. Observation is an ethnographic research method, stemming 
from anthropological and sociological studies and is used and defended as a technique by a 
range of fields.80 For instance, Simon During points to the work of Ien Ang in analysing 
audience responses to Dallas by placing herself as a fan of the show to ‘encourage engaged 
replies’ in the form of letters.81 Equally, David Morely in attempting to provide a better model 
for understanding media audiences and their responses, used research subjects to evaluate the 
programme Nationwide, Morely acting as a ‘neutral narrator’.82 Furthermore, in war and 
culture and bunker studies, Sean L. Kinnear employed an ethnographic observation approach 
by volunteering to restore a bunker in order to observe volunteers and the efforts to protect and 
restore nuclear bunkers.83 In this thesis, much focus is placed on how curators and directors 
depict the Cold War, how they select and shape the narrative and guide audiences, 
acknowledging the fact that each cultural production was created with an audience in mind. 
However, in visiting museum exhibitions and immersive events such as that at Greenham 
Common, I too am part of the audience, engaged in responding to these cultural productions 
and observing how visitors and audiences navigate and respond to the narratives depicted.  
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A final point for consideration when assessing museum exhibitions and historical sites can be 
found in the work of Ashplant, Dawson and Roper.  They offer a method for analysis of sites 
of memory, exploring what they have called the ‘articulation of memory’ through ‘agencies’ 
and ‘arenas’ of articulation. ‘Agencies of articulation’ are those behind or promoting the 
remembering of an event, including the state, civil society and local groups; and ‘arenas of 
articulation’ can vary from the family, national, or even international, and is where the 
remembering takes place.84 This thesis explores such sites, arenas or spaces in museums and 
popular culture, looking at British cultural memory of the Cold War, and will focus on the 
agencies behind such cultural representations, whether that is individuals, the state or particular 
organisations, in order to gauge the process and influences surrounding a specific memory or 
representation of the Cold War. 
1.4 Post-1989 History  
In looking at post-1989 cultural portrayals, it is important to acknowledge post-1989 history 
and the events which led to a revisiting of the Cold War past. The era of post-1989 in which 
British cultural memory of the Cold War is explored is now itself a period spanning over thirty 
years. This section briefly examines the history of the post-Cold War world and how this has 
shaped memory of the conflict in Britain. The era will be addressed as two periods: the first 
from 1989 to September 2001 and the second from post-9/11 to present day. This distinction 




84 Ashplant, T. G., Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper, ‘“The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration: 
Contexts, Structures and Dynamics”’, in The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration ed. by T. G. 




Immediately post-Cold War, there was a readjustment period as the world moved out of the 
east-west conflict that had divided the world for forty-five years. Many looked on this as a 
unipolar world order with the USA as the sole military, economic and cultural superpower. 
Michael Cox, in The Post Cold War World, states that many Western commentators 
immediately post-Cold War were ‘self-confident’ and ‘buoyant’.85 During Clinton’s 
Presidency (1993-2001) several attempts were made to partner with the successor of the Soviet 
Union, the Russian Federation. John Major, Prime Minister from 1990-1997, was also quick to 
establish good relations with the new Russian Federation. In November 1992, during a visit by 
Boris Yeltsin to the UK, the two leaders signed ‘the first friendship treaty between their two 
countries since 1766’ leading Major to state ‘“We are consigning the Cold War to history”’.86 
Rebuilding relations with Russia was not without tensions, including Ukraine, Chechnya and 
the 1993 Russian elections, in which ‘opposition to economic change’ gained more power in 
the State Duma.87 In 2000, Vladimir Putin replaced Yeltsin as the leader of the Russian 
Federation. Unlike Yeltsin who rejected the Soviet past from Russian history, Putin sought to 
revive it, seeing success and glory in Russia’s Soviet past. Within the wider context of a gradual 
shift toward right-wing and identity politics towards the end of the twentieth century, a 
nostalgic focus on national pride and heritage through anniversaries and commemoration, 
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served rising political needs.88 As a result, the Cold War period re-entered national language, 
rhetoric, attitudes, and policies.89  
In the early-2000s, Communism and the Cold War re-entered European memory and language. 
Previously, European and British memory had heavily focussed on the Second World War. In 
the 1990s, particularly in 1995 the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War saw 
commemorative events mark the war as a unifying moment in British national and European 
memory. In commenting on the 40th and 50th anniversaries of the conflict, Janet Watson stated 
that key events ‘were marked in a wide variety of ways, including newspaper, radio, and 
television coverage ( … ) Parliamentary debate and government reports; museum exhibitions; 
and a plethora of material commemorative objects’. 90 The Second World War was thus alive 
and present in news, culture, and society between 1989 and 1995. The Cold War instead faded 
into the past.  
Further to this, as the European Parliament 2015 study on ‘European Historical Memory: 
Policies, Challenges and Perspectives’ shows, throughout the 1990s and in the early-2000s, the 
European Union (EU) sought to unite European citizens around a collective memory of the 
Second World War, specifically National Socialism and the Holocaust, and later also Stalinism 
and Communism.91 The study states that this focus centred on the notion that an understanding 
of European and EU ‘principles such as freedom, democracy and respect of human rights’, 
could be emphasised by acknowledging ‘breaches of those very principles by 20th Century 
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totalitarianism’.92 Once again, these memories served a political need to establish a European 
identity amid the expansion of the European Union and the European project, adding 
legitimacy.93 The Second World War memory has thus been highlighted across EU states from 
the 1990s (of which Britain was a member until 2020). 
However, as the study demonstrates, the inclusion of Stalinist totalitarianism and Communism 
in the EU framework of European memory, largely resulted from the EU’s Eastern expansion, 
which began with the integration of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004.94 The more recent experience of Soviet occupation and 
suffering for Eastern European countries meant expanding European identity beyond the evil 
of National Socialism and the Holocaust to acknowledging ‘National Socialism and Stalinism 
as equally evil’. This differing experience but also the fact that several Eastern European 
countries were complicit in the Holocaust and concentration camps, led to this readjustment of 
European memory.95 The Eastern expansion of the EU and inclusion of Stalinism and 
Communism in EU memory could account, in part, for a resurgence in looking to the Cold War 
and the effects of the Western fight against Communism, as EU members actively 
communicated this collective European memory.  
A further key turning point in Cold War memory post-1989 was the 9/11 attacks. The attacks 
on the Twin Towers in New York on 11 September 2001 shook not only the USA but the world. 
The scale and devastation of the attacks brought the new threat of global terrorism starkly to 
the forefront of politics and the news. In the USA, the attacks saw a return to rhetoric from 
both the Second World War, particularly the attack on Pearl Harbour, and the Cold War. As 
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Lowe and Joel stated, George Bush’s ‘administration’s later references to the Cold War as 
instructive in the war on al-Qaeda left commentators wondering whether Bush intended to 
‘contain’ America’s enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan or engage in ‘roll-back’.96 An article in 
the Times in June 2004 equally remarked that Bush, in ‘comparing America’s brand of liberty 
with the totalitarianism of the terrorists, evoked the West’s victory over the Soviet Union’.97 
9/11 and its aftermath therefore not only saw a turning point in policies and global threats, it 
also reignited Cold War rhetoric and understanding, bringing the Cold War back into the 
present, driven by a new relevance to modern events.  
In contrast, in the UK, as Lowe and Joel highlight, Tony Blair declared 9/11 as ‘the dawn of 
an era in which there were no guidance markers, a complete break from the past’.98 John Tosh 
has remarked on the absence of historical awareness of previous British intervention in Iraq in 
the early twentieth century, which would have provided key insights on the risks and impacts 
of British intervention in Iraq in 2003. The lack of awareness of this in the public domain in 
the lead up to British intervention supported Blair’s declaration of an unprecedented threat, 
instead news centred on the horrors of Saddam Hussein’s regime and at the most acknowledged 
lessons of appeasement in the 1930s.99 Nonetheless, in painting 9/11 and the War on Terror as 
a new era, space was left for the Cold War to be looked on nostalgically. In the face of a new 
threat where the enemy and cause of the conflict was unclear, the previous conflict between 
East and West, could increasingly be looked on as a time of certainty, and even stability. Indeed 
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Paul Boyer, in remarking on the anniversary of Dr Strangelove in 2004, stated that 9/11 and 
the new War on Terror enabled a nostalgic look back on the Cold War with a sense of clear 
world order and stable governments.100  
1.4.2 Post-9/11- Today 
Following 9/11, the subsequent intervention in Afghanistan and later Iraq caused increasing 
lack of faith in the British government. This arose with the controversy surrounding the Iraq 
war. Despite one of the largest protests at the time prior to the UK’s entry into Iraq, the Blair 
government committed British troops to the conflict in 2003 in support of the US, on the 
grounds that the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein had Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
The later failure to find these weapons led to allegations that government reports had been 
‘‘sexed up’’ to justify the conflict. The moral outcry over the UK’s commitment to the war led 
to the Chilcot Inquiry and questions of the morality and worth of the conflicts in Afghanistan 
and Iraq became commonplace.101 The financial crash in 2008 and MP expenses scandal further 
damaged any trust.102 As will be demonstrated in this thesis, the new conflicts in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, the War on Terror and later in Syria have enabled a rose-tinted view of the Cold War. The 
Cold War in contrast to the present can be seen as more stable and certain. As such, memory 
of the Cold War has developed and altered in relation to current events.  
The increasing tensions between the West and countries including Iran and North Korea over 
nuclear proliferation have also worked to draw the Cold War and nuclear fears back into 
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significance. Similarly, a series of espionage scandals including the poisoning of Alexander 
Litvinenko in 2006, the discovery of Russian spy Anna Chapman, and the more recent 
poisoning of Sergei Skripal and his daughter, harp back to notions of Cold War espionage and 
clandestine warfare. Toby Whithouse, writer of The Game, even noted Anna Chapman as part 
of the inspiration for his Cold War espionage drama.103 
The continued impact of the Cold War and its increasing significance in the world today due 
to nuclear proliferation and espionage scandals thus help to explain the gradual increase in 
cultural representations of the conflict. Furthermore, the uncertainty of the present and 
undefined enemies in the War on Terror enable the Cold War to be looked on nostalgically. It 
is this increasing fascination and rise in cultural representations of the Cold War that this thesis 
is interested in, and how this shapes British cultural memory of the conflict.  
1.5 Themes in Britain’s Cultural Memory 
Shaping this analysis of cultural memory there are three key influences. The first being the 
challenge of how to define the Cold War period and issues with strict periodisation of the 
conflict. The challenges of how to define the Cold War begin with the term ‘Cold War’ itself. 
The term first being used by George Orwell in 1945, was used to define the developing hostility 
between the USA and Soviet Union at the time, a conflict not just, or even primarily, based on 
military warfare but on a new system of power, with the atomic bomb at the centre.104 The term 
‘Cold War’ is a complex concept, which has become synonymous with a wide range of issues 
and events, and indeed has been used to define the entire period between the end of the Second 
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World War and 1989 to 1991.105 As Holger Nehring has argued, the term has increasingly been 
applied vaguely with little analysis or explanation of what in fact the ‘Cold War’ was or what 
it meant.106 Highly debated is the period of the conflict itself as well as the nature of the conflict. 
The complexity of the term is highlighted in the work of John Lewis Gaddis. In 1986 Gaddis 
defined the Cold War as a ‘long peace’, though this has since been acknowledged as a result 
of his writing in the post-détente period, and rightly criticised by some as being largely 
inaccurate, particularly for countries which witnessed mass violence and because the fear of 
nuclear war was always present.107  After the Cold War, Gaddis shifted his stance to a more 
traditionalist one, seeing the Cold War as a conflict of ‘good vs. evil’ with America incapable 
of diplomacy when faced with Stalin’s paranoia and the Soviet Union’s ideological drive.108  
Thus time affects perspectives of the conflict - how it is seen and defined is open to differing 
interpretations. 
Arne Westad has pointed to the significance of regional differences in defining the ‘Cold War’, 
each side having their own set of values, experiences and understandings.109 Romero agrees 
with ‘Arne Westad’ s plea for a ‘pluralist approach’’ to Cold War history; Romero arguing that 
other ‘broad dynamics’ held greater significance in the global south than the Cold War, instead 
various spheres of research would provide a greater understanding of the conflict in different 
parts of the world.110 This need to acknowledge regional differences has also been posed in 
Heonik Kwon’s work. Kwon moved away from a Eurocentric approach to a more global one, 
 
 
105 Nehring, ‘What Was the Cold War?’, pp. 923 – 924. 
106 Nehring, ‘What Was the Cold War?’, pp. 923, 931. 
107 Nehring, ‘What Was the Cold War?’, p. 925; Grant and Ziemann, ‘Introduction: the Cold War as an 
imaginary war’, p. 25. 
108 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); 
See also Anders Stephanson, ‘Review: Rethinking Cold War History’, Review of International Studies, 24. 1 
(1998), pp. 119 - 124 (pp. 119 - 120) <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097509> [Accessed 22 January 2020]. 
109 Westad, ‘The Cold War and the International History of the Twentieth Century’, p. 6. 
110 Romero, ‘Cold War historiography at the crossroads’, pp. 690, 693.  
33 
arguing that whilst the Cold War may never have escalated to a full military conflict, or was, 
as some have labelled it an ‘imaginary war’ in the West, it was real for other places of the 
world; Kwon’s particular focus being that of Korea and Vietnam, where military force caused 
devastation.111 The ‘Cold War’ has different meanings for different parts of the world, as such 
Nehring and Westad argued that the Cold War cannot be seen as an all-encompassing 
concept.112   
Considering the concept of the ‘Cold War’ from a primarily western or British perspective, as 
is necessary for this study, it is useful to look at the existing scholarship on the idea of the 
‘imaginary war’. Matthew Grant and Benjamin Ziemann’s recent work looked at the ‘Cold 
War’ as an ‘imaginary war’ and how the Cold War, and at its centre the bomb, symbolic of 
nuclear war, was imagined in popular culture, society and in government. It explored how these 
‘assumptions’ influenced understandings, politics and strategy during the period. Their work 
proposed that whilst a full-scale military conflict never fully materialised, the fear of war and 
nuclear devastation was real, resulting in a mind-set of the need of defence and nuclear 
deterrence, or for others the removal of nuclear weapons.113 With the subsiding, or at least 
decreasing, of this fear with the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
conflict was in this sense at an end, providing a frame for the period of the Cold War.114 This 
is particularly interesting when combined with Nehring’s suggestion that we look at previous 
scholarship on war in order to define the ‘Cold War’.115 Nehring stated that wars have two 
dominant aspects, including a collapse in diplomacy, and a build-up of violence, both in arms 
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production and the ‘socialisation of violence’, allowing for a wartime mind-set.116 Nehring thus 
demonstrated a framework to conceptualise the nature of the ‘Cold War’ as these elements are 
evident during the period. Despite its difference to conventional wars, several exhibitions and 
narratives presented today do convey the Cold War as a military conflict. 
However, while it is possible to define the Cold War as a conflict, it can equally be seen as a 
period which penetrated everyday life. Some have criticised the broad application of the term 
“Cold War”. Nehring urges more clarity on ‘what the Cold War was (and what it was not)’, in 
order to delineate the direct correlations between the Cold War and post-1945 events.117 
Similarly, Lawrence D. Freedman has stated that the all-encompassing nature of the Cold War 
meant that ‘the term “cold war” became a convenient label for more than four decades of 
international history’.118 Despite these critiques, the Cold War is often defined and presented 
as a period in cultural depictions and cultural memory, though this often centres on particular 
‘hot points’. The Protect and Survive exhibition in The National Archives demonstrates this in 
its divided presentation between a military conflict captured in displays of war games, 
intelligence and global conflicts, and its emphasis on Cold War culture and everyday life in the 
reconstruction of a Cold War home, from Civil Defence guidance and experiences to popular 
culture taking hold of everyday life. Both the Cold War as conflict and as a prolonged period 
which seeped into daily life, politics, and culture, need to be acknowledged to assess how the 
Cold War is remembered today. As will be demonstrated, cultural depictions often have varied 
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emphases on the military or cultural nature of the period; the lack of clear definition providing 
yet more ambiguity for Britain’s cultural memory of the Cold War.  
1.6 Historical Time and Memory 
The complexity of the Cold War itself leads to a complex cultural memory of the conflict. As 
a period spanning nearly fifty years, the conflict provides challenges to memory studies. As 
Lowe and Joel have remarked, unlike studies of the Great War, which analyse how ‘a single 
event lasting the comparatively short time frame of 1914-18 has been and continues to be 
remembered’, the Cold War was an extended period.119 This included nearly fifty years of 
politics, military commitments, and social and cultural developments, all issues which were 
either directly related to, influenced by, or parallel to the ongoing Cold War. In addition to this, 
the start and end dates of the Cold War are highly debated, providing no clear guidelines 
through which to analyse the event or its legacy. This combined with the fact that the Cold War 
is not often seen as a war in the ‘conventional’ sense, as a ‘hot war’ never emerged between 
the two superpowers, raises the question of what is being remembered.120  This sets out the 
breadth and complexity of the topic being explored and the numerous legacies of the period. It 
is because of the length and reach of the Cold War that a study of the period must also 
acknowledge the complexity of its legacy and memory. Consequently, an understanding of 
how memory operates is required. It would be too simplistic to declare that the Cold War ended 
in 1989 or 1991 and thus memories of the conflict formed subsequent to this. Instead it must 
be made clear that memories of the Cold War were forming during the period itself, continuing 
to develop throughout and after the conflict.  
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The way in which memory operates causes issues with looking at the Cold War as a separate 
historical period with a defined beginning and end. Doing so ignores the complex nature of 
memory and how it operates and suggests that the Cold War was experienced as a separate 
event, without any influence from prior experiences and understanding. The work of Reinhart 
Koselleck, however, enables a reassessment of this. Koselleck’s focus on the influence of the 
past and future in a given present helps to convey how the influence of memories of the Second 
World War and concerns for the future have each shaped and continue to shape how the Cold 
War is remembered in Britain and why.121 Therefore, while it may be argued that the Cold War 
began in 1945 or the post-war years and ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of 
communism in 1989 to 1991, previous memories and discourses from wartime Britain, as well 
as contemporary concerns, influenced and shaped how the Cold War was seen and understood 
at various stages of the conflict.  
Koselleck’s work on ‘Zeitschichten (layers of time)’, analysed by John Zammito, offered an 
alternative theory to the strict periodisation of events. Layers of time were described by 
Koselleck as ‘“several layers of time of differing duration and differentiable origin, which are 
nonetheless present and effectual at the same time”’.122 Consequently, as opposed to strict 
periodisation, different strands of time link and overlap to form multiple temporalities within 
a given moment. As a result, different layers of the past flow into the present at ‘varying 
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velocities’, meaning that different pasts flow into, influence and shape the present, and equally 
the present opens up to the future.123 
As a result of this theory of time layers, Helge Jordheim has declared that Koselleck’s work 
rather than encourage periodisation, actually tried to ‘defy’ it. Jordheim concluded that: 
The fact that historical time is not linear and homogeneous but complex and multi-
layered accounts for the futility of all efforts to freeze history in order to delimit and 
define breaks, discontinuities, time spans, beginnings and endings. Indeed, it accounts 
for the futility of periodization itself.124  
Whilst periodisation is useful for historians in defining a specific area of exploration, it imposes 
limits on the actual flow of history and time, as causes and impacts can be felt a long time prior 
to or after an event.  
It is the ‘futility of periodization’ which is particularly important for the study of Cold War 
memory. Memories of the Cold War have formed from the early stages of the conflict and have 
continually been re-shaped throughout the conflict and after. However, even beyond this we 
can use Koselleck’s theory of time layers and the relationship between past and future in a 
given present, to understand that memories of the Cold War are framed based on past 
experiences and knowledge as well as contemporary and future concerns. The complexities of 
exploring Cold War memory thus unfold and the limits of periodisation become more acute. 
For example, the film Philby, Burgess and Maclean (1977) depicted the unveiling of Maclean 
and his and Burgess’ escape in 1951, ending with Philby’s public denial that he was also part 
of the spy ring in 1955.125 The film emphasised the spies’ treachery, particularly in the disgust 
of Maclean’s and Philby’s wives when they learnt of Maclean’s past. The treachery of the 
Cambridge Spy Ring, as will be discussed in Chapter Three, is often connected to the post-war 
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decline of Britain. The release of the film in the 1970s with events such as the 1972 Miner’s 
Strike and much discontent, equally reflect this sense of turmoil and crisis, the conditions of 
the present influencing and aiding portrayals and memories of a 1950s narrative. In recent years 
much scholarship has sought to assess and revise the memory of the 1970s as a ‘crisis’ period. 
Whilst some have argued that specific events and strikes were used and played upon for 
political rhetoric and a discourse of ‘crisis’, particularly by the New Right ahead of Thatcher’s 
election; others have argued that the period actually saw much improvement.126 For example, 
Lynne Segal argues that the women’s movement in the 1970s was stronger and more improved 
than previous years.127 As Lawrence Black states ‘Amid terrorists, strikers, streakers, 
scroungers, muggers, punks, and soccer hooligans, the 1970s were the apogee of decline’. 
However, in his assessment of the rising new literature of 1970s Britain, Black argues that this 
literature can enlighten the complexities of the decade as well as how decades can take on their 
own meanings and identities.128 Whilst scholarship is beginning to explore the more nuanced 
reality of the 1970s as a decade, popular memory and even popular culture during the 1970s 
itself played on this motif of crisis. Consequently, the narrative of the Cambridge spies, though 
recent past, was brought into the present of the 1970s and portrayed through this perspective 
of decline. We can therefore see how the present is influential in shaping views and portrayals 
of the past, as well as how the past flows into and shapes the present. The narrative of the spies 
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from the early Cold War is seen to shape the later Cold War period, indicating how memories 
developed throughout the Cold War itself and continue to do so today.  
Martin Heidegger’s work offered similar explanations that history is always taking place.129 
Heidegger argued that moments are not ‘timeless’ or ‘of determinate length’; pointing to the 
idea that whilst an event may have a chronological beginning and end, and therefore an event 
is seen to be ‘‘over and done with’’, historical time can actually be stretched out. This is evident 
in short, mid, and long-term causes which lead to and provide meaning for historical events.  
Further to this, due to the fact that historical time is ongoing and alters with the changing 
relationship between the past and future, Koselleck stated that ‘the truth of history changes 
with time, or to be more exact, that historical truth can become outdated’.130 In other words, 
the conditions of a given present create a new perspective through which to analyse and 
understand the past, the past is therefore brought into the present and is ‘articulate[d] ( … ) 
anew’.131 Though it must also be added that periods of history can fluctuate in importance for 
any given present, and though may be insignificant at one moment can become relevant again 
and vice versa.132  
These points are particularly relevant for the Cold War, as the ‘lingering contemporaneity’, to 
borrow the phrase of Lowe and Joel,133 means the legacy and impact of the conflict is still being 
felt today. The conflict continues to have much prominence in the present, and in modern 
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memory, as well as influencing ideas of the future, particularly in regard to international 
relations. We can see the significance of this in the work of Heonik Kwon on Cold War 
memory, focussing on Korea and Vietnam. Kwon points to the Cold War’s ‘decomposition’, 
the fact that the Cold War is still, in some places and in certain aspects, coming to an end.134 
The Cold War’s impact and legacy is still very much present in the world today. Therefore, it 
can be argued that the idea of the event being chronologically over, yet still coming to an end 
in regard to historical time, links to this. In addition, contemporary events are seeing increasing 
references to the Cold War, both in the events and the rhetoric used to describe them. For 
example, recent tensions between America and North Korea over nuclear weapons, brought 
the nuclear aspect of the Cold War firmly into the present, as the only basis on which to draw 
comparisons and understandings of the event. This, along with an increasing number of cultural 
representations and exhibitions, means the past of the Cold War is being brought into the 
present, possibly due to its relevance and significance, and as such the Cold War has been given 
new meaning by events in the post-1989 world. The application of Koselleck’s time layers 
enables a far more detailed and wider analysis of the many influences shaping Britain’s cultural 
memory of the Cold War today. The second and third influences on Britain’s cultural memory 
of the Cold War are a result of this operation of memory and shape the content of the cultural 
memories created and portrayed.  
1.7 Memory of the Second World War  
Through acknowledging the complex nature of memory and the overlapping of various layers 
of time, it is possible to analyse and understand the significant influence of the memory of the 
Second World War on the cultural memory of the Cold War. As the second key influence on 
the analysis of cultural memory of the conflict, the Second World War, in particular, the strong 
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national memory and identity which has emerged from wartime Britain, consistently frames 
cultural representations of the Cold War. In the same way that stating Cold War memory 
formed post-1989 would oversimplify our understanding, as would the omission of the 
influence of Second World War memory. The two conflicts and the memories of those conflicts 
cannot be seen as entirely exclusive of one another. 
It has long been acknowledged that the Second World War holds a significant place in British 
national identity. Lucy Noakes and Juliette Pattinson have even stated that ‘few historical 
events have resonated as fully in modern British culture as the Second World War’.135 Whilst 
the Second World War witnessed allied victory and the defeat of fascism, the Cold War, in 
contrast, offered little in regard to British glory and triumph. Instead, the post-war world saw 
Britain decline; both the cost of war and increasing wave of decolonisation causing Britain’s 
role in the world to alter significantly. These notions of decline, in contrast to a victorious 
wartime Britain, result in the Cold War’s place in British national and cultural memory being 
less celebrated and defined. As a result, the memory of the Second World War continues to 
dominate in British society. This is highlighted in Huxford’s work on The Korean War in 
Britain. Huxford argued that Cold War moments and conflicts such as the Korean War are 
often ‘forgotten’. Unlike the victory over fascism in the Second World War, they did not ‘fit 
within the prescribed narratives of British history’, or specifically the clear and victorious 
narrative of the Second World War.136 The Cold War instead is seen as too complex and thus 
memories tend to be less defined and less present in British national and cultural memory.  
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However, as stated, memory is ever changing and developing. Ashplant, Dawson and Roper 
have argued, in regard to war memory, how discourses and images of previous wars can be 
used to make sense of new or contemporary conflicts.137 Numerous war memory studies have 
pointed to this idea, including the work of Mark Connelly, who proposed that the Second World 
War may act as a guide for future and current conflicts, drawing on references made to the war, 
especially during the Falklands war, 1982, which drew numerous parallels in rhetoric.138 
Equally, Ashplant, Dawson and Roper stated that each new conflict provides a new lens 
through which memory of previous wars is then re-shaped, viewed and understood. This is 
demonstrated in the work of Geoff Eley, which explored the changing memory of the Second 
World War in post-war film and found an increasing emphasis on post-1945 failures and issues 
in British society. The post-war world shaped and reframed the Second World War, 
demonstrating the significance of the present in reflecting on the past. War memory is therefore 
fluid, as is all memory, and previous discourses as well as contemporary events and 
understandings can influence the way wars are viewed, remembered and commemorated.139 
The analysis of Britain’s cultural memory of the Cold War in this thesis thus acknowledges 
and explores the influence of Second World War memory on how the Cold War is framed and 
depicted, and demonstrates the intertwined relationship between the two memories, rejecting 
strict periodisation.  
1.8 Modern Day and Nostalgia  
In addition to the influence of the memory of the Second World War on the cultural memory 
of the Cold War, the third key influence is the impact of recent events. As discussed, the context 
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of a given present influences how the past is revisited and understood in that present. In order 
to understand modern cultural memory of the Cold War today, it is crucial to acknowledge how 
post-1989 events have shaped perceptions and understandings, and how they influence both 
the production and consumption of cultural portrayals of the conflict. 
 Following Ashplant, Dawson and Roper’s argument that new conflicts provide a lens through 
which to view previous conflicts, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in addition to the War on 
Terror, can be seen to have strongly influenced memories of the Cold War. These wars, without 
the world order of the superpower divide, have resulted in complex and multi-powered 
conflicts. Furthermore, terrorism provides new enemies, ones often without nation states and 
which are not always easy to identify. The complexity and uncertainty of such wars provide an 
uncertain present and future. The past of the Cold War, with its sense of order and rules, may 
in contrast seem much quainter, even peaceful in comparison. These recent events reshaping 
and moulding memories of the Cold War period.  
Halbwachs in his work on ‘collective memory’ also addressed what he called ‘contemplative ( 
… ) or dreamlike memory’, which enables an escape from today’s world and society. 
Halbwachs argued that the modern world shapes our memories of the past, and consequently 
we may produce a past which we yearn for, and not necessarily the past as it was.140 Linda 
Hutcheon, David Lowenthal, and others have since advocated much the same idea.141 Hutcheon 
has argued that it is an ‘idealized’ past we long for, that the very ‘irrecoverable nature of the 
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past’ is precisely its appeal.142 Lowenthal has similarly added the argument that the past  offers 
a ‘completeness lacking in any present’; being in the past we know what happened, whereas 
the future offers no such security and certainty, and thus we look to the past for some 
stability.143 A nostalgia for the Cold War can be seen to be emerging in today’s world and 
distortions of Cold War memory which result from this are explored in this thesis.  
There has also been an increase in recent years in turning toward the past more generally. In 
his work on the transition to modernity, Koselleck argued that modernity saw an emphasis on 
the future and on progress. His work enables us to map how experiences of historical time have 
developed in recent years. As stated, Koselleck declared that historical time can be found in 
the relationship between the past and the future in a given present.144 In regards to modernity, 
Koselleck saw the Enlightenment period as the turning-point at which the pre-modern 
experience and understanding of time altered.145 This transition saw the move from a pre-
modern experience of time based on reliance on the past and a predictable future - with the end 
focused on the Apocalypse - to an unknown future which was no longer dependent on lessons 
of the past.146 This change resulted in the divergence of the past and future. Koselleck captured 
this divergence in the phrases ‘space of experience’, which indicated the past that is recorded 
and remembered or the present past, and ‘horizon of expectation’, which indicated future 
possibilities or the present future. 147 Koselleck’s main point was that historical time exists in 
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the tension and constantly changing relationship between the two. The growing distance 
between the two became characteristic of modernity and more emphasis became placed on the 
future in regard to progress and a process of acceleration, which shortened ‘“the space of 
experience”’.148  
However, the focus on the future which Koselleck and others saw as a characteristic of 
modernity, has been seen by some as no longer entirely applicable.149 Instead, academics have 
argued that people are now looking to the past, or as Andreas Huyssen stated, ‘the focus has 
shifted from present futures to present pasts’.150 As a result, Koselleck’s theory of acceleration 
needs extending in order to understand this shift. In fact, what we are now seeing has been 
argued as the next stage of Koselleck’s modernity.151  
Huyssen has specifically considered this changing temporality, drawing the issues of 
temporality and memory together. In assessing the rapid memory boom since the late twentieth 
century, Huyssen questioned whether there was something more to this bringing the past into 
the present, ‘something ( … ) specific to the structuring of memory and temporality today.’ 
Huyssen pointed to the idea that new technology has caused change in our understanding and 
experience of temporality, compressing ‘time and space’.152 Consequently, there is now a sense 
of moving faster towards an uncertain future. Amy Elias has added that the modern perception 
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of progress has ‘nearly [been] abandoned’ as the future is now looked to ‘with anxiety’, as such 
we turn away from the uncertainty of the future. Elias follows the idea of Walter Benjamin’s 
‘Angel of History’ that we move toward the future whilst looking to the past or as she refers to 
it, ‘we are ( … ) caught in its [the future’s] slipstream’, the angel therefore represents the 
present.153 
In addition to this change in temporal understanding, and as a result of this process of 
acceleration, new technologies enable the storage of vast amounts of information, so much so 
that we are actually ‘in danger of forgetting’.154 As Rodney Harrison noted, it is impossible to 
‘form new memories and attach value to them without selecting some things to forget’. 
Consequently, Harrison declared, we are in danger of ‘being overwhelmed by memory’.155 
Huyssen highlighted this paradox - that the technology which enables us to store and remember 
so much, is also responsible for a fear of forgetting, as we risk being overloaded with 
information and memories. This fear of forgetting, Huyssen suggested, is the cause of focussing 
on ‘public and private memorialization’, as we attempt to find stability in the past and slow 
down the increasing process of acceleration. This therefore partly helps to explain why the 
recent past, including that of the Cold War, is increasingly turned to and brought into the 
present.  
This fear of forgetting and a turning towards the past points to a further key influence on Cold 
War memory today. There are concerns for the acceleration to an unknown future, in particular 
one with terrorist threats, the threat of new biological warfare and the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. The cultural memory of the Cold War is therefore shaped by experiences of recent 
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conflicts and events, in addition to anxieties for the unknown future, helping to create a more 
nostalgic memory of the Cold War with its sense of rules and superpower divide. The cultural 
memory of Britain’s Cold War thus becomes more complex and ambiguous when there is a 
need to consider both the portrayal of the period as one of decline and fear, alongside the fact 
that films, television dramas, and exhibits are increasingly looking back to the Cold War in an 
uncertain present.  
These broad themes form a framework through which the cultural memory of Britain’s Cold 
War can be examined. Koselleck’s theory of time layers aids an exploration of how memory 
operates and the numerous influences on Britain’s Cold War memory and how this has 
developed. In order to address the cultural memory of Britain’s Cold War today, Chapter Two 
provides an overview of how this memory has developed since the news that the Cold War was 
ending in 1989 to 1991 to recent exhibitions in 2019. The chapter draws out some of the key 
themes which emerge across portrayals of the conflict post-1989, finding similarities in matters 
of dramatisation, the topics focused on and some of the challenges of creating a Cold War 
narrative, in particular the lack of a definitive end to the conflict or a clear role for Britain. The 
discussion within this chapter provides an overview of Britain’s cultural memory of the Cold 
War, whilst the following chapters focus on specific themes which form central aspects of this 
memory. Chapter Three addresses the recurring theme of espionage throughout cultural 
portrayals of the conflict, particularly present in films and television dramas. The chapter traces 
the popularity of the espionage genre from the Cold War itself to the present day, and how 
espionage has become synonymous with the conflict. It explores the attraction of espionage for 
modern viewers and visitors to exhibitions for entertainment, and how this drama and intrigue 
captures not only a troubled period of betrayal and secrecy, but also a sense of nostalgia. This 
nostalgia is particularly reflected in references to the Second World War, demonstrating the 
intrinsic relationship between the two memories. Equally, if not more, synonymous with the 
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Cold War is the theme of nuclear war. Chapter Four looks at the portrayal of the nuclear threat 
and how a memory of fear and looming apocalypse has developed since the early-Cold War. 
Yet, it also addresses the recurrence of discussions of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) 
and deterrence in Cold War portrayals and how this helps to create a strange sense of nostalgia 
in contrast to the unpredictable nature of the world today. Lastly, Chapter Five notes the 
dependence of the memory of Cold War activism on that of the nuclear threat. This chapter 
analyses post-1989 reflections of Cold War activism, which draw on the debate between the 
successes and failures of activism in the period and why there may be more recognition and 
understanding for Cold War protest in today’s world.  
This thesis enables the centrality of these themes to the British cultural memory of the Cold 
War to be explored in detail. It argues that the ambiguous nature of the conflict, in particular 
Britain’s role, causes challenges in creating a British Cold War narrative. The thesis will argue 
that this ambiguity results in a lack of certainty in how to remember the period, leading to 
varying emphases and interpretations. As will be demonstrated, this uncertainty often results 
in depictions of the Cold War focused on key events, resulting in episodic narratives, and are 
often simplified or sometimes portrayed to be dramatic as opposed to a background to daily 
life. It also suggests that the cultural memory of Britain’s Cold War is heavily influenced by 
the strong national memory and identity associated with the Second World War, the Cold War 
often framed as a contrast to the unity and strength of wartime Britain. Emphasis is often placed 
on creating dark and troubled images of the period, adding to the drama yet also contrasting 
victorious wartime Britain with the Cold War. However, the impact of today’s world equally 
continues to reshape the memory of the conflict, with an increasing desire to look back and 
understand Britain’s experience of the period. This looking back is at times nostalgic, and 
questions arise as to whether aspects of the Cold War should be celebrated, highlighting the 
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complex memory that has developed. In doing so it adds to the growing field of Cold War 




2 The Development of Britain’s Cultural Memory of the Cold War. 
 
When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the symbol of a world divided by East and West collapsed. 
In its wake and following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, people looked towards a 
world void of ideological divisions, on the basis of communism versus capitalism, and the 
looming threat of nuclear war. The Cold War was uniquely experienced in each continent and 
nation in the world, and the experience of its collapse and legacy was no different. Whilst in 
Eastern Europe, the end of the Cold War brought waves of new independence and, for many, 
freedom from Soviet occupation, Britain’s experience was less defined. The challenge of how 
to remember Britain’s Cold War emanates from during the conflict itself and continues to shape 
the narratives of the conflict presented today. This chapter explores how Britain’s cultural 
memory of the Cold War has developed from the final years of the conflict to the present day. 
In order to demonstrate this, the chapter will assess the narratives created in the 1998 Cold War 
television documentary, followed by an assessment of press reactions to the final years of the 
conflict from 1989 to 1991. Lastly, these will be explored alongside three 2019 Cold War 
exhibitions. The analysis and comparison of these portrayals enables an assessment of how 
Cold War memory has developed. These examples have been selected to provide a wider 
picture of how the Cold War has been imagined and reflected in cultural sources since 1989, 
and how these portrayals may have altered based on the given present, such as a gradual move 
from seeing the Cold War as a superpower conflict, to recognising the Cold War’s impact on 
everyday life in Britain. In mapping this development, the sources also enable an exploration 
of key challenges facing a cultural memory of Britain’s Cold War and how cultural portrayals 
have navigated these challenges to find a narrative and framework. One challenge is defining 
the conflict, the period being defined and framed differently throughout, either as a conflict, 
context or as a period as a whole. Within these various narratives and frameworks, however, 
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some similarities and continuities are evident. In particular, the complexity of the Cold War 
and the challenges this creates in forming a Cold War narrative often results in a focus on 
specific ‘hot points’, such as themes of nuclear war and events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis; 
providing a way to explore a largely non-conventional war for Britain. The chapter will also 
demonstrate the influence of the given present on Britain’s cultural memory of the conflict. 
Following Koselleck’s argument that the given present is shaped by past events and future 
concerns, this chapter will demonstrate how memories of the Second World War and concerns 
of an uncertain future have shaped the cultural memory of the Cold War.1 The influence of 
Britain’s national memory of the Second World War can be seen as having a significant 
influence on memory of the Cold War. Unlike the narratives of glory and bravery associated 
with wartime Britain, the Cold War is associated with Britain’s changing position in the world. 
The impact of decolonisation as a period of decline for Britain, but also often one of violence 
and controversy creates a difficult past for Britain to acknowledge. This chapter will thus 
explore how Britain’s difficult past results in an ambiguous memory and a largely absent 
narrative of decolonisation. Equally, the tendency to focus on the superpowers of the Cold War 
further reduces Britain’s role in the conflict, adding to this challenging and unclear memory. 
Exploring these case studies in turn will thus highlight that, despite the difference in years and 
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2.1 Cold War Series and Book 
The challenges of how to portray and how to remember the Cold War have existed from during 
the conflict itself and particularly in reflections in the years following the end of the conflict. 
The television documentary, Cold War, was produced and aired in the UK and USA in 1998-
1999.2 This was a landmark documentary on the conflict, capturing the complex story of the 
Cold War from its beginning in the post-war years up to its end in 1991. The series was funded 
by Ted Turner of Turner Original Productions who wanted the producer of The World at War, 
Jeremy Isaacs, to produce a Cold War series.3 Isaacs had ‘a distinguished career in British 
Television’, following The World at War series Isaacs was director at Thames Television and 
later founded Channel 4, before becoming General Director of the Royal Opera House. 
Downing, himself a historian and television producer, teamed with Isaacs and Turner Original 
Productions to produce the series, with the support of three leading Cold War historians, John 
Lewis Gaddis, Vladislav Zubok and Lawrence Freedman.4 The series made use of the opening 
of archives on both sides to produce approximately ‘500 interviews’ of eye-witness accounts 
and collected various other footage from world film archives, to create a narrative of the Cold 
War which provided both East and West perspectives. This was a particular focus for Turner 
who wanted to present ‘a history with two sides to it’ and avoid a triumphalist narrative.5 In 
many ways the documentary did achieve this as interviews from politicians, intelligence 
officers and “ordinary people”, on both sides of the Cold War, were consulted for their accounts 
of events. In his article on the production of the series, Taylor Downing discussed the 
enthusiasm of all those behind the series to make a Cold War history that would be 
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communicated with the public.6 As Downing states in an article from 1998, it was an 
‘irresistible’ challenge for Isaacs to create a series of the ‘history that we have all just lived 
through’. Isaacs, Downing and the team behind the series all of generations who grew up during 
the Cold War.7 As one review of the series noted, the significance of the series was that it would 
influence ‘the man-in-the-street’s beliefs about forty years of important, dangerous and in the 
end successful policy-making’.8 The legacy of the documentary is thus important to consider, 
at the time of its release the documentary presented a full-length narrative of a forty-five year 
period, and the way this narrative was presented would help to shape viewers’ perspectives of 
the Cold War.  
Of particular importance was the fact that the documentary makers decided to follow a 
chronological structure, however this structure was framed around particular themes and ‘hot 
points’ of the Cold War. In presenting the documentary in a chronological format, the series 
very much gave the impression of the Cold War as a continuous period from the end of the 
Second World War to the start of the 1990s. The series thus provided more of a coherent 
narrative of the entire period than perhaps other cultural depictions have attempted since. In 
focusing this narrative around particular ‘hot points’ of the Cold War, however, it portrayed a 
series of significant events and themes. The focus on the two superpowers in the documentary 
resulted in ideology forming a central theme in explaining the causes behind these events. One 
theme in particular which has come to define the Cold War era since during the conflict is that 
of nuclear war. The very first episode of the television series opened with footage of a nuclear 
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explosion and a rising mushroom cloud, setting the scene for a conflict with a looming nuclear 
threat. The words narrated by actor Kenneth Branagh, opened the series, declaring that ‘A cloud 
hides the sky, a nuclear shadow falls across the human future’.9 This opening scene generated 
a sense of awe and fear for the audience and set the tone of the series as being one that presented 
the drama and terror of the Cold War period. The book to accompany the series which was 
published in 1998, written by Isaacs and Downing, equally set this tone, as the book’s front 
cover was an image of a mushroom cloud and the subtitle read: ‘For 45 years the world held 
its breath’.10 The series and book thus both provided a dramatic introduction. The series 
followed the nuclear threat and arms developments throughout, with particular episodes 
covering the arms race in ‘Sputnik 1949-1961’; ‘Cuba 1959-1962’ narrating how the world 
came close to nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962; ‘MAD 1960-1972’ detailing the 
increasing arms race and reliance on deterrence; and ‘Star Wars 1981-1988’ which followed 
Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative and the renewed arms race tensions in the 1980s, along 
with nuclear accidents such as Chernobyl.11 The threat of nuclear war and the increasing arms 
race therefore ran continually throughout the series, the audience was reminded that this threat 
always loomed in the background. With the development of atomic and thermonuclear 
weapons during the Cold War, and their significance to international relations throughout the 
conflict, as well as their very visual depiction of the conflict which threatened Armageddon, it 
is not surprising that nuclear war forms a key and recurring theme in Cold War memory, both 
during the conflict itself and today. 
 
 
9 ‘Comrades 1917-1945’, Cold War, BBC Two, 19 September 1998, 20:05. 
10 Jeremy Isaacs and Taylor Downing, Cold War: For 45 Years the World Held its Breath, (London: Bantam 
Press, 1998).  
11 ‘Sputnik 1949-1961’, Cold War, BBC Two, 14 November 1998, 20:10; ‘Cuba 1959-1962’, Cold War, BBC 
Two, 28 November 1988, 20:10; ‘MAD 1960-1972’, Cold War, BBC Two, 6 February 1999, 20:10.  
55 
In addition to a focus on nuclear war, a key, and perhaps the greatest ‘hot point’ of the Cold 
War was the Cuban Missile Crisis. Both the 1998 Cold War series and cultural portrayals in 
exhibitions or dramas since, have used the Cuban Missile Crisis to demonstrate the reality of 
the nuclear arms race, and how close each side came to nuclear conflict. The Crisis was also 
presented dramatically to emphasise the tension and concerns of those at the time. The build-
up of the Crisis, the enforcement of the blockade and attempts to avert nuclear war presented 
the audience with an intense narrative. Again, the language and statements selected for the 
series emphasised the drama and the fear. An American news broadcast following the 
agreement between Kennedy and Khrushchev was included, declaring that ‘This is the day we 
have every reason to believe when the world came out from under the most terrible threat of 
nuclear holocaust since the end of World War Two’,12 giving the audience a sense of how close 
the world had been to nuclear conflict. One review of the series and book by John L. Harper 
highlighted the criticism of the episode on Cuba, one criticism being that the episode suggested 
‘that the crisis suddenly erupted on 14 October 1962’, adding that intelligence had been 
collected as early as August.13 This may partly have been the result of fitting the narrative into 
a forty-six-minute episode. However, in presenting the narrative this way, as a sudden eruption 
of Cold War tension, the series reflected but also built on the drama of the event, creating a 
memory of intensity and fear during the Cold War.  
Alongside the tension of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the series placed emphasis on the fact that 
diplomacy averted the crisis and that both Kennedy and Khrushchev recognised the need to 
avoid nuclear war. Throughout the series there was a great deal of emphasis on the issue of 
deterrence. The episode ‘MAD 1960-1972’ in particular, focused on the growing belief in 
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Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), leading to the stockpiling of weapons on either side to 
maintain a balance.14 The episode ‘Star Wars 1981-1988’ also noted the resistance to Ronald 
Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative, including from Margaret Thatcher, as there was a strong 
belief among many that this would upset the balance of capabilities and thus threaten the 
effectiveness of MAD.15 The closing summary of the series reiterated this point further, stating 
that, ‘Statesmen on both sides who had the power to push the nuclear button, in crisis after 
crisis, put humanity’s interest first. Nuclear deterrence kept the peace’.16 The series therefore 
did much to highlight and even celebrate the role of deterrence and MAD in maintaining peace 
throughout the Cold War. The nuclear threat and deterrence can thus be seen to form key 
themes within the documentary’s Cold War narrative. 
Other ‘hot points’ emphasised in the series included a specific focus on Berlin. Berlin was 
focused on in three separate episodes throughout the series, including ‘Berlin 1948-1949’, ‘The 
Wall 1958-1963’ and ‘The Wall Comes Down 1989’.17 Harper’s review stated that the ‘series 
is Euro-centric and, within Europe, Berlin-centric’.18 That there were three episodes which 
focused on Berlin, highlights the centrality of the city to the Cold War, and the city continues 
to serve as both a focal point and symbol of the Cold War in portrayals today. In the Cold War 
series, two of the episodes concentrated on the Berlin Wall. Episode nine which narrated the 
construction of the Wall opened with the statement, ‘It started as a barbed wire fence; dividing 
a city; imprisoning its people. The very image of the Cold War, the Berlin Wall’. Equally, the 
episode closed with the words, ‘The Wall was the supreme symbol of the Cold War’s cruelty, 
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and Europe’s division’.19 Berlin, and in particular the Wall, served during the Cold War and 
continues to serve as an ultimate symbol of the Iron Curtain and the divide across Europe. As 
such its centrality to the conflict was emphasised in the series’ focus on the Wall and its 
symbolism. Both the episodes on the construction and the fall of the Berlin Wall were very 
moving, and marked key moments in the development and latterly, ending of the Cold War. 
The latter episode of the fall of the Wall and the subsequent reunification of Germany signalled 
the ending of the Cold War for many and as such the Wall has been a constant and key theme 
in cultural portrayals and Cold War memory.  
While there was not a great focus on East Asia in the series, both the Korean and Vietnam Wars 
had an episode each dedicated to them. The series continued to focus on a very US-Soviet 
perspective of the events and captured how the two wars influenced US-Soviet relations and 
the development of the Cold War. The two wars can be seen to form key ‘hot points’ in Cold 
War narratives dating from the late 1990s to present day. The two wars were fundamental 
turning points in the Cold War and provide devastating examples of when the Cold War became 
‘a hot war’.20   
The series also dedicated whole episodes to protest and espionage during the Cold War in 
‘Make Love Not War in The Sixties’ and ‘Spies 1944-1994’.21 These also form central topics 
and themes that continue to run throughout portrayals of the Cold War and Cold War memory. 
The focus on protest in the series concentrated on protest in the USA. Remarkably little was 
said throughout the series regarding the British peace movements such as the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament (CND), Committee of 100 (C100) or the women’s protest at Greenham 
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Common. Mention of peace movements in other episodes tended to focus on German peace 
movements, again providing an emphasis on Berlin. The episode ‘Make Love Not War in The 
Sixties’, however, centred on the US Civil Rights Movement and anti-war demonstrations 
against the Vietnam War. The counterculture of the 1960s was drawn upon in this episode to 
provide a cultural perspective of the conflict. Further controversy was shown in the episode 
‘Thaw 1969-1975’ which captured the devastating consequences of police force against student 
anti-war protests at Kent State University in 1970.22 Protest and the use of violence against 
those protests were also concentrated on in the episode ‘Red Spring The Sixties’23. The episode 
focused on the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968, to put a stop to the cultural reforms and 
freedoms being introduced by Alexander Dubček. Protest thus formed a further key theme in 
the series, with each episode highlighting both the power of protest but also the devastation of 
its suppression during the Cold War. 
The theme of spies and espionage featured in a whole episode in the series and a separate 
dedicated section in the accompanying book, highlighting the centrality of espionage to the 
Cold War. The episode did much to focus on the reality of intelligence warfare and the human 
cost of betrayal and shared intelligence. Details on the deaths of agents caused by others naming 
them were made explicit, with some acting under a belief of duty and others sharing 
information for monetary gain. In the book, a quote from Markus Wolf, part of the East German 
secret service, was used in which he ‘denies that spying is romantic. “It is dirty; people 
suffer”’.24 Several well-known spies including Kim Philby, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, 
as well as Klaus Fuchs, George Blake and Dimitri Polyakov were discussed. Whilst a James 
Bond trailer was integrated into the episode, this was shown to represent the British ‘spy 
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mania’, in contrast to the dark reality of Cold War espionage and the betrayal and humiliation 
that later shook Britain. Espionage was an integral part of the Cold War conflict and was how 
both East and West gathered vital information about their enemy for both use in proxy wars 
but also diplomacy. The cultural boom in the espionage genre alongside this with the likes of 
James Bond and John Le Carré’s George Smiley have resulted in espionage becoming 
synonymous with the Cold War. The drama and intrigue that espionage lends is easily 
incorporated into a Cold War narrative to emphasise the dark, threatening, and sometimes 
secret, conflict that dominated for over forty years. As well as providing a vital piece of the 
Cold War narrative, the inclusion of espionage in the series added excitement and 
entertainment. As a result, espionage, like nuclear conflict and the symbol of the Berlin Wall, 
continually forms a key feature in most Cold War cultural portrayals.  
The series thus ensured it included and focused on specific ‘hot points’ of the Cold War. In the 
new introduction for the 2008 paperback edition of the book, Peter Hennessy remarked that, 
‘Cuba was but one of a series of punctuation marks to the Cold War, which delineated its 
greatest crises from Berlin in 1948-9, Korea 1950-3, Suez and Hungary 1956, Berlin, once 
more, 1958-61, Prague 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979’.25 We can therefore see that these ‘hot 
points’ were emphasised throughout the series, highlighting the key and often decisive 
moments of the Cold War conflict. It is these same ‘hot points’ which continue to form the 
focal points and central themes for cultural portrayals of the Cold War, and as such the portrayal 
of these events shapes people’s memories of the conflict. These events become the defining 
moments for Cold War memory and, as ‘hot points’, they highlight the most dangerous and 
dramatic moments from 1945 to 1991. 
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With an emphasis on ‘hot points’ and narratives of danger, comes a sense of drama, even 
sensationalism, in portrayals of the Cold War. The series in particular did much to evoke the 
drama of the conflict. The series’ music score produced by Carl Davis, as one review by Harper 
stated, ‘augments the sense, variously, of tension, drama and pathos’.26 The music drew the 
audience into a sense of intrigue and investigation, both thrilling and unnerving. The title 
sequence which accompanied it enhanced the dark and secret nature of the Cold War conflict 
by following a tunnel with projected Cold War footage on the tunnel walls, moving ever closer 
to a white light at the end when the screen fades white and then reappears with ‘Cold War’ 
written on the screen. The series producers therefore worked to both reflect and perpetuate this 
sense of a dark, ominous Cold War period, emphasising drama. Similarly, the narrative 
language used throughout the episodes enhanced this further. As discussed above, the opening 
words of the series created an immediate sense of drama for the audience and was echoed 
throughout. Often the episodes would end on an ominous tone, closing statements such as 
‘Preparations for global annihilation continued’ and ‘The fires of rebellion burned on’, worked 
to dramatise the documentary.27 Therefore, whilst a factual documentary, a degree of 
entertainment and dramatisation were evident, and in doing so the series perpetuated this sense 
of looming fear and danger throughout the Cold War period. Lastly, the series was closed 
effectively with the use of President George Bush Senior’s Christmas broadcast in 1991, 
following Gorbachev’s resignation and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Bush declared:  
“For over forty years the United States led the West in the struggle against communism 
and the threat it posed to our most precious values. This struggle shaped the lives of all 
Americans. It forced all nations to live under the spectre of nuclear destruction. That 
confrontation is now over”. 28 
 
 
26 Various, ‘Review Essays and Book Reviews’, p. 136. 
27 ‘MAD 1960-1972’; ‘Freeze 1977-1981’, Cold War, BBC Two, 27 March 1999, 20:15.  
28 ‘Conclusions 1989-1991’.   
61 
By ending the series on this declaration, a sense of finality and conclusion was provided for 
the audience. A narrative of dramatic conflict which lasted over forty years was brought to a 
close and the audience was left to contemplate both the end of the Cold War and the post-Cold 
War world.  
The series has been argued to have placed too much emphasis on the Cold War ‘as a time of 
unmitigated troubles for humanity, a long parenthesis of terror from which we have been lucky 
to escape’.29 As discussed above, this was evident in the use of a dramatic music score and 
dramatic language, creating an atmosphere of doom and terror, with the looming shadow of the 
bomb ever present. However, as Harper pointed out the period also witnessed ‘unprecedented 
prosperity’ in the West for the reunification of Germany, the increasing unity of European 
countries and ultimately the fact that the superpowers avoided nuclear confrontation through 
diplomacy. Here, Harper emphasised John Lewis Gaddis’ argument that the Cold War was in 
fact ‘a long peace’.30 The Cold War was, in reality, not one constant, tumultuous period. For 
many, day-to-day life continued with the Cold War in the background. This of course was not 
the case for every country as those in the East, Africa and Latin America had far different 
experiences to much of the Western World. Yet, especially from a British perspective, life 
mostly continued as normal. Despite this fact, every cultural portrayal of the Cold War and 
Britain’s Cold War, emphasises this atmosphere of doom and terror, through the use of music, 
language, large images of the mushroom cloud, and dark narratives of secrecy and betrayal. 
This continued emphasis from the end of the Cold War itself has worked to create a memory 
of the Cold War and Britain’s Cold War as a tumultuous time, which continues today. This not 
only works to create a specific cultural memory but also provides entertainment and a 
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dramatised narrative for audiences. The focus on this sense of endless turmoil and dramatic 
‘hot points’, however, may equally account for a feeling of detachment from the Cold War in 
cultural memory. The dramatisation instead creates an abstract idea of the conflict, and not the 
reality that many in Britain may remember, thus, in part, accounting for an ambiguous memory 
of the Cold War.  
One final narrative challenge faced by the Cold War series and book  was the lack of a definitive 
moment at which the Cold War ended. As discussed previously, the end of the Cold War is 
heavily debated among scholars, and as such the series and accompanying book reflected this. 
In the final chapter of the book, ‘Endings’, it stated:  
Some say the Cold War ended when the Berlin Wall came down; others say it was when 
Gorbachev, at Malta, told Bush, “We don’t consider you as an enemy any more”. Now 
the Soviet Union had reconciled itself to seeing Germany ( … ) in military alliance with 
the West. Since Germany had always been at the epicentre of the Cold War in Europe, 
this has a strong claim to be considered the decisive moment of the Cold War’s 
ending.31 
This demonstrates that there was no clear or decisive ending moment provided by the series or 
book and this continues to be a key aspect and issue for Britain’s cultural memory of the Cold 
War. Without a clear and definite ending, it is difficult for people to know what to remember, 
and how to remember the Cold War. However, the fact that both the book and the series took 
the narrative to the end of 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, provided at least an 
indication that the gradual slowing down of the Cold War finally culminated in the end of the 
Soviet Union and the collapse of communism. A series of key events helped to form a narrative 
and a sense of a highly complex conflict, but there remains a confusion of how to remember 
the Cold War.  
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There were several omissions in the series and accompanying book. In particular, the series 
presented a very US-Soviet Union, superpower focus, with little attention played to the roles 
of other countries during the Cold War. For example, the roles of Britain and France were 
mentioned sparingly throughout, often only to provide context for key events between the USA 
and Soviet Union. Interestingly, whilst mentioned briefly in the series, and with slightly more 
detail provided in the book, the Suez Crisis featured only to highlight the world’s distraction 
from the Hungarian Uprising in 1956. The Suez Crisis was, however, a crucial turning-point in 
the Cold War for Britain when its role as a global power diminished. Equally, the resentment 
from the USA against Britain and France which resulted from the crisis affected US-European 
relations in the period. The lack of dedicated time to the topic is therefore surprising. This may 
consequently both reflect and shape a sense of uncertainty over Britain’s role in the Cold War. 
If Britain’s role during the conflict was only briefly mentioned on occasion, it provided a sense 
that Britain, and indeed other nations, were not as involved in, or affected by, the Cold War. 
The superpower focus of the series and book thus evoked a particular memory of the Cold War 
being a conflict fought between the USA and the Soviet Union, while other countries remained 
on the side-lines.  
Further to this, reviews of the series stated that there was little attention paid to events in the 
Far East, with the exception of the obvious ‘hot points’ in Korea and Vietnam.32 The impact of 
the Vietnam War on Cambodia and Laos was mentioned briefly, although there was again 
slightly more detail provided in the book. Equally, whilst Cuba was given its own episode and 
Latin America was fairly well covered in the episode ‘Backyard 1954-1990’,33 the impact of 
the Cold War in Africa was extremely brief. The episode ‘Good Guys Bad Guys 1967-1978’ 
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covered the wars in the Middle East, as well as some conflicts in Africa.34 The focus here was 
on superpower proxy wars in Angola and between Ethiopia and Somalia. Each conflict 
highlighted the role played by the USA and Soviet Union in funding and arming conflicts to 
empower governments who would back their system against the other. The impact of the Cold 
War in Africa, however, was devastating. Once again, a superpower focus detracted from 
emphasising the global nature of the Cold War and the wide-reaching impact it had. In 
particular, the wave of decolonisation following the Second World War was largely omitted, 
removing a vital Cold War narrative of changing power balances and the widespread human 
cost throughout Africa. This narrative would have a significant impact on the memory created 
for British audiences seeking to understand the Cold War, and in particular Britain’s own role 
and changing position during decolonisation. A focus on the superpowers omitted the 
complexity of the Cold War but also the impact the conflict had on other countries. As will 
become evident, the narrative of decolonisation is often omitted or only mentioned briefly in 
cultural portrayals, demonstrating both a superpower focus but also a difficult past for Britain 
to acknowledge. That these countries did not form a central focus, distorted memory of the 
conflict and its widespread impact.  
Omissions such as these also prompted reviews to declare that the series and book captured a 
simplified narrative, with one stating that ‘it lacks penetration and complex analysis’,35 whilst 
another, by Harper, argued that ‘The minimalist narrative inevitably ignores some events, over-
simplifies others and tends to gloss over long-standing controversies’.36 This simplification, 
however, may be symptomatic of the complexity of the Cold War narrative. The Cold War 
series attempted to present the Cold War in its entirety. In order to cover the Cold War in 
 
 
34 ‘Good Guys Bad Guys 1967-1978’, Cold War, BBC Two, 13 March 1999, 20:15. 
35 Unwin, ‘Book Reviews’, p. 68. 
36 Various, ‘Review Essays and Book Reviews’, p. 138. 
65 
twenty-four, forty-six-minute episodes it is not surprising that some content was prioritised 
over others. This was also inevitable when framing the narrative through a US-Soviet 
perspective. It would seem a challenge for portrayals of the Cold War to fully capture a forty-
five-year conflict, from all perspectives. Instead, alternative focuses narrow a large and 
complex conflict to create a simplified but more digestible narrative for audiences and visitors. 
The cultural memory of the Cold War, and specifically, Britain’s Cold War, is therefore shaped 
by this challenge.  
In 2013, Downing reflected on the series in ‘A Personal View’. Within this article, Downing 
noted the fact that the Cold War series did not share the success of Isaacs’ The World at War 
documentary series. This is a particularly interesting point as the Second World War continues 
to hold more significance and thus garner more interest from the public than the Cold War. 
Downing stated that: 
Put simply, there was and still is a sense that the Second World War had been a war 
worth fighting, that the destruction of fascism in Europe and of militarism in Asia were 
noble aims, and that the good guys had won the war. By comparison, the Cold War 
looked extraordinarily complicated, sprawling and long-winded.37 
This comparison between the Second World War and the Cold War is a constant theme 
throughout this thesis. The significance of wartime Britain to the British national identity 
contrasts to Britain’s decline in the Cold War period. The Second World War thus holds a vital 
place in Britain’s cultural memory, whilst the complexity of the Cold War is often relegated. 
Downing added that, unlike The World at War series, Cold War had only been repeated once 
at the time of his writing in 2013; stating that whilst the Cold War did not seem to attract 
producers and broadcasters for factual documentaries, the Cold War was a great deal more 
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popular in ‘the world of drama’.38 As stated previously, the potential for drama in the Cold War 
narrative is great and provides a key background for thrillers and narratives of fear, intrigue 
and betrayal. This may be indicative of what attracts people to the Cold War and the influences 
on cultural memory of the conflict.  
In 2008, the Cold War book was republished in a paperback edition. The new Preface in the 
book did, however, acknowledge an increased interest in the Cold War, noting its inclusion in 
university and school curriculums and an increased number of films and exhibitions with a 
Cold War theme.39 From the early twenty-first century an increased interest in the topic is 
evident and is demonstrated in the number of British Cold War films and museum exhibitions 
analysed in this thesis. In an introduction for the second edition, Peter Hennessy outlined the 
significance and legacy of the book for new and Cold War generations, to understand and 
remember the Cold War and the legacy it has left behind. As Hennessy stated, ‘without a feel 
for the Cold War ( … ) it is impossible to understand what we are living through in the early 
twenty-first century’.40 The significance of the book and the series was thus argued to be its 
encompassing narrative of the Cold War and how it successfully outlined the context behind 
contemporary issues, particularly in the Middle East. The Afterword by Isaacs and Downing is 
also insightful for the development of Cold War memory since the original series. At the end 
of the original series and book, a sense of hope was provided for a new world devoid of Cold 
War divisions. However, in the Afterword of the 2008 edition, today’s world was labelled as a 
world in ‘dangerous disorder’ with no ‘new world order’ to fill the gap left by the Cold War.41 
A review of the second edition in the Guardian also outlined this point, stating that ‘From 
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where we are now, it is possible to look back with a certain nostalgia to the cold war, a period 
of immobility in world affairs that brought with it “a strange sort of peace”’.42 In the ten years 
following the Cold War series, hope for peace was increasingly replaced by a nostalgia for a 
conflict that had supposedly been engulfed with fear and terror. The rise of terrorism and 
nuclear proliferation in other countries has created an unpredictable world and a nostalgia for 
the bipolarity and certainty of the Cold War. It is therefore possible to see this nostalgic element 
of the cultural memory of Britain’s Cold War develop.  
2.2 Press Reaction to the End of the Cold War (1989-1991) 
In the press reactions and headlines from 1989 through to 1991 and the ending of the Cold 
War, similarities can be seen with subsequent cultural reflections on the conflict, offering a 
sense of continuity, but also helping to demonstrate the development of a British cultural 
memory of the Cold War. Much like the Cold War series, there was an emphasis on dramatic 
and emotive language surrounding ‘hot points’ and key events in press reactions. This was 
particularly evident in reflecting on the nuclear threat and following the key moments of the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, the Malta Summit and in reflections on the new post-Cold War world. 
These were undoubtedly crucial Cold War moments and were naturally dramatic and 
momentous for many people across the world. However, in the language used there is a clear 
sense of continuity with cultural portrayals since, which have seemingly adopted or reflected 
this language and the atmosphere created.  
In particular, in several reflections of the Cold War throughout 1989 to 1991, a common and 
repeated theme of the ‘shadow’ of the Cold War and of nuclear war was repeated throughout 
the press. As early as January 1989, comments were made on the diminishing nuclear threat. 
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This followed several steps towards more diplomacy in 1988, including the successful INF 
Treaty in December 1987 - which agreed to eliminate intermediate-range missiles - an 
agreement for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in April 1988, and a speech 
by Gorbachev to the UN General Assembly that December in which he pushed for humanity 
and not ideology to drive international relations. As Adam Roberts argued this was seen as an 
indication that the Soviet Union would not use force over Eastern Europe.43 Both an article in 
The Times which looked back on Reagan’s career, and an article in the Sunday Telegraph 
marking the new year, referred to the ending of a nuclear threat, a new year ‘the first since 1950 
( … ) not to be celebrated under the shadow of the dreaded mushroom cloud’.44 This Sunday 
Telegraph article, however, was written by Peregrine Worsthorne, a ‘high Tory’ and anti-
communist who believed in ‘hierarchy, empire and aristocracy’.45 Journalist Jason Cowley 
even described Worsthorne as having been ‘a pantomime villain for the left’.46 As such, 
Worsthorne was likely to use dramatic language to celebrate the supposed victory for 
capitalism and the West at the end of the Cold War. Other articles did not use the word shadow, 
but used similar emotive language of struggle and suffering, one article in The Times reporting 
the Washington Summit in 1990, quoted Gorbachev as saying ‘“The trenches of the Cold War 
are disappearing. The fog of prejudice, mistrust and animosity is vanishing”’.47 The inclusion 
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of Gorbachev’s words here and the language used echoed this sense of a conflict ending and 
peace slowly emerging.  
 Further to this, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was naturally much language which 
emphasised ‘freedom’. In an article by The Times published the morning after the Berlin Wall 
was opened, the caption of a photo of the events read ‘Dance of freedom’.48 Written by Anne 
McElvoy, a foreign correspondent in Eastern Europe,49 the caption emphasised the impact of 
the Berlin Wall and the confinement and division it had caused. Another article by foreign 
correspondent for the Times, Michael Binyon, was entitled ‘Day trip to freedom for thousands’, 
detailing the flood of people across the border and from East to West.50 Those reporting from 
Berlin itself at the time the wall fell would have witnessed the celebrations and embrace of 
divided families, these sights contributing to the language of freedom. Margaret Thatcher was 
also reported as saying that the fall of the wall ‘was “a great day for freedom”’.51 The opening 
of the border also saw statements of western victory. One article was titled ‘Victory for 
Democracy’ and provided much emotive language. It stated:  
The Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain between East and West Germany were built to 
imprison the people of the Communist East, within a tyrannical political system from 
which they had been fleeing in their thousands. The gates of this grim and brutal barrier 
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The use of language such as ‘imprison’ ‘tyrannical’ and ‘fleeing’ all emphasise this theme of 
Cold War terror. The rest of the article proceeded to look back on the Cold War from a 
perspective of Soviet aggression and expansionism, with an underlying sense that Soviet 
communism was doomed to fail.53 Equally, a review of the 1980s in the Daily Mail in 
December 1989 followed a series of articles in a pull-out titled ‘The decade that smashed 
barriers’. In particular it remarked that ‘in a breath-taking rush at the end of the Eighties, the 
people of eastern Europe began to smash down their own barriers ( … ) The most potent symbol 
of oppression, the Berlin Wall, was brought crashing down by the people of East Germany’.54 
Again this echoed a sense of fighting oppression and entering freedom. Events leading to the 
end of the Cold War thus triggered emotive reflections on both the forty-five-year conflict and 
its ending from 1989 to 1991. However, it must also be noted that this language of freedom 
and victory over Soviet ‘aggression’, as well as signifying an ending of the Cold War, reflected, 
and was conducive to, the political rhetoric and aims of western right-wing governments at the 
time. Dramatic language and a sense of victory and freedom from a period of terror can be seen 
to be echoed in the Cold War series as described above.  
However, as well as hope and enthusiasm for a world without barriers and the nuclear threat, 
some articles noted as early as 1989 that a nostalgia for the security and understanding of the 
Cold War and nuclear arms race may soon emerge. One article in The Times noted that the 
removal of ‘the shadow of superpower war’ makes way for new threats. Another article, again 
by Peregrine Worsthorne, in the Daily Telegraph explicitly stated that, ‘Young people, having 
never known anything worse, used to complain about living under the shadow of the mushroom 
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cloud. It could be that they will soon come to look back at that shadow with a certain nostalgia’, 
the article proceeds to list the numerous economic concerns and other threats in the post-Cold 
War world.55 The communist enemy had at least been a clear enemy, whilst the post-Cold War 
world order brought uncertainty. It is interesting that as early as 1989 and 1990, a sense of a 
new complicated post-Cold War world was on the horizon and already a sense of nostalgia for 
the Cold War and MAD were emerging. This nostalgia for the East-West conflict in today’s 
world is a key theme which runs throughout cultural portrayals. Indeed, the rising production 
of Cold War museum exhibitions, films, and television dramas, demonstrate this desire to look 
back at the Cold War, and despite its terror, to look back with a sense of certainty and 
understanding.  
Following the Malta Summit and throughout 1990 there was also much reflection on the new 
post-Cold War world. Many sentiments echoed hopes for peace after the Cold War conflict. In 
articles relating to the 1990 Washington Summit and 1990 Paris Summit, articles discussed the 
prospect of peace and cooperation in Europe. In particular an article, following the signing of 
the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, noted that Thatcher had called the document a ‘new 
Magna Carta’, whilst President Mitterrand declared that, ‘“We 34 states share from now on a 
common vision of the world and a common heritage of values”’.56 A new sense of hope and 
peace was thus captured in these articles, the language contrasting to other reflections of the 
‘shadow’ and ‘terror’ of the Cold War years. Further to this, however, was speculation as to 
the world which would replace that of the Cold War. One article in the Daily Mail, discussing 
the reunification of Germany, remarked that ‘some already hanker for the old confrontational 
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certainties between the free West and the communist East. The sheer size of a ‘big’ Germany 
frightens them’.57 It is also now widely acknowledged that Thatcher herself was paranoid about 
German reunification.58 Even by the end of 1990, there was therefore a sense that the 
superpower confrontation during the Cold War had provided a sense of security which had now 
collapsed. A further article by Norman Tebbit in The Times, stated ‘as the shadow of 
superpower war is lifting, the darkness of international crime, drugs, civil unrest, civil war and 
terrorism will spread widely through the world’. The article suggests hope for cooperation with 
Cold War enemies to face these new threats.59 The new world discussed in this article very 
much mirrors the threats facing the world today. As well as hope there was thus also a sense of 
the uncertainty that would come with a world not dominated by the balance of East and West. 
This uncertainty is reflected in exhibitions depicting the Cold War and the challenges of how 
to remember the conflict.  
As explored with the later 1998 Cold War documentary, a common challenge with establishing 
and understanding a cultural memory of the Cold War is the lack of an agreed and clear end to 
the conflict. Unlike the end of the Second World War for Britain, there was no VE Day for the 
Cold War. The reporting during the years 1989 to 1991 instead seemed to document a series of 
events which gradually saw the end of the Cold War. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, some 
articles made hints to the inevitable collapse of communism, however, perhaps one of the most 
decisive moments for the end of the Cold War hinted at by the press was the reporting of the 
Malta Summit between George Bush Senior and Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1989. On 4 
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December 1989, the front-page headline of The Times read: ‘Malta summit declares: Cold War 
is over’.60 The article outlined the discussions of the summit, reporting Bush’s statement that 
‘“Tonight, we stand at the cross-roads of history on the way to a Europe whole and free”’.61 A 
further article in the Daily Mail similarly reflected this, titled ‘Partners in Peace’.62 Once again, 
the sentiments of freedom and peace were echoed in the reporting of the meeting. However, 
whilst this summit proclaimed the end of the Cold War, reporting continued to outline the 
ongoing developments and agreements that would gradually bring the Cold War to an end, 
culminating with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Just prior to the Malta summit, in 
late November, Thatcher was reported to have said that ‘the cold war would not be over until 
the end of the century’ discussing the need to maintain an American presence in Europe.63 
Amid the celebrations of events toward the end of the Cold War, caution was thus still urged 
by some. In this sense there was still no definitive end to the Cold War, rather a series of 
multiple endings throughout 1989 and 1991, and across different countries, culminating in the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. We therefore see similarities to the challenges faced by the Cold 
War documentary and framing a cultural memory of Britain’s Cold War. 
There is limited literature on British reactions to the end of the Cold War beyond the political, 
the lack of a definitive end may in part account for this. Grace Huxford’s current oral history 
research into the experiences of British military personnel and civilians on British bases in 
West Germany, has highlighted that the collapse of the Berlin Wall was ‘bittersweet’ for those 
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who had built lives there, however, knowledge of reactions in Britain is limited.64 Furthermore, 
in an article for the Economist in 1999, on the ten-year anniversary of the fall of the wall, and 
for some the end of the conflict, Thatcher’s absence from Berlin was remarked upon. The 
article stated that her absence ‘captured the insouciance with which Britain is commemorating 
the end of the Cold War’.65 The limited commemoration further highlights the lack of a clear 
end to the Cold War and the ambivalent relationship with Britain’s Cold War past; perhaps the 
feeling that it was something that happened elsewhere, the impact on Britain seemingly less 
clear. 
The press reactions to the ending of the Cold War thus share the dramatisation which was 
evident in the Cold War series. Specific events and ‘hot points’ of the Cold War lend 
themselves to dramatic narratives and thus may partly explain the increasing appeal and 
nostalgia for the period. However, this continued emphasis on drama from the end of the 
conflict can be seen to have been a crucial influence on the cultural memory of the period, the 
reporting likely shaping memories and later portrayals. In particular, the emphasis on nuclear 
war and the end of the nuclear threat at the end of the conflict present a constant theme for 
Britain’s cultural memory, the ‘shadow’ of the bomb epitomising the conflict, the fear and the 
drama. Yet it is interesting that a suggestion of nostalgia for the conflict was made as early as 
1989. Whilst there was much hope at the end of the Cold War, it was clear that the post-Cold 
War world would provide less order and less certainty. This would seem to have increasingly 
developed over the years as new threats unfolded and escalated. Recent events form a key 
influence on how we look back on and understand the Cold War today.  
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2.3 Exhibitions & Present Memory  
The developing reflections on the Cold War from the end of the conflict onwards have shaped 
understandings and portrayals today. In 2019, thirty years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, 
there were three key museum exhibitions you could visit in Britain on the Cold War and 
Britain’s experience of the conflict. These were Peace and Security, 1945-2015 at the Imperial 
War Museum (2014), the National Cold War Exhibition at RAF Cosford (2007) and Protect 
and Survive: Britain’s Cold War Revealed in The National Archives (2019).66 Each exhibition 
told varied narratives and differed in their portrayal of the Cold War. The military nature of the 
Imperial War Museum (IWM) and RAF Cosford led to more of a military focus in their 
exhibitions on the Cold War; whilst The National Archives (TNA) made a concentrated effort 
to balance a military narrative with the wider social and cultural impacts of the Cold War. The 
military focus in the IWM’s Peace and Security exhibition was centred on British military 
experiences, especially in Northern Ireland, the Falklands War, and more recent conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. the National Cold War Exhibition at RAF Cosford similarly projected a 
military focus. This was again largely captured through the display of military aircraft, 
vehicles, and weapons, including an old Polaris missile. The military narrative was, however, 
merged with some cultural aspects, particularly displays relating to the Cold War’s influence 
on society and culture including art, sport, film and television, which helped to present the wide 
reach and impact of the conflict on both the East and West.  
In contrast, the Protect and Survive exhibition at TNA balanced the military planning of the 
Cold War through displays on ‘war gaming’ and nuclear weapons with displays of the Cold 
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War in everyday life and the civilian experience, reflected in Civil Defence but also popular 
culture and board games. In the exhibition, emphasis was placed on the fact that military 
preparations and developments took place in the background to daily life. Each of these 
exhibitions therefore had a particular focus and in turn told differing narratives and created 
different atmospheres and memories of the Cold War. In these varying approaches, the 
challenge of how to remember the Cold War is evident. In particular, the exhibitions highlight 
the debate surrounding whether to define the Cold War as a conflict or a period as a whole. 
Whilst the Cold War series presented the Cold War in its entirety, both as an ideological and 
military conflict and a period which influenced society and culture, it will be demonstrated that 
portrayals today explore the narrative via themes. Each exhibition either projected the Cold 
War as a conflict, series of events, or a period as a whole. As stated in the introduction to this 
thesis, it is necessary to acknowledge these various definitions to understand the challenges 
faced by museums today and their choices in how to construct a narrative of Britain’s Cold 
War. 
As stated, the exhibitions differed in their framing of the Cold War. The IWM’s Peace and 
Security exhibition provided the most military narrative of the three exhibitions. The 
exhibition, however, was not Cold War specific and had the role of capturing a seventy-year 
period from 1945 to 2015. The layout of the museum is such that each floor and exhibition 
surround the atrium which forms a central feature of the museum. The result of this was that 
the Peace and Security exhibition on the third floor was in a u-shape, with stairs to it opening 
into the middle of this space. Consequently, the layout did not lend itself easily to a 
chronological narrative and as such relied on different sections which focused on a particular 
aspect or theme. In addition to this, with just one floor and a seventy-year period to cover, 
particular sections were carefully selected so as to cover a broad range of topics. The Cold War 
was not used as a framework for the exhibition’s narrative; instead the Cold War served as 
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context for a series of events, conflicts and themes and formed one part of an exhibition on 
post-1945 conflict. The exhibition’s focus was instead on the continuation of conflict from the 
post-war period. The opening text read, ‘In 1945 the newly formed United Nations offered the 
hope of world peace and security. Yet war and violent conflict, fuelled by local tensions and 
global rivalries, still show no sign of ending’.67 There was thus no defining Cold War 
framework. This is particularly interesting for how visitors engaged with the exhibition and the 
memory of the Cold War, portrayed as a series of defining moments in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, such as nuclear development, and conflicts in Kenya, Aden, Northern 
Ireland and the Falklands. Despite this, however, with an extended timeline presented, Cold 
War themes and events were framed by the impact of the Second World War and recent 
conflicts. This captures two key influences on Cold War memory, both the enduring legacy of 
wartime Britain, and the comparison of Cold War and post-1989 conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. In framing the exhibition within this extended period, a sense of continuity was 
captured through the themes and events displayed, helping to provide a demonstration of how 
conflict has evolved. Rather than seeing the Cold War as a period in itself, late twentieth and 
early twenty-first century conflicts were portrayed as interconnected.  
As with IWM, RAF Cosford’s National Cold War Exhibition had a strong military emphasis. 
This being the remit of the museum due to it being an RAF airfield. The military emphasis was 
echoed in the exhibition’s housing a hangar with aircraft, vehicles, missiles, and weapons from 
the Cold War era. A viewing platform, accessible by lift, also enabled visitors to see and engage 
with the vast number of military artefacts on display. The platform allowed visitors to be close 
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to aircraft hanging above their heads, providing a true submersion into the Cold War’s military 
narrative.  
The military narrative, much like the IWM exhibition, was evidenced in the displays relating 
to the development of nuclear technology, surveillance with the U2 operations and the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, and information regarding the development and use of various US, Soviet and 
British missiles, including the Polaris missile. Unlike the IWM, however, the exhibition in RAF 
Cosford had an entire hangar to utilise for their Cold War narrative and a purely Cold War 
focus, devoid of needing to include more recent conflict. As a result, the National Cold War 
Exhibition, whilst also portraying Britain’s experience, provided a far more global narrative of 
the conflict. This was most evident in the ‘Global Conflicts’ silo, several silos throughout the 
exhibition captured specific themes and topics. Around the outside of the silo, the introductory 
text read:  
It is often said that the Cold War was a conflict without casualties. This is far from the 
truth. War may not have broken out between NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces but 
the war was fought throughout the globe and millions died. This display is that story of 
more than forty six years of conflict.68 
This display therefore provided two messages for visitors. The first message was the emphasis 
that the Cold War was not always “cold” and that it was instead a truly global conflict which 
impacted countries all over the world and which cost millions of lives. The second message 
leading from this was that the Cold War was a military conflict. Evidence of conflicts and 
military engagements by Western and Eastern powers suggested that the Cold War can be 
remembered as a military conflict and not simply a “cold” or ‘imaginary war’. 
Alongside a military and nuclear narrative was also an acknowledgment of how the Cold War 
impacted on culture and everyday life. Several displays, designed as sections of the Berlin Wall 
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with the West on the left and the East on the right, captured aspects relating to lifestyle, 
freedom, arts, sport, and espionage. Featured artefacts of Cold War board games such as ‘Spy 
Ring’ and ‘Radar Search’, Private Eye magazines, Olympic posters, film posters and espionage 
books helped to demonstrate how the Cold War was ever-present in the everyday lives of 
individuals and how the promotion of each system as being superior led to vast propaganda.69 
These themes were, however, framed as an extension of the conflict; the competing systems 
waging cultural wars to win “hearts and minds”. Further to this, the exhibition featured displays 
on the Berlin Wall, economic competition, and the Space Race, once again capturing the wide 
reach and influence of the Cold War in all aspects of life. Whilst capturing the social and 
cultural impact and legacy of the conflict, this remained part of a conflict narrative.  
Unlike the exhibitions at IWM and RAF Cosford, the Protect and Survive exhibition at TNA 
presented a very specific narrative of nuclear threat and military planning but balanced this 
equally with a narrative of the lived experience of the period. The small exhibition in the 
Keepers Gallery was designed to resemble two juxtaposed environments, one being a nuclear 
bunker room and the other being a home environment.  
Following a brief introduction, the visitor entered what was labelled as the ‘Government 
Command Centre’ or the bunker room. The room ahead was very much set up as a working 
bunker with plotting maps and desks surrounding a central table. To the left-hand side of the 
room was a display on ‘War Gaming’, this moved the narrative onto specific government 
preparations and plans for a nuclear attack. The display text explained ‘Transition to war 
exercises’, with books in a cabinet providing evidence of these government plans. This room 
therefore set a military narrative of a conflict being planned and fought.  
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However, as the visitor left the environment of the nuclear bunker they entered an entirely 
different scene, one resembling a family home. This section ‘Cold War in the Home’ paid 
attention to ‘ordinary citizens’ and their experiences of living under the threat of the bomb. In 
particular the exhibition stated:  
For some, the Cold War was about protest, focused on revulsion at nuclear weaponry. 
Artists, authors, songwriters and filmmakers channelled their fears too, reacting to the 
threat of nuclear war across many media.  
But you didn’t have to be an activist or artist to be affected by the Cold War. Just by 
living through it, and absorbing popular culture in a consumer society, everyone took 
part in this global conflict.70  
Whilst other exhibitions tend to focus on key events and themes including anti-nuclear activism 
and other social and cultural impacts of the Cold War, the Protect and Survive exhibition paid 
particular attention to the lived experience of the Cold War and its place in the background of 
everyday life. This worked to create a less dramatic and sensationalised narrative and yet 
engaged visitors through how they remember living in the Cold War, or for younger 
generations, how everyday life continued despite threats of nuclear annihilation.  
This section of the exhibition, designed like an ordinary home, began with a detailed display 
of Civil Defence. This was depicted by several Civil Defence posters on display as well as the 
Strath Report (1955) detailing British preparations for a nuclear attack. An interactive screen 
also enabled the visitor to engage with two short videos. The first was footage of Protect and 
Survive, enabling visitors to see and understand the advice available to people during the Cold 
War for trying to survive a nuclear attack. The second video was an interview with Dr Matthew 
Grant who discussed the plans for Civil Defence but most importantly its shortcomings and its 
eventual use as a façade for propaganda, to convince people to accept the nuclear deterrent. 
 
 
70 Protect and Survive: Britain’s Cold War Revealed [Exhibition]. 
81 
Once more the narrative presented was one of government preparations in the face of nuclear 
threat, yet alongside this, the acknowledgement that it was impossible to prepare for such an 
attack, knowledge that the public, particularly in the latter Cold War, would have lived with 
whilst they went on with their daily lives.  
Along from the section on Civil Defence was one on Cold War culture. This area was set up 
like a living room with a sofa, television and a cabinet used as a display. The display text 
declared that: 
In a cultural battle for hearts and minds, Western values of democracy, individualism 
and consumerism were brought to life in fictional heroes. Alternatively, darker stories 
of espionage played on themes of paranoia and distrust. Science fiction authors 
explored apocalyptic themes, whilst a huge number of folk and pop songs referenced 
Cold War tensions.71 
These themes were captured in the artefacts on display containing newspaper clippings relating 
to the controversial film by Peter Watkins, The War Game, and a press release for Threads, 
representing the apocalyptic theme. In an additional display cabinet featured objects included 
Cold War games such as ‘Spy Ring’ and ‘Radar Search’, espionage novels, and music by The 
Jam and Frankie Goes to Hollywood, which referenced Cold War divisions, capturing Cold 
War paranoia, western consumer values and tensions between East and West.72 The variety of 
these objects helped to emphasise the fact that the Cold War infiltrated all aspects of life, and 
the living room scenery stressed this sense of the “ordinary”, that people lived with the Cold 
War constantly in the background.  
Towards the end of the exhibition, was a table with paper, pencils, and typewriters. Visitors 
were invited to write or type out any memories of, or reflections on, the Cold War and put them 
on the ‘Cold War Witness’ board. Again, visitors were able to actively engage, the activity 
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acknowledged that many visitors would have lived through the Cold War themselves and have 
their own Cold War memories to share, adding to the narrative of ‘ordinary citizens’’ 
experiences. The activity also, however, enabled others to read people’s memories and 
recollections, helping to form their own cultural memories of the period. From reading the 
comments it became very clear that the Cold War was a part of daily life, yet these fears and 
concerns discussed were still very much present, particularly at high points in the conflict.  
Each exhibition therefore framed the Cold War in a myriad of ways. The IWM focused on key 
military themes, from specific conflicts to nuclear developments and military borders. The lack 
of a specific Cold War framework relegated the significance of the conflict. Instead, rather than 
a defined conflict or period as a whole, the Cold War period was narrated via numerous 
conflicts and themes. The exhibition at RAF Cosford similarly had a military narrative yet 
presented the Cold War as a defined and global conflict, fought in military, political and 
cultural spheres. The most recent exhibition at TNA, in contrast, placed the most emphasis on 
the fact that for nearly fifty years the Cold War formed a background to, and infiltrated, daily 
life, whilst military and government plans were made behind closed doors. The exhibition 
emphasised how people “lived” the Cold War, inviting visitors to reflect on their own 
memories. Despite these differences in framing the conflict or period, each exhibition included 
an aspect of a military narrative, often looking at similar events or ‘hot points’. 
In the IWM, the need to order the exhibition by themes saw the focus on topics such as conflicts 
in Northern Ireland, the Falklands, nuclear warfare and recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
It is thus evident that the exhibition was specifically designed to draw on themes and events, 
often those that were particular ‘hot points’ in post-war Britain. In the limited space to present 
these topics, narratives were told through selected objects, making much of the exhibition quite 
visual, with visitors able to picture moments of the Cold War and modern conflict through the 
items on display. This choice of display was explained in the exhibition’s opening text:  
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It is a complicated story. To explore it, we have chosen objects that offer insights into 
some of the key and often controversial episodes of recent history. We have grouped 
them to show the many ways in which modern conflicts have been fought, experienced, 
resolved, or left unfinished.73  
The exhibition therefore openly confronted the difficulty of capturing such a vast period. There 
was an acknowledgement of the complexity of trying to present a single post-war narrative, 
resulting primarily in a lack of a Cold War framework. This highlights that museums will each 
approach this in a myriad of ways. Similarly, to the Cold War series, the breadth and 
complexity of post-1945 and recent conflict results in particular themes being focused on, 
which in turn become central to memories of the Cold War and post-1945 period. 
The predominantly military narrative was told in several areas, the first key one focused on the 
collapse of Britain’s empire and decolonisation in ‘News from Abroad’. Interestingly, this 
highly complex and controversial aspect of Britain’s Cold War was somewhat brief but focused 
the telling of this narrative through films and newsreels which informed people at home of 
global events. The introductory text to this section explained that post-war,  
Britain’s position in the world changed. The Empire became the Commonwealth, as 
countries demanded independence. Often this process was peaceful, but violence broke 
out in places such as India and the newly created Pakistan, as well as in Malaya and 
Aden.74 
This text pointed to violence taking place in some fights for independence but provided little 
indication of Britain’s actions and the levels of controversy surrounding these conflicts. Whilst 
there was mention of the Mau Mau in Kenya being ‘Harshly dealt with by the ruling British 
authorities’, there were few explicit mentions of British violence in places like Kenya and 
Malaya.75 Instead, the exhibition allowed the visitor to engage with some of the films and 
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footage which captured these conflicts. In particular, Witness to the Partition of India (1947) 
was a home movie used to capture events following the division of India and Pakistan. The 
Malayan Emergency at first hand (1948) showed more amateur footage to capture operations 
in Malaya and Hospital and Off Duty Services in Aden (1964-1966) revealed events and daily 
life in a hospital during the conflict.76 The exhibition thus offered very visual glimpses via 
these films to events in the decolonisation period and the films, in particular Witness to the 
Partition of India, provided glimpses of violence and the aftermath of conflict. However, it is 
notable that whilst the films mentioned were taken by individuals caught up in the conflicts, 
many were serving in or aiding the British military and government. This is likely due to the 
museum’s focus on British experiences, however, the voices or perspective of inhabitants and 
those either fighting for, or caught up in the struggle for, independence was limited. In other 
words, whilst the footage enabled these issues to be addressed, a narrative of British fighting 
and violence was not made explicit in the display. In contrast, the British were portrayed as 
peacekeepers, operating in defence of the empire. As Erik Linstrum highlights, even during the 
conflict with Kenya, people in Britain were quietly aware of some of the violence taking place, 
but doubt was often cast over this through pointing to stories as gossip, portrayals of fiction, or 
even discrediting journalists who did publish the violence and controversy. In particular, 
Linstrum noted how the professionalisation of journalism led to such rigour over objectivity 
that journalists often did not publish what they knew if sufficient evidence was unavailable.77 
The suppression of narratives documenting British violence highlights Britain’s difficult 
relationship with this aspect of its history. Indeed, the Cold War and decolonisation cannot be 
considered separately. The proxy wars which ensued as a result of decolonisation shaped the 
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Cold War conflict and left their legacy in today’s world. As Kennetta Hammond Perry argues 
in their article ‘“Little Rock” in Britain’ - which explores the influence of Little Rock Arkansas 
on British notions of racism, citizenship and Britishness - the international context of the Cold 
War, empire and decolonisation cannot be considered separately from domestic events.78 
Equally, here, Britain’s international role in decolonisation is key to understanding Britain’s 
domestic experience of the Cold War. However, Britain’s difficult relationship with this aspect 
of its past results in a largely absent decolonisation narrative. This complex and controversial 
past is thus not captured in IWM and may demonstrate the simplification of post-war narratives 
in order to focus on a British perspective. The exhibition therefore offered a fairly specific 
British narrative of ‘hot points’ during decolonisation. In doing so cultural memories generated 
by this exhibition would likely be very much from a British perspective of defence during the 
collapse of empire and Britain’s experience in these conflicts. 
Similarly, in the ‘War on the Doorstep’ section which addressed the ‘hot points’ of The 
Troubles in Northern Ireland and the Falklands War, the narrative was again very focussed on 
the experience of British soldiers. Part of the section on Northern Ireland used a speaker by a 
Humber ‘Pig’ vehicle on display. If stood directly beneath the speaker, visitors could hear voice 
recordings of British soldiers and their experiences. Many of the comments made focussed on 
attitudes towards them and how they were treated by locals, including abuse towards them, 
stones being thrown at them and how riots escalated. While some comments were made 
regarding the fact that some people would approach them normally and ask questions, there 
was a particular emphasis on negative experiences and relations between the soldiers and 
locals. Further to this, a display board for objects relating to Northern Ireland provided context 
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for The Troubles and stated, ‘The British soldiers sent to Northern Ireland as peacekeepers 
found themselves in the middle of a conflict with a long history. Many would have found it 
hard to understand who they were fighting and why’.79 There was thus a particular focus on 
the struggles and difficulties of the British soldiers, perhaps more so than the impact of the 
conflict on Northern Ireland itself and the locals it affected.  
Much like ‘News from Abroad’ controversial moments or British actions tended to be omitted 
or merely mentioned in passing. For instance, Bloody Sunday, January 1972, which saw British 
paratroopers open fire on unarmed protesters, killing 13 and injuring others, was only 
mentioned in passing in relation to the use of the Humber ‘Pig’. From these examples, it would 
seem that the exhibition’s narratives focused primarily on the British experience, as it is a 
British war museum, but also paid far less attention to controversial moments in Britain’s own 
history.  
The section on the Falklands War was very much the same, little seemed to be mentioned about 
the devastating casualties or controversy surrounding the sinking of the General Belgrano in 
which an estimated 400 Argentinians were killed, although figures differ.80 Instead, a speaker, 
like that for the Northern Ireland section, played the statements of soldiers who described their 
relief at the Belgrano being hit before they had to intervene and the justification of it as a target. 
However, the sinking of British warships and casualties were noted in the displays. Once again 
the projected narrative was of British wartime service. That the exhibition focused primarily 
on a British perspective and the duties and roles of active service in these conflicts reflects the 
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remit of the IWM. However, in its omissions it also highlights the difficulty in capturing key 
post-1945 events in a relatively short space. The result being that the narrative chosen was far 
more of a Britain defending territory that at the time was, or still is, theirs, and peacekeeping, 
as opposed to Britain’s own controversial and violent actions.  
The National Cold War Exhibition at RAF Cosford also focussed on several ‘hot points’ of the 
Cold War. For example, a silo was specifically designated to explain and capture the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, the Berlin blockade and construction and fall of the wall also served as a 
predominant feature, much like in the Cold War series. The Global Conflicts silo, mentioned 
above, provided examples of several ‘hot points’ of the conflict. Conflicts discussed included 
those in China, South America, South East Asia, in particular Vietnam and Central and South 
Asia including conflict between India and Pakistan following the withdrawal of British 
influence. Africa was noted as having been ‘particularly tragic’ with ‘7.06 million killed in 
war’.81 Specifically for the British narrative, the use of Lincoln bombers against the Mau Mau 
in Kenya was highlighted. Also mentioned was Britain’s contribution to Korea, British 
involvement against communist guerrillas in Malaysia, controversial action in Suez and their 
role in Greece. Whilst these conflicts were noted, much like the IWM, details of British 
controversies or violence were omitted, instead basic facts and details made up the narrative. 
Whilst this may have been to avoid over-complication, it provided a somewhat simplified 
narrative. The only conflict explored in detail here was that of the Vietnam War, which was 
detailed throughout the inside of the silo, covering key events such as the Tet Offensive and 
the My Lai Massacre.  
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Similarly, TNA’s exhibition captured some key conflicts, although quite briefly. To the left of 
the central desk was a map of the world labelled ‘Cold War World’, the text beside it introduced 
the fact that conflicts were fought across the globe and stated that ‘This map shows some of 
the key developments and flashpoints’, emphasising again particular ‘hot points’ of the 
conflict. The map covered several events including those conflicts in Korea, Malaya, Aden, 
and Indonesia, as well as noting the Berlin Wall, Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam, and other key 
conflicts. In regard to those relating to British involvement, once more general key facts about 
the conflicts were provided and details of tragedies and controversial moments were less 
focussed on or omitted entirely. This has been seen throughout the three exhibitions, creating 
a simplified narrative regarding decolonisation and proxy wars, not making this a central focus 
in British cultural portrayals of the Cold War. Instead, the ‘hot points’ focussed on include 
those such as Vietnam, Cuba and Berlin. The continued emphasis on these events and countries 
ensures that they continue to hold central positions in the cultural memory of the Cold War. 
Britain’s own experiences of decolonisation are side-lined. This may be for several reasons, 
much like the Cold War series it could be the result of a tendency to focus on the superpowers, 
although this tendency is decreasing with the rise in knowledge of other countries and their 
involvement in the Cold War. Equally, the relative decline of Britain’s role in the world is not 
a widely taught or popular topic in British history and it is a difficult past for Britain to come 
to terms with, thus it is likely relegated for more dramatic or global narratives in the period. 
Whatever the reason, this lack of emphasis on the significance of Britain’s involvement and 
actions in these conflicts further adds to the uncertainty of Britain’s role in the Cold War and 
how to remember it.  
As was also the case in the Cold War series, each exhibition paid significant attention to the 
development of nuclear warfare throughout the Cold War years, the nuclear theme forming a 
central focus for portrayals of the Cold War. In Peace and Security, further to the exhibition’s 
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military narrative were the sections on nuclear war. Under the titles ‘Shadow of the Bomb 
1945-’ and ‘War That Never Was 1945-1989’, the very military based narrative was partly 
juxtaposed with the sense of the ‘imaginary war’,82 which the exhibition text echoed, stating 
‘But the cataclysmic ‘Cold War’ never fully ignited’.83 This is an interesting point and one 
which indicates the challenges of how to remember the Cold War and explore its memory, 
which were discussed in the introduction. The fact that, for the superpowers, there was no direct 
or “hot” conflict and a nuclear proliferation that never materialised as a nuclear war, captures 
the struggle of what is being remembered and how to portray this. The IWM exhibition thus 
relied on the narrative of the threat of war and in doing so used emotive and dramatic language 
to capture the fear and the danger. This was particularly evident in the text for ‘Shadow of the 
Bomb’ which read: ‘Their [Nuclear weapons] potential was horrific. If they were ever used, 
the consequences could be devastating. They might lead not just to a calamitous war, but to the 
end of humanity itself’.84 The emphasis on the language ‘horrific’, ‘devastating’, ‘calamitous’ 
and ‘end of humanity’, echoed this threat and therefore in turn projected and shaped a cultural 
memory of the Cold War as a period ridden with total fear. Here we see the same use of 
dramatisation that was evident in the press at the end of the conflict and in the Cold War series.  
The nuclear sections of the exhibition were largely captured in the military objects on display 
such as a case for the ‘Little Boy’ bomb, lance missiles and warning equipment among others. 
However, there were some cultural features including Colin Self’s Beach Girl sculpture, a place 
for the book When the Wind Blows and a CND poster. These items, though far fewer than the 
military objects, added the voice of opposition to the nuclear conflict and the government’s 
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preparations for such an attack; the military narrative being combined with some of the social 
and cultural fallout of nuclear proliferation.  
The nuclear narrative in the National Cold War Exhibition was similarly dotted throughout the 
exhibition, however, one of the first focal points was a board standing isolated with a large 
image of a nuclear explosion and mushroom cloud covering it. Text next to the image, titled ‘4 
minutes’ explained the concept of the four-minute warning and how ‘The image of a nuclear 
mushroom cloud and the fear of a four minute warning were engrained in the minds of all those 
who lived through the Cold War in the United Kingdom’.85 This threatening image alongside 
the text once again created the sense that the nuclear threat was an integral aspect of everyday 
life during the Cold War and one that generated an all-encompassing fear. Further immersive 
silos capturing the Cuban Missile Crisis and anti-nuclear activism in the Cold War reiterated 
the all-encompassing nature of this fear, creating drama and excitement to convey the threat of 
nuclear war.  
In the Protect and Survive exhibition, a narrative of nuclear fear was created through immersing 
the visitor in ‘war gaming’. In the centre of the bunker room was a single desk with a red 
telephone at one end. This telephone rang on a circuit, signalling the start of a video which was 
projected onto the desk. This video was a ‘transition to war’ exercise called WINTEX-CIMEX 
(1979-1989), based on a 1983 scenario. However, the video was presented almost as a 1980s 
video game with ‘Get Ready’ and later ‘Game Over’ flashing in the centre of the desk. The 
video took the visitor through details of an escalation towards war and nuclear attacks. This 
was very visual with footage of a nuclear mushroom cloud when bombs were targeted against 
the East, or in this case known as the ‘ORANGE bloc’. The mushroom cloud filled the desk, 
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escalating until the image became white. Following this, the screen turned multi-coloured and 
crackled as signal was lost and the sound of white noise lingered. This dramatic use of footage 
for a ‘transition to war’ exercise video helped to create drama and the sense of impending doom 
throughout the Cold War as a result of the nuclear threat. This was only made more ominous 
by the ringing red phone in between screenings of the video. The phone rang in the centre of 
the room with no answer, adding to an unnerving feeling which further perpetuated a memory 
of the Cold War as shrouded in nuclear fear. Much like in the press reactions and previous 
portrayals, the narrative of nuclear fear was created and exaggerated through dramatic language 
and immersive experiences.  
A further common theme found in the exhibitions and other cultural portrayals was that of 
espionage. Whilst it did not feature strongly in Peace and Security, espionage formed a key 
topic in both the National Cold War Exhibition and Protect and Survive exhibition. In the 
National Cold War Exhibition espionage formed one display and within the exhibition, 
interactive screens enabled visitors to access additional information on weapons, events, key 
people, and espionage. These interactive screens provided key details about the individual 
Cambridge spies and the fictional character of James Bond. Equally, the dedicated display on 
spies featured stories on Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Klaus Fuchs, Colonel Rudolph Abel, and 
others, whilst espionage in the East was depicted via the stories of spies Oleg Penkovsky, Oleg 
Gordievsky and Berlin as a hub of intelligence operations. Items on display included a James 
Bond board game and novels by Ian Fleming and John le Carré, capturing both intrigue and 
nostalgia. The text on the West side of the display stated that ‘spies and spying came to 
epitomise the Cold War’, thus justifying a separate display. Whilst espionage did not feature 
in the IWM exhibition, the display in RAF Cosford’s exhibition placed espionage as a key 
aspect of the Cold War alongside its influence on culture and lifestyle.  
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The Protect and Survive exhibition also had dedicated a large display to the theme of espionage. 
On the opposite side of the room to the display on world conflicts, was a section on espionage 
and subversion. In one corner, there was a pin board with connections and facts between the 
five Cambridge spies plotted out, imitating an investigation, emphasising the search for the 
spies throughout the Cold War. This enabled the exhibition not only to set the scene of betrayal 
and intrigue but was also an effective way to tell the spies’ story. This board was next to a desk 
with several files marked ‘Top Secret’ on it, each one containing documents relating to various 
spies including the Cambridge spies, Klaus Fuchs and others. Visitors were free to conduct 
their own secret investigation by searching through copies of files held by TNA. To add to the 
scenery of an MI5 or MI6 office, above the desk hung a portrait of the Queen, not only 
emphasising British values and a British experience, but also carefully juxtaposing patriotism 
with the spies’ betrayal of their country.  
The display to the left of this featured cabinets of artefacts including the last page of Klaus 
Fuchs’ confession and newspaper articles relating to Blunt’s ‘treachery’ amongst other items.86 
Collectively, these sources captured betrayal, the danger and the intrigue of espionage. 
However, a video above the display cabinet featured Dame Stella Rimington, the former 
Director General of MI5. In this video visitors were told the realities of espionage. The video 
enabled the visitor to consider the realities of spying, the lack of action, the slow thinking 
process, the need for honesty. However, the points of danger, betrayal and values are themes 
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The inclusion of a large section on espionage in a nuclear-bunker themed exhibition 
emphasised secrecy and intrigue. The introductory text to the bunker-room highlighted several 
questions that would be explored, one being ‘who was leaking our secrets?’.87 Secrets 
surrounding nuclear war and espionage were combined here to provide a narrative of key Cold 
War threats. Both nuclear preparations and the passing on of government secrets were serious 
and recurring issues facing Britain throughout the Cold War. The exhibition thus shaped and 
reflected a cultural memory of secrecy and danger, yet the intrigue also added drama and a 
sense of excitement for visitors to the exhibition; engaging them and immersing them in a 
secret environment where they could feel part of the narrative and part of the intrigue. 
All three of the exhibitions discussed therefore had a different focus. Each approached the Cold 
War narrative in a different way depending on the remit and space of the museum. A key 
variation between the exhibitions was the emphasis placed on the Cold War as a defined 
conflict or as a period spanning nearly fifty years. To varying extents each exhibition addressed 
the military conflict or government preparations for conventional, nuclear and cultural conflict. 
The IWM’s Peace and Security exhibition presented a British perspective of post-1945 
conflicts, focussing its narrative on particular events and themes as opposed to a specific Cold 
War framework; whilst the National Cold War Exhibition at RAF Cosford captured a more 
global interpretation of the Cold War conflict. Alongside the military narrative, however, were 
key themes to express the wide influence of the Cold War into all areas of life, this being used 
to demonstrate the cultural conflict for hearts and minds. Lastly, TNA’s Protect and Survive 
exhibition presented a very British experience of the everyday nature of the Cold War. It did 
this by recreating the Cold War era through immersing visitors in a nuclear bunker and Cold 
War house setting, enabling them to engage with the period, and for those that lived through 
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the Cold War, perhaps trigger memories whether they be of fear or nostalgia. The various 
portrayals demonstrate the uncertainty as to how to remember and how to define Britain’s 
experience of the Cold War.  
Despite these factors influencing the narrative produced and, in turn, the cultural memory 
created, particular themes emerged across all three of the exhibitions. In particular the themes 
of nuclear conflict and espionage formed central focuses in the exhibitions. Each theme was 
portrayed in visual and immersive ways. The creation of tense, dramatic environments and the 
submersion of visitors in this experience is thus a common trend and a theme that is repeated 
throughout different cultural media portraying the Cold War. A final key focus was the reach 
of the Cold War into everyday life and culture. The Protect and Survive exhibition specifically 
emphasised this. The inclusion of a cultural narrative alongside one of military conflict, nuclear 
threat and espionage provided a memory of the Cold War as a conflict which invaded all aspects 
of life. 
There was, however, a limit to how much detail each exhibition provided on decolonisation 
and other proxy wars across the world. The vast number of such conflicts and their complexity 
may account for this, yet mostly basic facts were provided to capture either the global nature 
of the conflict or Britain’s changing role in the Cold War world. Britain’s own difficulty in 
confronting this controversial part of its history may equally account for a limited narrative. 
Therefore, whilst each exhibition dedicated some space to addressing this topic, it was often 
limited and did not serve as a key focus. The production of each exhibition may have influenced 
this, RAF Cosford exhibition opened in 2007, having been established for the longest period 
of time, followed by the IWM exhibition which opened in 2014, and then the temporary 
exhibition at TNA during 2019. The dates of their establishment may indicate the gradual 
development of knowledge and understanding about both the Cold War and the various 
conflicts which comprised it. However, the dates of establishment also demonstrate an 
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increasing understanding of the cultural and social impact and legacy of the conflict, possibly 
at times in place of a military narrative. Equally, as museums increasingly have to balance 
education and entertainment, we see evidence of dramatised narratives, focusing on those ‘hot 
points’ which are likely to entertain and appeal to visitors. 
The three exhibitions therefore provided a broad overview of the specific themes in Britain’s 
Cold War cultural memory, often themes which have continued from the Cold War itself, 
which this thesis will explore. They demonstrate that particular themes are repeated throughout 
exhibitions providing a specific cultural memory of a dark period of fear, threats and subversion 
but also that this narrative is in no means presented uniformly across portrayals. The 
differentiation between presenting the Cold War as a defined military conflict or a framework 
for a period which spanned nearly fifty years captures the challenge and lack of clarity in the 
British cultural memory of the Cold War. There is a struggle to present a clear, detailed, single 
Cold War narrative and the juxtaposition of dark and nostalgic memories partly captures this. 
2.4 Conclusion  
From the end of the Cold War in 1989 to 1991 right up to present day, there are clear themes 
which have continued and developed to form central aspects of Britain’s cultural memory of 
the conflict. During the conflict and since, the ‘shadow’ and looming threat of nuclear war has 
served as both a symbol for the Cold War and a central, recurring theme in cultural portrayals 
and reflections. The development of nuclear weapons during the conflict made it the first era 
of nuclear threat, and the unimaginable destruction of such weapons would undoubtedly shape 
fears during the conflict and memories since. However, the centrality of this theme in portrayals 
and the language and imagery used to capture this part of the Cold War is often dramatised and 
the threat exaggerated. As seen in both the post-Cold War documentary series, Cold War, and 
the 2019 exhibitions, the image of the mushroom cloud is used extensively, alongside dramatic 
language and narration of terror and apocalypse. The drama offered by this theme adds 
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excitement and entertainment to cultural reflections, helping to draw audiences in. Similarly, 
the recurring fascination with, and focus on, espionage equally attracts people. The intrigue, 
secrecy and darkness of espionage is reiterated throughout the Cold War series and two of the 
2019 exhibitions. The choice to dedicate whole episodes or displays to the topic indicate its 
centrality to the Cold War, and thus memory of the conflict. Yet, again the excitement of 
espionage helps to add a level of entertainment.  
Other similarities include a lack of clear end to the conflict and lack of a clear role for Britain 
in the conflict. These challenges would seem to emerge from the very end of, and even during, 
the period. The difficulty in capturing a conflict for which there is no agreed end provides a 
challenge for producers of cultural depictions of the Cold War. It sparks questions of what is 
being remembered and how people should remember the Cold War. Equally, for Britain’s 
cultural memory of the conflict, the Cold War series did not focus on Britain’s role, this was 
often only mentioned in passing to aid the US-Soviet narrative. This could be a reflection of 
the tendency of a superpower focus immediately post-Cold War. What is interesting is that the 
increasing number of British exhibitions and films and dramas today demonstrate not only a 
heightened interest in looking back to the Cold War, but also attempts to provide a narrative 
for Britain’s role and experience, though displays on Britain’s decline are often still limited. 
This however, as we have seen, is by no means unitary and attempted in various ways with 
numerous approaches.  
Additional influences on Britain’s cultural memory of the Cold War are the Second World War 
and recent conflicts. Both the Cold War series and exhibitions, in particular Peace and Security, 
frame the start of the Cold War with the Second World War. As Downing acknowledges in ‘A 
Personal View’, Cold War never had the same impact on audiences as The World At War. The 
significance of the Second World War to British memory and identity results in less interest in 
the Cold War but also less significance placed on its memory; the memory of the Cold War 
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battling for its place in British national memory. In framing the Cold War conflict with wartime 
Britain, the impact of the war and its memory on the Cold War are reflected and reiterated. 
Equally, more recent conflicts impact the way we look back on the Cold War today. As early 
as 1989 suggestions of a nostalgia for the conflict when faced with a new unknown world were 
made. This nostalgia has indeed emerged and would seem to be increasing. The multi-polar 
world of nation states and terror groups, and fears of nuclear proliferation among more 
countries presents a less balanced, more uncertain world. In contrast to the almost peaceful 
balance of East and West and MAD, this development of nostalgia is perhaps the most changed 
aspect of Britain’s cultural memory of the Cold War. Audiences and museum visitors would 
seem increasingly interested in and drawn to a “quaint” narrative of spies and the ‘shadow’ of 
the bomb, to escape the uncertain threats in the world today. It is possible that this nostalgia 
will increase in coming years or that world events, such as those in North Korea and Iran, will 
pull the Cold War further into national significance.  
The key themes and challenges of Britain’s cultural memory of the Cold War discussed here 
will be explored in more detail in the following chapters. The chapters will assess how the Cold 
War is remembered in Britain today, why these themes continue to form the focus of Cold War 
memory, and how perspectives and reflections of the Cold War have and continue to develop. 
In particular, the impact of memories of the Second World War and recent world events on the 
memory of the Cold War will be explored.  
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3 Cold War Espionage in British Cultural Memory 
 
The Cold War employed a new form of warfare, one not fought in the trenches but one where 
the front-line troops were spies.1 As Eva Horn has remarked, ‘Secret war replace[d] actual 
combat’.2 It is thus no surprise that the period itself saw a surge in espionage novels and dramas 
and a fascination with this secret world. It is, after all, from the Cold War that the infamous, 
though infinitely different, characters of James Bond and George Smiley emerged. Despite the 
end of the Cold War these characters remain strong in British culture. Indeed, Bond, despite 
narratives adapting to the new threats, continues to dominate the cultural scene with each new 
film. Smiley himself was reborn in 2011 with the remake of Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, and 
more recently was revived in Le Carré’s novel, A Legacy of Spies, which brought the Circus’ 
well-known characters back into the frame after years in retirement.3 Espionage continues to 
capture people’s imagination in museum exhibitions. However, exhibition portrayals are far 
less common than those in film and television, and reasons for this are explored in the chapter. 
Yet what exactly is it about these characters and about Cold War espionage, which continue to 
capture the public’s imagination? Simon Willmetts and Christopher Moran state that the Cold 
War saw a transformation in the espionage genre, one which was both reflected and influenced 
by the likes of the infamous Cambridge spies, George Blake and John Vassall.4 As opposed to 
the traditional patriotic hero of early espionage literature, Cold War spies and the genre itself 
 
 
1 See Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, dir. By Tomas Alfredson (StudioCanal, 2011) [Motion picture]. 
2 Eva Horn, The Secret War: Treason, Espionage, and Modern Fiction’, trans. by Geoffrey Winthrop-Young 
(Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 2013) p. 230. 
3 Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, dir. By Tomas Alfredson; John le Carré, A Legacy of Spies (London: Viking, 
Penguin, 2017). 
4 Simon Willmetts, and Christopher Moran, ‘Filming Treachery: British Cinema and Television’s Fascination 
with the Cambridge Five’, Journal of British Cinema and Television, 10. 1 (2013), 49–70 (p. 53), 
<https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/abs/10.3366/jbctv.2013.0121> [Accessed 18 March 2020]. 
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became increasingly sordid and lacking in morality. Joseph Oldham states that the espionage 
genre re-emerged in the 1950s ‘[r]esponding to the mass professionalisation of society in the 
Second World War, these reworked the protagonist from the gentlemanly amateur of early 
twentieth-century spy thrillers to a licensed professional agent’.5 British secret agents who had 
traditionally been patriotic, acting out of duty, transformed to spies who, as Horn has stated, 
were ‘no longer fervent ideologues who willingly submit to the “dirty ethics” of revolution’.6 
This transformation of the espionage genre thus increasingly focused on reality. The Cold War 
and espionage have, as a result, become synonymous, and many people’s perceptions of 
espionage are formed by these cultural representations.7  
A balance of portraying the Cold War as a turbulent era but also portraying a sense of nostalgia 
is apparent in depictions of Cold War espionage. On the one hand, cultural portrayals, 
particularly in film and television, place great emphasis on depicting a dark and troubled 
period. However, the genre of Cold War espionage is also able to offer the audience or visitor 
an odd sense of nostalgia. This chapter will first address a particular focus on both recreating 
aspects of the Cold War era and emphasising its “cold” and dark nature. This is followed by an 
exploration of what draws audiences and visitors to narratives of Cold War espionage and what 
causes a nostalgia for the period. What do Cold War spies and the espionage genre provide for 
the audience? The chapter will draw on these two conflicting narratives of Cold War espionage 
which are portrayed today, to demonstrate the ambiguous memory of the Cold War in Britain. 
 
 
5 Joseph Oldham, Paranoid Visions: Spies, Conspiracies and the Secret State in British Television Drama 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), p. 4. 
6 Horn, The Secret War, p. 251; See also David A. T. Stafford, ‘Spies and Gentleman: The Birth of the British 
Spy Novel, 1893-1914’, Victorian Studies, 24. 4 (1981), pp. 489-509, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3827226> 
[Accessed 18 March 2020]; John Atkins, The British Spy Novel: Styles in Treachery (London: John Calder, 
2010), pp. 16, 25, 140. 
7 Tony Shaw, ‘Cinema and the Cold War: An International Perspective’, in The Ashgate Research Companion 
to Modern Warfare, ed. by George Kassimeris and John Buckley (Surrey and Burlingham: Ashgate Publishing 
Ltd., 2010), pp. 365-382 (p. 378).  
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It will suggest that the confusion in whether to remember the Cold War as a turbulent or 
peaceful and quaint era is the result of the given present and events in the early twenty-first 
century.  
The chapter explores various espionage films and dramas which have been released during and 
after the Cold War, it being crucial to examine how portrayals have changed, in order to engage 
with the memory of the conflict. These include Cold War films such as Philby, Burgess and 
Maclean (1977),8 and An Englishman Abroad (1983),9 as well as recent adaptations and dramas 
including Cambridge Spies (2003),10 Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy (1974, 1979, 2011),11 and The 
Game (2015), among others.12 In addition to this, the Imperial War Museum’s (IWM) Secret 
War exhibition is examined.13 The espionage theme seems far more prominent in film and 
television in comparison to museums, however, this may be a result, simply of the ability of 
film and television to depict complex narratives and plots. Cinema and television are also able 
to elicit emotional responses. Erll has stated that the ‘medium is the memory’, that film and 
television are able to portray strong emotions of betrayal and divided loyalties and capture 
complex psychologies, make it not only an ideal medium through which to explore espionage, 
but also helps to capture and shape the memories of espionage as being dominated by these 
themes.14 It is also worth noting that many exhibitions, especially of specific topics, are often 
temporary and therefore finding record of these may be far more difficult. The Secret War 
exhibition, however, was a permanent exhibition at the Imperial War Museum from 1995 until 
 
 
8 Philby, Burgess and Maclean, dir. by Gordon Flemying (Granada Television, 1977) [On DVD]. 
9 An Englishman Abroad, dir. by John Schlesinger (BBC, 1983).  
10 Cambridge Spies, BBC Two, 9 May 2003- 30 May 2003, 21:00.  
11 John le Carré, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy (London: Sceptre, 2011, [originally published London, 1974]); 
Tinker Tailor Solider Spy, BBC Two, 10 September 1979- 22 October 1979, 21:00; Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, 
dir. By Tomas Alfredson. 
12 The Game, BBC Two, 30 April – 4 June 2015, 21:00. 
13 Secret War [Exhibition] (Imperial War Museum London, 5 July 1995-Present), visited September 2017.  
14 Astrid Erll, Memory in Culture, trans. by Sara B. Young (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 116. 
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it closed recently, thus providing evidence not only of how the narrative is depicted, but also 
the popularity and longevity of the exhibition.  
It is important to consider why espionage is a dominant theme in the memory and portrayals 
of the Cold War. The Cambridge spy ring and other double agents such as George Blake and 
John Vassall, were often present in the news throughout the Cold War. These incidents equally 
matched and influenced a wide genre of espionage fiction, including numerous works by the 
writers and ex-Secret Service agents John le Carré and Graham Greene. This is not to forget 
the widely popular James Bond series which first began in 1953 with Ian Fleming’s book 
Casino Royal.15 In both reality and culture, espionage thus became emblematic of the conflict. 
This may partially account for why the theme is one continually returned to in portrayals of the 
period.  
3.1 Cambridge Spies 
It is impossible to discuss the popular memory of Cold War espionage without delving into the 
narrative and legacy of the Cambridge spies. The story of the spies continues to fascinate the 
public, despite it being nearly thirty years since the ‘fifth man’ was revealed, that being John 
Cairncross. Cairncross was revealed publicly by Oleg Gordievsky, a former KGB agent and 
British spy, in 1990, following intelligence confirming Cairncross’ treachery in the late 1970s 
and Cairncross actually confessing in 1964.16 The Cambridge spy ring was a group of men 
recruited by the Soviet Union’s KGB during their student years at Cambridge. The men went 
on to achieve high-ranking positions within the British establishment. Harold ‘Kim’ Philby, 
ironically, became head of Soviet Counterespionage, whilst Donald Maclean held a position in 
the Foreign Office and British embassy in Washington and Guy Burgess worked for the BBC 
 
 
15 le Carré, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy. 
16 Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5, (London: Allen Lane, 2009), 
pp. 438, 440-441, 707. 
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and MI5. Anthony Blunt worked for MI5 and later held the title of Surveyor of the King’s, later 
the Queen’s, Pictures, as well as holding a prestigious position at the Courtauld Institute of Art. 
Cairncross most notably worked in Bletchley Park, passing on information to the Soviet 
Union.17  
Their story continued to unravel throughout, and even post-Cold War, resulting in the story 
being revisited time and time again. Consequently, their treachery was ‘articulate[d] ( … ) 
anew’ with each revelation,18 returning to knowledge of previous spies and playing on fears 
that more spies may yet be discovered. Burgess and Maclean fled to Moscow in 1951, in 
anticipation of Maclean being discovered. Following the Burgess-Maclean revelation, much 
doubt was cast over Philby. Philby publicly denied being a spy in 1955 yet had been forced to 
retire from the SIS and went to Beirut to work as a journalist, from there he later defected to 
Moscow in 1963.19 In 1964, Blunt was also discovered, however he gained immunity in return 
for providing information. Blunt was publicly revealed in 1979 by Thatcher and following 
Andrew Boyle’s book, The Climate of Treason, which claimed to know the fourth- and fifth-
men’s identities.20 Finally, Cairncross was revealed in 1990, the spies by this point being 
infamous and symbols of deceit and government failure. It is partly this continual unravelling 
which inspires so much fascination about the spies. Willmetts and Moran remark that ‘Few 
intelligence failures have been more enduring ( … ) than the treachery of the Cambridge 
Five’.21 Since the end of the Cold War, popular culture continues to retell the spies’ story. For 
 
 
17 Chris Hastings, ‘Former KGB colonel attacks BBC's 'Cambridge spy lies'’, The Telegraph, 13 April 2003,  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1427405/Former-KGB-colonel-attacks-BBCs-Cambridge-spy-
lies.html> [Accessed 1 November 2017]. 
18 Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. and with an introduction by 
Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 208. 
19 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, pp. 426-427, 433, 435-436. 
20 ‘The World at One - Andrew Boyle’ The World at One, BBC Radio 4, 1 November 1979, 13:00. BBC Archive 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/archive/cambridgespies/7803.shtml> [Accessed 2 November 2017]. 
21 Willmetts and Moran, ‘Filming Treachery’, p. 49. 
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example, in 2003 a four-part BBC drama Cambridge Spies, was the first drama to portray the 
lives of the spies from their years at Cambridge to the fleeing of Burgess and Maclean to 
Moscow in 1951.22 Equally, numerous biographies and books about the men continue to be 
published, such as Andrew Lownie’s, Stalin’s Englishman: The Lives of Guy Burgess.23 
Consequently, it is clear that the spies’ legacy continues into modern British cultural memory. 
This fascination and the legacy of the spies is evident in that traits of their story can be found 
in numerous Cold War and post-Cold War dramas, films, and exhibitions. The spies themselves 
influenced the espionage genre and themes of ‘treachery ( … ) Englishness, class and post-
imperial decline’, Willmetts and Moran stating that their story is one of core British values.24 
Indeed many dominant themes evident in the cultural memory of Cold War espionage can be 
seen to stem from the Cambridge spies and their legacy. These include notions of betrayal in 
challenges to deemed sexual and gender norms and betrayals of class. Furthermore, the spies 
capture a sense of disillusionment and decline. Consequently, it is in these themes that we can 
explore a key part of the British cultural memory of the Cold War as a turbulent period. The 
chapter will explore how these themes capture turbulence, through the analysis of mise-en-
scène and aesthetics. 
3.2 The Cold War as a Turbulent Era  
In many cultural portrayals of Britain’s Cold War, there is a focus on presenting a dark and 
troubled period, one constantly overshadowed by the threat of nuclear war and attack from the 
Soviet enemy. We see this as a continuation from the language used in the press itself during 
and at the end of the conflict. Espionage in particular, with its narratives of betrayal and 
 
 
22 Matt Wells, ‘BBC drama high on sex and espionage’, The Guardian, 8 April 2003, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2003/apr/08/bbc.highereducation> [Accessed 18 March 2020]. 
23 Andrew Lownie, Stalin’s Englishman: The Lives of Guy Burgess (London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 2015). 
24 Willmetts and Moran, ‘Filming Treachery’, pp. 51-52. 
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secrecy, aids producers in capturing this image and in doing so shape cultural memories of the 
Cold War in Britain. To enhance a sense of a declining period, alongside aesthetics and mise-
en-scène, comparisons to the Second World War serve to emphasise and exaggerate the 
turbulence of the Cold War.  
3.2.1 Aesthetics and mise-en-scène 
The aesthetics and mise-en-scène used in both popular culture and museum exhibitions are 
crucial to understand the atmospheres and memories these images create. It is notable that post-
1989 films and dramas set in the Cold War, have made a conscious effort to recreate Cold War 
Britain. The Hour, for example, set in the late-1950s, allowed for a visual recreation of the 
period, to immerse the audience in a 1950s British newsroom. The series follows three main 
characters, producer Bel, friend and reporter Freddie and news host Hector, as they report on 
domestic and international challenges whilst, in the first series, trying to untangle a Soviet 
intelligence operation known as Brightstone.25 Though not obviously an espionage drama, the 
series has been aptly referred to as a ‘spy thriller that happened to have a newsroom setting’.26 
From the BBC newsroom and offices themselves right down to the fashion, the series’ 
designers paid great attention to detail. The series also captures several shots of a grey, 
concrete, 1950s London.27 These images matched the narrative of the chaos surrounding the 
impending Suez Crisis, bringing fears of another war and which has ultimately become viewed 
as a turning-point which confirmed Britain’s decline. As well as capturing the period, the mise-
en-scène therefore also works to compliment the narratives of decline explored. This is further 
 
 
25 The Hour (Series 1), BBC Two, 19 July 2011- 23 August 2011 (21:00). 
26 Julia Raeside, ‘Have you been watching … The Hour?’, The Guardian, 23 August 2011, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/tvandradioblog/2011/aug/23/the-hour-bbc-finale> [Accessed 2 
November 2017]. 
27 Matt Zoller Seitz, ‘Seitz on Season Two of BBC’s The Hour: A Classy Potboiler With Oh-So-Attractive 
People’, Vulture, 28 November 2012, <www.vulture.com/2012/11/tv-review-season-two-of-bbcs-the-
hour.html> [Accessed 4 November 2017]. 
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evident in the second series, which portrays an increase in crime, alongside growing racism.28 
In the series, Hector’s old friend, high in the police service, seeks to rid London of the moral 
decay which has taken hold; frequent shots of a rainy, dull London and stale images of cigarette 
smoke and whisky, all add to this atmosphere of decay and corruption.29 The mise-en-scène 
therefore works to support and create memories of a struggling post-war Britain. 
The Game and Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy film, each set in the 1970s, equally pay attention to 
the details of fashion and décor. The Game follows the investigation of an MI5 team inspecting 
a Soviet operation, yet the series becomes mired in plots of dubious loyalties, betrayal and 
disillusionment as each member of the team is suspected of being a Soviet mole.30 Similarly, 
Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy is the latest adaptation of le Carré’s 1974 novel, and follows the 
complex plot of the Circus and the divided loyalties of the men within it, as protagonist George 
Smiley is brought out of forced retirement to investigate a potential mole within the service.31 
Each drama is saturated with brown and grey colours, one review regarded this as ‘the colour 
palette ( … ) of top-rank Cold War despair’.32 The colours create dark, decaying scenes of Cold 
War Britain. This of course reflects the relative decline of Britain post-war. The cost of the 
Second World War had meant that Britain struggled, and mostly failed, to retain its Empire. 
The “Greatness” of Great Britain seemed consigned to history and to the Second World War 
in particular. By the early 1970s, when both The Game and Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, are 
set, numerous domestic challenges faced Britain, including rising inflation and several 
unpopular attempts to improve the economy. Indeed, the unpopularity of the Industrial 
 
 
28 The Hour (Series 2), BBC Two, 14 November 2012 - 13 December 2012, 21:00, 23:20; Seitz, ‘Seitz on 
Season Two of BBC’s The Hour’.  
29 The Hour (Series 2), BBC Two. 
30 The Game, BBC Two. 
31 Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, dir. By Tomas Alfredson. 
32 Rob Smedley, ‘“The Game” Preview: Our Verdict on Toby Whithouse’ s New Spy Drama’, Cultbox, 22 April 
2015, <http://www.cultbox.co.uk/features/previews/the-game-preview> [Accessed 2 November 2017]. 
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Relations Act, 1971, led to opposition from the Trade Union Congress, and tensions increased 
with the 1972 Miner’s Strike over issues of pay.33 The strike lasted for most of January and 
February and resulted in blackouts to conserve energy.34 The Miner’s Strike provides a 
backdrop to The Game. In the first episode, one of the earliest scenes is of protagonist Joe 
Lambe and colleague Sarah Montag watching the news, which declares the Miner’s Strike is 
now in its fifth week, resulting in the introduction of restrictions and the ‘darkening of city 
centres’.35 This sets the domestic scene of a Britain in turmoil and literal darkness. The series 
plays on the Miner’s Strike further, for example, in episode three, Sarah and her husband Alan, 
another agent, are sitting in a car in darkness waiting for the Russian Kasimir to leave his house. 
In the scene, Sarah states, ‘I’ll say this for blackouts, they make shadowing easier’.36 To use 
the term of Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, as ‘agencies of articulation’, the series producer’s 
played on this image of British domestic distress, portraying it alongside espionage and in 
doing so suggest that this distress and darkness go hand in hand with this secret world.37 The 
visual nature of television is therefore pivotal in creating this atmosphere and excitement. The 
series clearly attempts to recreate the 1970s period, bringing the past into the present, yet 
choosing to emphasise the distress and decline of the era, to set the scene for conspiracy and 
treachery. 
Tomas Alfredson’s Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy similarly creates scenes of decline. One review 
of the film placed emphasis on the grey tones which engulfed many of the scenes, noting, ‘the 
 
 
33 Alan Fox, History and Heritage: The Social Origins of the British Industrial Relations System (London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1985) pp. 392-393; See also Sid Kessler and Fred Bayliss, Contemporary British Industrial 
Relations: Third Edition, (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1998), pp. 20 - 21. 
34 Kessler and Bayliss, Contemporary British Industrial Relations, p. 21.  
35 ‘Episode 1’, The Game, BBC Two, 30 April 2015, 21:00 
36 ‘Episode 3’, The Game, BBC Two, 14 May 2015, 21:00.  
37 T. G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper, ‘“The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration: 
Contexts, Structures and Dynamics”’, in The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration ed. by T. G. 
Ashplant, Graham Dawson, and Michael Roper (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 3–85 (pp. 16-
17). 
107 
side trips to Budapest (gray) and Istanbul (not quite as gray)’.38 In addition to this, Alfredson 
noted that they attempted to ‘create images with the scent of damp tweed’, which conveys a 
sense of a stale, dismal atmosphere.39 Despite the fact that some, including Mark Fisher, have 
criticised the film for being too glamorous and lacking ‘the grain of the 1970s’,40 the fact that 
the film attempts to recreate the 1970s through images of grey and damp, provides useful 
indications for the cultural memory of the period. The period is seen to be remembered as one 
of decay and ‘moral decrepitude’,41 and in creating these scenes, the film serves to further 
perpetuate these ideas of the 1970s and influence memories of this period of the Cold War. As 
Darragh O ’Donoghue remarked, when the novel of Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, was released, 
Edward Heath’s government was coming to an end after being dominated by issues of inflation, 
strikes and unemployment.42 The Watergate scandal, 1972, involved the break in of the 
headquarters of the Democratic National Committee, and resulted in Nixon’s forced 
resignation in August 1974.43 As Dobson argued, the scandal raised questions of the ‘imperious 
use of executive power and constitutional integrity’.44 The scandal acted as a further backdrop, 
matched by the unfolding narrative of the Cambridge spy ring. All of this therefore created a 
context for both the narrative itself, set in 1973, and when the narrative was first released, 
influencing this idea and memory of the period as one of corruption. Eric J. Morgan declared 
 
 
38 Steven Rea, ‘Cold War shivers’, The Philadelphia Inquirer, 22 December 2011, 
<http://www.philly.com/philly/entertainment/movies/20111223_Cold_War_shivers.html> [Accessed 2 
November 2017]. 
39 Matt Singer, ‘“Tomas Alfredson Talks ‘Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy’”’, Independent Film Channel, 12 August 
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that in regards to economic struggle and government scandal, the 1970s and the world today 
share some similarities.45 O ‘Donoghue has further highlighted that the narrative has remained 
largely topical, stating that the 1979 television series coincided with the rise of Thatcher and 
the conclusions of the Winter of Discontent (1978-79), and the 2011 film followed the scandal 
of the Iraq War and questions over the intelligence reports used, as well as the financial crash 
of 2008.46 Consequently, although Alfredson inherited ‘a 70s period piece’ from le Carré, the 
portrayal of ‘physical and moral decay’ arguably remained relevant.47 In regards to cultural 
memory, contemporary audiences view each portrayal through the specific lens of a given 
present. In 2011, despite the narrative being set in the Cold War, the audience may have been 
able to decode the narrative in some ways, similarly to audiences in the 1970s, through this 
lens of scandal and crisis. The continued popularity of the narrative may partly be due to its 
continued relevance. This, combined with the aesthetics, further enhances a memory of the 
1970s Cold War as a period of demise and corruption. The Game and Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, 
Spy therefore have this atmosphere as their backdrop, playing on it and in turn emphasising 
dark images. As a result, the fashion and mise-en-scène of these 1970s dramas can be said to 
create a world of darkness, decay, and ‘decrepitude’, setting the scene for Cold War espionage.  
The visual element, however, is also pivotal in museum exhibitions, as how the narrative and 
artefacts are displayed influence how the visitor engages with the exhibition and the memory 
it creates.48 The IWM’s Secret War exhibition was particularly interesting for exploring the use 
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of aesthetics and the process behind displays. The exhibition was originally created in 1995, 
shortly after the end of the Cold War. One document on the creation and production of the 
exhibition claimed that ‘We are now able to appreciate that victory in both the World Wars and 
the Cold War owed much to Britain’s special talents in clandestine warfare’.49 The emphasis 
on ‘Britain’s special talents’ points to the more positive depiction of British intelligence, noting 
the successes as opposed to the failings or challenges. That the refurbishment was supported 
by The Gerry Holdsworth Special Forces Trust, which offers grants for ‘commemorative 
projects’ on the history of British special forces,50 also attests to the more positive portrayal 
and may highlight one of the many influences on the exhibition, which shaped the narrative 
portrayed and therefore the memory produced. However, despite this, in its portrayal of the 
Second World War to Cold War operations of ‘Secret Soldiers’, the exhibition echoed the same 
dark and mysterious atmosphere as portrayed in the dramas above. The designers of the 
exhibition wanted to create ‘environmental narratives’ that would tell the story of the themes 
and artefacts in the exhibition.51 When designed, it was anticipated that members of the public 
would already have ideas about espionage prior to visiting the exhibition, acknowledging the 
active role of the visitor, and thus the aim of the exhibition was to ‘contrast ( … ) fact and 
fiction’.52 Although the exhibition achieved this, there were notable similarities between the 
aesthetics used for Cold War espionage fiction and those used in the exhibition.  
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The exhibition was not Cold War specific but followed espionage from the First World War to 
the present day. The third main area of the exhibition dealt with some aspects of the Cold War 
period, in particular, this included ‘the Reformation of the SAS’ in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, operations in Southern Arabia in 1958, 1964 and later in 1970, and the Falklands War.53 
As you entered this section, the rooms were dimly lit and the walls of the exhibition turned to 
cold, grey, concrete, evoking similar images of 1950s to 1970s Britain captured in the above 
dramas. A beam of concrete, damaged and crumbled hung overhead. As you walked through 
this section a partition wall of the same look was displayed with a hole through it, as if it had 
been knocked through, revealing the metal structural rods beneath, adding to the feeling of 
damage and decay.54 The designers referred to these aesthetics as ‘robust, brutalist finishes’,55 
capturing the concept of post-war Brutalism in architecture. Alexander Clement has stated that 
with Brutalist architecture, ‘where concrete was used it was usually unadorned and rough-cast, 
adding to its unfortunate reputation for evoking a bleak dystopian future’.56 The exhibition, 
despite its positive perspective of the secret services, therefore seemed to echo this post-war 
concrete and dark image of Britain. 
The first sections of the exhibition on MI5 and MI6, where incidentally you found a brief 
mention of the Cambridge spies, created a different, although still cold ‘environmental 
narrative’. The use of ‘polished hardwood and stainless steel’ along with white walls and bright 
lighting created a cold, clinical feel, almost like an interrogation room.57 It was also an aim that 
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the exhibition ‘intentionally disorientates the visitor’, as part of this, ramps were included in 
each section so that the rising and sloping of the floor created ‘psychological tension’.58 
Consequently, although it did not follow the idea of darkness and decay, it still created a jarring 
and cold environment. The designers and creators of the exhibition did well to create different 
environments and atmospheres. However, as we can see many of the aesthetics used, 
particularly of cold, dark, and concrete environments echoed the mise-en-scène of the films 
and dramas. As a result, despite the exhibition contrasting between fact and fiction, certain 
themes and tropes of espionage are strong in people’s imaginations and the exhibition both 
played on these but also further influenced these perceptions and memories of espionage, and 
in turn the Cold War period. That the visitor was taken on this visual and sensory, as well as 
informative, journey, demonstrates the ‘memory production’ function of museums,59 the 
exhibition creating an image of espionage through the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
3.2.2 Notions of Betrayal  
The notion of divided loyalties and betrayal are at the heart of Cold War espionage. As a result, 
popular culture during the Cold War and since has focused on these themes. Both events and 
popular culture during the Cold War centred on British values and the betrayal of these values. 
The Cambridge spies often serve as an example for this. In particular, the betrayal of what were 
deemed sexual and class norms have been continually emphasised both in cultural portrayals 
during the Cold War and after. 
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There is much emphasis on sexuality in the cultural memory of the Cambridge spies, and 
espionage more widely. From the origins of the Cold War, homosexuality was linked with 
ideas of betrayal and treason. As Willmetts and Moran stated, ‘homosexuality had long been 
used as a character trait of enemy agents’ in popular culture, and this belief seemed to be all 
but confirmed by Burgess and Maclean’s escape to Moscow.60 Burgess himself had always 
been open about his sexuality and was regarded as extravagant and reckless; in an interview, 
Cambridge Spies writer, Peter Moffat, stated that Burgess ‘“was very noisy about his 
gayness”’.61 Maclean’s sexuality was rather more ambiguous, yet despite his marriage there 
are numerous opinions that Maclean was bisexual.62 Notably at the time of their escape in 1951, 
homosexuality was still illegal and would remain so until 1967. Matt Houlbrook has 
particularly noted that post-war concerns over homosexuality ‘acquired a particularly electric 
resonance’, especially as Britain’s decline threw into question the notions of ‘masculinity ( … 
) and nationhood’ among others. Homosexuality was thus viewed as increasingly dangerous to 
British society and ideas of citizenship.63 Despite the Wolfendon Report (1957) and the Sexual 
Offences Act (1967), which decriminalised private homosexual acts between consenting 
adults, as Houlbrook remarked, ‘the boundaries between public and private were regulated with 
increasing vigour’, and thus much of the stigma against homosexuality remained.64 The views 
at the time of Burgess and Maclean’s escape would therefore undoubtedly reflect that both the 
spies’ sexuality and treason were crimes against the state. For as Allan Hepburn remarked, 
‘Queer spies in the Cold War compound illegalities: treason and homosexuality were both 
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punishable by law’.65  Early views and memories of the spies therefore originated in this setting, 
with past values of sexuality and masculinity being challenged and resulting in unclear ideas 
of British values in the future. Even in 1979, over ten years after the Sexual Offences Act, when 
Blunt was publicly revealed, an interviewer asked Blunt if a homosexual affair with Burgess 
was the “leverage” that caused him to join the spy ring, as if homosexuality was a key cause of 
his betrayal. Blunt clearly denied this stating his actions were not linked to his sexuality.66 
Homosexuality thus became and continued to be intrinsically linked to espionage and betrayal 
in society during the Cold War and, consequently, the spies influenced the espionage genre, 
indoctrinating many of these traits.67 It was not only the Cambridge spies, however, that shaped 
this view. Other double agents including the civil servant John Vassall, who worked for the 
Soviet Union after blackmail threats, was also homosexual. These numerous scandals 
involving homosexual men, linked this ‘in many people’s minds with espionage and 
betrayal’.68 Evidently, in the USA the McCarthy hunt for Communists also targeted 
homosexuals, demonstrating the strength of this connection with Communist or Soviet 
sympathies and homosexuality.  
Further to the Cambridge spies and others challenging sexual “norms” in post-war Britain, they 
also ‘challenged the conventional notion of the British spy as a heroic and patriotic, 
heteronormative agent’.69 Not long after the revelation of Burgess and Maclean, Ian Fleming’s 
first book Casino Royale was published (1953). Bond presented the ideal of masculinity, 
working to defend Britain, a ‘fantasy figure of sexual and political potency’.70 Bond served as 
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a nostalgic ideal of Britain and masculinity without ambiguities of either treason or 
homosexuality, and therefore, as Jeremy Black argues, was partly an escape from the decline 
of Britain and the challenge to values. Whereas the Cambridge spies, with their challenges to 
masculinity and their treason, were the ‘antithesis of Bond’.71 As a result, whilst Bond seemed 
to offer an escape, the likes of the Cambridge spies and other double agents both matched and 
influenced Britain’s decline. In Michael Denning’s words, ‘the spy novel is ( ... ) the war novel 
of the Cold War, the cover story of ( … ) the definitive loss of Britain’s world power’.72 This 
is further pointed to by Baker, who employed gendered language to explain Britain’s position 
in the Cold War stating that the period meant the loss of ‘the soldierly prowess which made 
Britain ‘Great’. Britain instead became ‘‘emasculated’ or feminized by the dominance of the 
superpowers’’.73 The emasculation of Britain can be said to match the challenge to values of 
masculinity and sexuality that the spies caused. This, Willmetts and Moran have added, partly 
meant that the spies’ story was popular among writers and producers as the downfall of the 
spies seemed to reflect that of Britain.74 The memory of the Second World War and empire 
would undoubtedly have shaped opinions of the spies in the period. That the spies were seen 
to match Britain’s decline post-war, also likely heightened animosity towards them, the 
memory of the spies in transgressing both values of masculinity and sexuality thus developed 
in this atmosphere of post-war decline and changing values, shaping opinions and memories 
of the men. 
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Portrayals of espionage during the Cold War itself highlight this theme. According to John L. 
Cobbs, le Carré often linked homosexuality to betrayal, and included this in the relationship 
between Bill Haydon and Jim Prideaux in Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy.75 Le Carré’s Bill 
Haydon, the villain of the narrative, was portrayed as highly-sexual, having relationships with 
both men and women, including an affair with his colleague’s wife, Ann Smiley.76 As 
Willmetts and Moran have argued, Haydon’s ‘sex appeal is ( … ) associated with betrayal’.77 
However, throughout the novel, references were made to the relationship between Haydon and 
Prideaux, a fellow agent and friend from Oxford. Lacon, a civil servant, remarked to Smiley, 
‘Prideaux and Haydon were really very close indeed, you know’.78 Further to this, not merely 
was Haydon’s betrayal of his country linked to his homosexuality, there was also his betrayal 
of Prideaux.79 The mission Prideaux was sent on by Control, was devised by Haydon and Karla, 
Smiley’s Soviet adversary, as they knew Control was beginning to sense a mole. Haydon knew 
Prideaux would be chosen for the mission, yet things did not go to plan and Prideaux was shot. 
Haydon had therefore set up and betrayed the man he cared for. It was this betrayal that lead 
Prideaux to kill Haydon at the close of the narrative, Haydon’s sexuality and betrayal seen to 
lead to his ultimate demise.80  
The television adaptation of the novel in 1979 also dealt with the relationship between Haydon 
and Prideaux, yet it was extremely subtle with mere remarks by others hinting towards the 
closeness between the two men, such as ‘it was perhaps the most famous Partnership the Circus 
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ever had’.81  However, Willmetts and Moran remark, that the producers were ‘clearly uneasy 
with this subject’.82 The subtlety in the series may partly have been a reflection of the time of 
its release, following the period of Mary Whitehouse’s campaign against permissive society 
from 1964, which ‘targeted sex and violence’ on television.83 The most open discussion of their 
relationship was at the end of the series when Prideaux goes to the holding camp to kill Haydon. 
Prideaux asked why Karla did not kill him, ‘was that out of delicacy to you?’. In the book these 
were Smiley’s words, by giving them to Prideaux in the series it gave him a voice for the 
betrayal he felt from the man he loved and admired. When Haydon remarked that ‘the shooting 
wasn’t part of the plan’, Jim added, ‘no not the shooting-but everything else’, at which point 
he struck Haydon and killed him.84 The closeness in this scene identified the relationship but 
more obviously, the betrayal Prideaux felt, linking these themes of homosexuality and 
treachery.  
The subtle portrayals of homosexuality in the television series were contrasted with the 2011 
film. As one review read, Haydon and Prideaux’s relationship, ‘is so explicit in the movie that 
one gets the impression that the director was afraid viewers would miss it’.85 This is again most 
likely a factor of the times in which the versions were released, indicating the changing attitudes 
to homosexuality, influencing the way the narrative is interpreted. Interestingly, in the film, the 
character of Peter Guillam, played by Benedict Cumberbatch, is portrayed as homosexual, 
despite being heterosexual in the original versions.86 In an interview, Cumberbatch remarked 
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that he keeps his ‘‘character’s homosexuality secret because you’re open to blackmail. It 
necessitates a certain amount of secretiveness, which goes hand in hand with spying’.’87 In 
addition to this, Cumberbatch added, ‘‘the absence of women isn’t just a mark of the workplace 
in the early Seventies, it’s also very much to do with how emotionally retarded these men are 
( ... ) a mark of the many sacrifices I think they made’’.88 Consequently, Cumberbatch’s 
portrayal of Guillam suggests that the idea of homosexuality captures this world of secret and 
disjointed loyalties, having to remain secret to protect themselves and loved ones. This could 
be said to provide a different interpretation of homosexuality in regard to espionage, rather than 
betrayal and treason, it can now be seen to emphasise the secrecy which engulfed the lives of 
the spies, and the complexity of the double-lives they led. The passing of time and changes in 
perspectives have consequently influenced memory and portrayals of the Cold War. Whilst the 
theme of homosexuality remains in Cold War espionage dramas, modern perspectives have 
slightly altered the way this theme is interpreted, so as opposed to homosexuality serving as an 
indicator of betrayal and decline, it now further highlights the secret lives and world of the 
spies, adding a deeper psychological understanding of the characters.  
Sexuality is also a key aspect to the narrative of Cambridge Spies. One review remarked that 
whilst other depictions of the spies had ‘tiptoed discreetly round the more salacious elements 
of the story’, Cambridge Spies portrays the men’s sexuality openly. The overt sexuality of the 
men, and the homosexuality of Blunt and Burgess, continues the connection between 
homosexuality and espionage. However, despite Burgess often getting caught by the law in 
terms of homosexual behaviour, a contemporary audience is unlikely to interpret his 
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homosexuality as a treasonous attribute. Instead, the relationships between the spies and their 
relationships with other men, including Blunt’s and Burgess’ individual relationships with 
Julian Bell, highlight the complexity of the men’s lives and their inability to form lasting 
commitments due to the nature of their work and their double-lives. The aim of writer Peter 
Moffat was subsequently achieved as he hoped to convey the complexity of the men’s lives 
and the personal sacrifices they made.89 Burgess’ own antics of ‘cruising public toilets for sex’ 
instead add humour to the series and heighten the sense of Burgess’ eccentric character.90 The 
series therefore does much to focus on the personalities of the men, taking a different approach 
to le Carré’s narratives of linking homosexuality to betrayal, and in turn these new perspectives 
have shaped today’s memories of the men and the period.  
We can therefore see how memories of the spies, espionage and the Cold War are shaped by 
the contemporary environment of such portrayals. That the Cambridge spies confirmed and 
influenced ideas in 1950s Britain that homosexuality was linked to betrayal and treason, led to 
a basic understanding and memory of the spies as transgressing both sexual and patriotic 
values. The resonance of this memory continued, taking some time for homosexuality to be 
viewed any differently, even after the Sexual Offences Act. However, post-Cold War 
portrayals, such as those in Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy and Cambridge Spies, indicate how 
perspectives have changed with time, enabling new understandings and therefore different 
portrayals of the spies and homosexuality during the Cold War. Though it remains a common 
theme, continued portrayals of homosexual spies are likely due to the legacy of the Cambridge 
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spies’ narrative reaching into many espionage dramas, as opposed to the perspective of 
homosexuality and treason remaining.  
In conjunction with ideas of sexuality and masculinity, the use and emphasis of gender is also 
a noticeable feature of some Cold War espionage portrayals. Three examples, including Philby, 
Burgess and Maclean, An Englishman Abroad, and A Question of Attribution (1991),91 
highlighted how gender has been used to emphasise the Cambridge spies’ transgressions both 
in sexuality and treason. In Philby, Burgess and Maclean, we were presented with a rather 
unsympathetic portrayal of the men. The film began with the ‘Volkov incident’ of 1945, where 
a Soviet agent claimed to have information regarding spies being placed in the British 
intelligence services and government positions. It then followed the incidents leading to the 
defection of Burgess and Maclean in 1951 and ended with Philby’s denial of being a spy 
himself in 1955.92 The film focused on creating feelings of treachery, yet there were one or two 
brief moments where a reasoning for the men’s actions was portrayed. When Maclean’s wife 
was informed, she condemned Burgess for his and Maclean’s actions. However, Burgess 
responded with his justification, that ‘the entire West is rotting away’ making it ‘the 
responsibility of every civilised man to sweep away the whole ( … ) mess’.93 Their treachery 
however was emphasised by Maclean’s wife’s unwavering shock, the female voice used to 
highlight the spies’ treachery. Equally, when Philby’s wife hears the news, not aware of her 
own husband’s involvement, she too deplored their actions. Philby, known to the audience to 
be expressing his own justification, suggested to his wife that ‘Those days it was a different 
world - Europe was about to collapse in front of the Nazis – the only option seemed to be Soviet 
Russia’.94 However, again Philby’s wife remarked that his statement was ‘nonsense’. As a 
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result, any attempts to provide a justification for the men’s actions in the film were disregarded. 
It is perhaps possible here to explore the use of gender with the female voice acting as a moral 
compass. 
Slightly more sympathy was evident in Alan Bennett’s and John Schlesinger’s An Englishman 
Abroad and A Question of Attribution. However, in each, similarly to Philby, Burgess and 
Maclean, there were reminders of the spies’ treason. This again seemed to be through the 
employment of female voice, being used to draw attention to ‘the moral dilemma of 
defection’.95 Coral Browne in An Englishman Abroad, confronted Burgess and in doing so 
reminded him and the audience of his treachery, stating, ‘we’re sat here ( … ) pretending that 
spying – which is what you did my darling – was just a minor social misdemeanour’.96 
Similarly, in A Question of Attribution, the female voice was projected through the role of the 
Queen. In perhaps the most famous scene of the film, the Queen and Blunt discussed forgeries, 
a fake Titian painting being central to the plot. The painting throughout the film served as a 
metaphor for the Cambridge spy ring; perceived to be a Titian, the painting was later deemed 
to be fake and behind each layer of paint a new portrait lurked. The numerous ‘double entendre’ 
throughout the conversation pointed to Blunt’s dual identity, both a respectable academic and 
Surveyor of the Queen’s pictures and yet also a spy.97 The use of gender in the above examples 
point to a specific voice being projected, one which highlights the immorality of the spies. As 
has been discussed, the spies influenced and reflected a crisis of masculinity in post-war 
Britain. As traitors to class and the rules of gentlemen, and particularly Burgess, Blunt and to 
some degree Maclean, transcending heterosexual “norms”, the spies epitomised this crisis and 
changing British values. In employing the use of feminine voice to condemn the men’s actions, 
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the crisis of masculinity could be emphasised. Consequently, the female voice acts as a moral 
compass and a reminder of the spies’ numerous transgressions.  
It is worth noting however, that this use of female voice and emphasis on gender roles would 
seem more prominent in portrayals of the spies during, or just after, the Cold War, A Question 
of Attribution being released in 1991 for television, yet the narrative being employed in a 1988 
play Single Spies. This would suggest that the female voice being used to highlight the crisis 
in masculinity and treason of the men, was likely a response to the proximity of the portrayals 
to the events unravelling. Philby, Burgess and Maclean, being released in 1977, was amid the 
unfolding events, conspiracy theories about who the ‘fourth man’ was were increasingly 
discussed and indeed Blunt was publicly revealed two years later. This was similarly the case 
with An Englishman Abroad in 1983, four years after the revelation of Blunt and also Blunt’s 
death earlier that same year. The topic was therefore still recent in people’s memory. A 
Question of Attribution was released just after the end of the Cold War; however, this also 
followed the revelation of Cairncross. Again, previous questions asked of the spies and the fact 
that each new revelation raised concerns of more spies yet to be discovered, likely shaped 
perspectives in the present of the men’s betrayal and transgressions. However, as time passed, 
and although the spies have remained a point of fascination, perspectives of the spies were able 
to change, as did perspectives of gender and homosexuality. Consequently, this may account 
for why later adaptations express the crisis of masculinity caused by the men less, or at least 
less overtly.  
Further betrayals were found in the changing values of the class system in society. John 
Beynon’s work has explored the connection between class and masculinity, arguing that 
masculinity in Britain’s imperial era was reliant on male institutions and public schools. 
However, the realities of the First World War began to challenge the image of war as ‘a glorious 
game played by gentlemen’ and with the gradual collapse of empire following the Second 
122 
World War, this ideal had all but vanished.98  The Cambridge spies, having been part of this 
public school system which bred imperial men, betrayed the ideals of masculinity and of 
gentlemen being incapable of betraying their country.  
A great deal of the shock and disbelief surrounding the Cambridge spies was their betrayal of 
their own class and the British establishment. Indeed, Willmetts and Moran have stated that 
more emphasis is placed on their betrayal of class than country.99 This stemmed from a 
fundamental belief in, and understanding of, the British class system. Following Beynon’s 
argument that men from backgrounds of public school and equivalent ‘all-male organizations’ 
were trained for empire and were therefore deemed patriots, to be trusted and above 
suspicion;100  the news of the spies’ betrayal caused a great deal of shock, but also a drastic 
challenge to these crucial British traditions and values. At a time when Britain was decreasing 
in global status and power, it would appear that the British image was undergoing a drastic 
transition. The views of the given present in the 1950s, when the first spies were revealed, were 
therefore caught between past ideals of class and future uncertainty as to British values. Ideas 
of class and British gentlemen in the post-war period continued to draw on ideas of class and 
masculinity in the era of empire. However, the public transgression of these ideals by the spies 
from the 1950s onwards shattered these previous notions. In the words of Willmetts and Moran, 
much fascination around the spies is that they appeared to hold the values of gentleman but 
‘perverted’ them.101 Horn has argued, that despite all the spies belonging to and working within 
the establishment, the greatest challenge to these values came with the revelation of Philby, 
and later Blunt, who both epitomised the British gentleman. Horn goes as far to say that ‘The 
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Philby case was the trauma of Western intelligence: treason on the highest level committed by 
a civil servant whose loyalty was deemed unshakeable’,102 the British gentleman ideal being 
irrevocably damaged. It is not surprising that both during the Cold War and after, there 
continues to be a great emphasis on class in portrayals of espionage.  
The emphasis on class is especially strong in depictions of the Cambridge spies. The Secret 
War exhibition at the IWM London, enabled visitors to engage with stories of spies. These 
included profiles and recorded statements from those that knew them, profiles were available 
for both Blunt and Philby.103 Blunt’s profile particularly captured this idea of class and British 
gentlemen. A statement from Barbara Price-Smith, who was a MI5 secretary between 1940 and 
1944, provided her views of Blunt, stating: 
He always opened the door for you and touched his cap good morning. He was the 
perfect English gentleman we thought, didn’t we. But he was, he was well mannered, 
he was always smartly dressed. Nothing in the world to suggest, to us anyway ( … ) 
that he was suspected.104  
The use of this statement for the exhibition directs the visitor to the fact that the spies 
challenged values of class. The fact that Barbara Price-Smith could not equate ‘the perfect 
English gentleman’ as a suspect of treason, captures the shock at the betrayal of the ideals of 
gentlemen. In continuing to portray this challenge of ideals, the exhibition enhanced memories 
of the spies as traitors to their class and the Cold War period as being a time when British 
values were challenged.  
An Englishman Abroad is particularly interesting for exploring Cold War portrayals of class. 
Bennett and Schlesinger’s more sympathetic approach to the spies meant that rather than class 
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being portrayed critically, they showed it as being ‘uprooted’ and displaced. The film portrayed 
the meeting between actress Coral Browne (played by herself) and Burgess in Moscow in 1958. 
Burgess was depicted exiled and isolated, with the dreams of the communist society appearing 
somewhat disappointing. In his isolation, Burgess missed England, his allegiance to 
Communism existing side by side his love for his English identity. In his meetings with 
Browne, Burgess revealed that he wanted her to measure him for a suit from Savile Row which 
he asked her to order and get sent to him. This attempt to cling onto his former identity followed 
his rejection and isolation from his English ‘citizenship ( … ) and class status’; his betrayal of 
his class and his exile thus left him no option but ‘to act out his former identity’.105 However, 
as Michael Brooke notes, despite a ‘strangely triumphant’ tone to the final scene, in wearing 
the attire of his class again, Burgess’ identity as an Englishman amid Russian citizens merely 
highlighted his exclusion and isolation from both societies.106 That he was only able to ‘act 
out’ his identity, demonstrated, according to Willmetts and Moran, that Bennett and 
Schlesinger were suggesting ‘that these once concrete categories have been stripped of their 
authenticity and exist in contemporary society merely as reproductions’.107 As agents of 
articulation, Bennett and Schlesinger’s own interests, particularly critiques of patriotism and 
their focus on the betrayal and collapse of identities rather than treason, shaped this portrayal 
of Burgess and in turn the portrayal of British class in the period. 108 They therefore created and 
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This cultural memory of the challenge to ideals of class during the Cold War continues to be 
found in modern portrayals and particularly the Cambridge Spies series, which draws heavily 
on the spies’ class and establishment membership.  The spies’ connection to the establishment 
is often portrayed in a critical way, with even the spies shown to mock and manipulate it. In 
the first episode, after being caught in bed with a waiter at the university, Burgess is called in 
and told that the waiter has been asked to leave. Although Burgess protests, the reasons they 
give him point to class ties and a ‘membership’, making statements such as ‘we shouldn’t 
imagine that we’re like them because we’re not. Us and them don’t mix’ and ‘this is a club 
here ( … ) the club makes allowances for the mistakes of its members’.109 The ironic nature of 
these comments however, is expressed in Burgess’ later statement to Blunt that he would ‘have 
to bugger the Dean to get sent down’, ridiculing the strength of the ‘ties’ in belonging to the 
establishment.110 In creating the series, the producers and writers used the hindsight of the 
audience, knowing that men of class and prestige betrayed their country, to convey irony and 
a notion of ridicule that such men were above suspicion. This further highlights how the spies’ 
story changed views and values - the upper-classes and members of the establishment are not 
above suspicion and this perspective remains today. Particularly at the time of the series’ 
release in 2003, the Iraq War highlighted much discontent with the establishment. 
Consequently, ideas that such members were once above suspicion added irony when stories 
of scandals like Iraq were often making headlines. Notions of class and betrayal were 
emphasised throughout the series, continuing a theme and memory of the Cold War which 
originated with the spies themselves and continues into the present. 
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Not only are challenges to class portrayed in relation to the spies, there are also more general 
displays of the British ideals of class and the establishment being challenged in modern Cold 
War dramas. A notable example is that of the character Hector in The Hour. Throughout the 
first series, Hector is portrayed as the ideal British upper-class gentleman and wartime hero. 
The second series challenges this image of Hector, portraying, in stark contrast, his self-
destruction. In the series, Hector’s image as a gentleman and a hero are contrasted to his 
excessive drinking and numerous affairs.111 The memory of wartime British gallantry and 
bravery were thus played upon, these ideals being challenged by Hector’s downfall. That these 
wartime values and British ideals were seen to be disintegrating echoed the notion of Britain’s 
decline, both the nation and its values entering an era of change and transition. The memory of 
the Second World War was carefully played on in the series, serving to frame the Cold War 
and act as a contrast. The Cold War was portrayed as the anti-wartime image; rather than 
bravery and pride, there was decline and the uprooting of British values. Not only does this 
demonstrate the continued significance of memory of the Second World War in British society, 
but that memory of the Cold War is heavily shaped by memories and ideals of wartime Britain 
as a time of strength, bravery, and stoicism. The comparisons serving to emphasise and 
exaggerate the turbulence of the Cold War era.  
The memory of the Cold War in relation to ideas of class and changing values can therefore be 
seen to have developed throughout the Cold War period and continued into the present day. 
That the Cambridge spies are central to this theme also adds to the ongoing memory of the 
spies as transgressing the values and expectations placed on them. It is interesting, that much 
like notions of sexuality, the ideals of class and establishment were rooted in ideals of 
gentlemen in the era of empire and even the Second World War period. This enhanced the 
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shock caused by the spies’ betrayal, which continued throughout the Cold War, especially with 
the later revelations of Philby and Blunt. The challenge to these values shapes memories of the 
spies and Cold War today. Yet, with modern events such as the Iraq War challenging faith and 
trust in the establishment, there is also an argument for why such narratives are returned to, as 
people can relate to the sentiments explored. In order to fully understand the memory and 
legacy of the conflict, it is necessary to consider the origins of such memories, how they have 
developed and how they shape perspectives and memories today. These current sentiments in 
turn shape the narratives and aspects of the Cold War which are returned to and which remain 
popular in television, film, and exhibitions. 
3.3 Disillusionment 
As a result of these depictions of betrayals, a sense of disillusionment with the establishment 
and society is often created. In particular the challenges made by the spies to ideals of the 
English upper-classes and establishment caused further public outcry, in the sense that there 
was a questioning of how the government and intelligence services had failed to identify the 
spies and their treachery. Following the defection of Burgess and Maclean, there were constant 
questions as to why they were not suspected. In a Sunday Times article, the lives and careers 
of the two spies were detailed. It stated that Maclean was not suspected until his disappearance 
and in regards to Burgess, the article detailed his recruitment to MI5 during the war ‘when it 
may be necessary to pass over disagreeable aspects of personality’.112 The article added that 
Burgess’ life was ‘reckless’ and that he was open about his socialist political views yet again 
was not suspected. The article concluded that ‘two errors were made both of which with greater 
care or stricter standards could have been avoided’.113 Such criticisms and the scandal 
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surrounding the spies caused a review of those working in the Government, especially in 
intelligence or atomic energy.114 Consequently, it is clear that failures to identify the spies 
formed a focus in the press and further fuelled the scandal.  As a result, alongside portrayals of 
class, there are also numerous references to the failures of the establishment and Government, 
adding to this tone of disillusionment which is echoed throughout. This is, however, primarily 
evident in television dramas and films.  
Blunt’s revelation is particularly interesting for looking at these ideas of class and a corrupt 
establishment. Following Thatcher’s unmasking of Blunt in 1979, Blunt was portrayed as a 
‘villain’, or as Miranda Carter stated in her biography of Blunt, ‘a villain who had not only 
betrayed his country, but had embarrassed the Queen’.115 Both Blunt’s class and sexuality were 
central to the scandal. Carter and Barrie Penrose and Simon Freeman in their biographies of 
Blunt, emphasised the questions surrounding Blunt’s revelation; in particular, why had Blunt 
been given immunity? Issues of class were raised here given the arrest and imprisonment of 
several other spies who had not shared the same position or background as Blunt.116 Oldham 
equally states that Blunt’s immunity ‘seemed to indicate for many that the old-boy network 
was as alive as ever’.117 Further to this each biography made a point to note that following 
Blunt’s public statement, he attended a lunch hosted by The Times of ‘smoked trout, veal, fruit 
salad and wine, with coffee and cigars to follow’. Penrose and Freeman stated that the lunch 
‘seemed to symbolise the attitude of the Establishment to Blunt the Traitor’.118 Blunt therefore 
had not only transgressed the ideals of class and gentlemen but continued to be treated as 
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superior despite his treachery. The corruption and failure of the establishment was therefore 
reiterated during the Blunt scandal.  
We have seen above in Philby, Burgess and Maclean, that the spies expressed the decline and 
failures of the Western system, using this disenchantment to justify their betrayal. Post-1989 
dramas and films have highlighted this lack of faith and trust in the establishment. In A 
Question of Attribution for example, and in many similar ways, Cambridge Spies, the 
government and intelligence service’s failures to identify and investigate an infiltration were 
portrayed critically. A Question of Attribution followed the imagined events between Blunt 
being discovered as a spy in 1964 and his later unveiling in 1979. Despite offering Blunt 
immunity in exchange for useful information, it becomes apparent early in the film that the 
intelligence service has failed in this investigation. Detective Chubb becomes the next 
employed to get information from Blunt, however, Chubb himself was rather unsuccessful, 
despite the film following his numerous attempts. These failures on the part of the service were 
epitomised in the closing scenes of the film in which the audience viewed Blunt talking to 
Donleavy, Chubb’s Chief, stating ‘you’re in the clear’ and therefore revealing that Donleavy 
was the much searched for ‘fifth man’.119 This high level of infiltration further pointed to the 
intelligence service’s incompetency in identifying traitors, and as such created this idea of a 
hopeless service, in whom the public could have little faith. 
This lack of faith created by the film was heightened by events surrounding the film’s release. 
The film’s release in 1991 followed the recent unveiling of Cairncross as the real ‘fifth Man’. 
The hunt for the fifth spy in the film thus captured the atmosphere of contemporary Britain. 
This was combined with the fact that at the end of the film Blunt discussed the painting with 
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Chubb, which had been at the centre of the plot. At the end of the film Blunt explained the 
faces in the painting to Chubb, ‘behind them lurk other presences ( … ) it is never going to 
end’.120 Cairncross’ recent revelation would add credibility to this statement. The audience was 
likely to decode the film in the present circumstances where a ‘fifth Man’ had been revealed 
after a gradual revelation of the spy ring throughout the years, bringing back into the present 
the narrative of the spies and the questions of government failure. The audience’s decoding in 
the given present was also likely to be influenced by questions of whether there were more 
spies yet to be discovered, Blunt’s statement in the film echoing this and perpetuating the idea 
of further treachery. The memory created by the film was therefore likely to be influenced by 
circumstances in that given present, echoing the failures of government and the services in 
identifying the spies. 
Similarly, in Cambridge Spies, criticisms are made of the government’s failure, even deliberate 
refusal, to investigate any infiltration. This mirrored numerous debates which had been sparked 
by the spies as to whether they were helped by others in the service due to class loyalties.121 
The Cambridge Spies series portrays this idea, most obviously through the character of 
Angleton in the CIA. When it becomes known that there is a spy in the British Embassy, 
Angleton informs Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, and suggests an investigation of all 
embassy staff. Halifax’s reply to this is that it is likely one of the kitchen staff, or a cleaner. 
When Angleton asks Halifax if he would also be investigating “upstairs”, Halifax replies, ‘Well 
why should we do that? Upstairs is beyond reproach’. This again plays on the belief that the 
upper-classes and members of the establishment could be trusted, drawing on the British ideals 
of class and gentlemen’s honour. Later in the episode when enquiring as to the progress of the 
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investigation, Angleton is shocked that still no one from “upstairs” has been investigated, 
Halifax simply declares, ‘Traitors don’t come from the top, not in England’.122 The audience 
is in a position of knowledge, the Cambridge spies did ‘come from the top’ and this in turn 
emphasised the failure and refusal to acknowledge that the upper-classes could be traitors. 
Thus, the portrayal evokes a memory of a failed establishment during the Cold War, heavily 
flawed, and which matched and added to the image of a declining Britain. Indeed, in 1979, 
Thatcher’s public unveiling of Blunt was said to partly be the result of her rejection of the old 
establishment,123 demonstrating the impact the spies had on changing values and modern 
portrayals continue to reflect this attitude and reinforce it in modern cultural memory. The 
continued reference to the unshakeable trust placed in members of the establishment sets up 
the fall both of the spies and the service in failing to acknowledge them.  
The American perspective conveyed by Angleton can be said to reflect American views of the 
time. An article in the New York Herald Tribune in December 1952 criticised the British 
Government, stating it ‘has been caught with another failure that emphasizes its laxity’, 
referring to the escape of Burgess and Maclean.124 The ‘other’ failure referred to is that of Alan 
Nunn May who was arrested in 1946 for providing nuclear information to the Soviet Union. 
The article remarked that:  
One need not wonder ( … ) why Stalin considers the Western democracies so soft that 
he can start Korean wars and inflict casualties on American boys without fear that his 
agents in Britain and America will get any harsher punishment than a life in a jail for a 
few years with plenty of food to eat.125   
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This criticism captures the spy scandal in the wider context of the Cold War. It highlights that 
the British failures to detect these spies meant they were viewed as weak, enforcing the idea of 
British decline and loss of power. In addition to this, the article also blamed British failures 
and weakness for directly impacting on ‘American boys’ and therefore Britain’s status was 
viewed, even by its allies, as flawed. The statement pointed directly to the state of affairs in the 
Korean War, at that time in a drawn-out stalemate, the war had taken its toll on all sides.126 The 
strain of the Korean War likely enhanced criticisms and condemnations of Britain’s apparent 
weakness. The cultural memory of the Cold War period, and espionage, therefore further the 
atmosphere of decline, reflecting and reinforcing it in British memory of the Cold War. It is 
therefore necessary to question why this lack of faith in the establishment and government 
failures continues to be central to Cold War dramas and why these Cold War narratives are 
being returned to. In one instance, it is possible that the failures of the government which the 
Cambridge spies highlighted have remained a key part of British memory and perspective, as 
the spies were revealed gradually over the years and therefore questions and doubts as to 
government capabilities were continually revisited.  
Equally, the continued presence of this theme could be that it reflects current views and 
therefore people find a connection to Cold War dramas because they can relate to these notions 
of distrust and disillusionment. The Iraq War can be looked to as having a key influence on the 
decoding of the Cambridge Spies series, being released just prior to Britain’s entry into the war 
against Iraq in 2003. The Iraq War and the actions of Tony Blair and the Government, captured 
these same feelings of disillusionment and lack of faith. Protest and debate surrounded the Iraq 
War, the most notable was a protest against the war in February 2003, ‘part of a worldwide 
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protest’ against the war and noted ‘as the largest protest march in British history’,127 with some 
estimating over a million marchers involved. The war sparked further controversy when reports 
declared that no Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) had been found. The subsequent 
condemnation and accusations that intelligence reports and assessments had been ‘“sexed up”’ 
to convince people that military action was necessary, evidenced feelings of outrage and 
distrust.128 An article in the Guardian, on the work of le Carré, noted how since the end of the 
Cold War, le Carré has continued to reflect current concerns and the Iraq War was undoubtedly 
one of them, feeding into his book, Absolute Friends.129 With such a high lack of trust in the 
government, it is unsurprising that narratives portray the establishment critically and the Cold 
War narrative of the Cambridge spies provides a suitable backdrop to express these sentiments, 
enabling the exploration of moral ambivalence and disillusionment. The return to the period in 
much popular culture as well as novels and dramas about modern crises has been pointed to by 
novelist Simon Conway, as it being ‘easier to write comfortable period pieces than to try to 
understand what’s going on’ in the modern world.130 It is therefore perhaps less jarring to 
follow tales of disillusionment that are set in the past, if only recently, than it is to face today’s 
uncertainties.  
The failures of government and the establishment that were so condemned during the Cold War 
period, and which arose again and again with the revelation of each spy, are thus repeated in 
modern portrayals, shaping memories of the Cold War as an era which lacked trust and faith in 
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its leaders. However, recent events may also influence the memory of the Cold War, post-1989 
wars like Iraq and Afghanistan raised numerous questions as to worth and morality. In looking 
at the Cold War through the lens of these more recent conflicts, the themes and questions 
explored may be framed by current concerns. The Chilcot enquiry into the Iraq War for 
example, and similar calls for an enquiry into the war in Afghanistan,131 raised questions of 
failures and flaws within the establishment as well as questions of morality. In this respect, it 
is perhaps not surprising that Cold War dramas continue to reflect this sentiment, a modern 
audience being able to relate to such questions. It may simply be less unnerving returning to 
past narratives where the same issues are portrayed without having to face the unknown of the 
present and the future. 
Modern disillusionment may help to account for the controversial sympathetic portrayal in the 
Cambridge Spies series. The series takes both a new and controversial perspective of the spies. 
Director Tim Fywell has said of the writer Peter Moffat’s script, that it ‘“balance[s] history 
with the human side of these men ( … ) It explores how they justified their treachery and how 
it impacted on their personal lives”’.132 One scene which was particularly remarked upon by 
viewers and critics was the invented scene of the spies defending a Jewish girl in a student bar. 
When a bully, by the name of Givens, knocks into a girl and spills her drink, Philby remarks 
that Givens should buy her a new one, to which Givens replies, ‘she’s a Jew. I don’t buy drinks 
for Jews’.133 Here, Moffat played on sensitive memories of the Second World War, of genocide 
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against Jews, to create this shock and disgust at Givens’ comment. So much so, that when 
Philby and Burgess defend her, they are presented as pro-Semitic heroes. Mark Lawson, in a 
review for the Guardian, argued that what Moffat was trying to achieve was an understanding 
for the men’s allegiance to Communism. Lawson further remarked that the understanding of 
supporting Communism as a way to oppose Fascism ‘has little impact on a modern audience’, 
the notion of the Communist “enemy” being firmly entrenched from the Cold War years.134 
Consequently, Moffat’s invented scene creates a justification for their cause. This in turn helps 
to evoke sympathy for opposing an evil regime. From this it is clear that several memories were 
in play, overlapping one another to create this new perspective of the spies. Moffat’s use of the 
strong memory of the Second World War to counter Cold War memories of the Communist 
enemy helped to convey an understanding for the spies’ actions. Furthermore, we can again 
see how understandings of the Cold War period, and the spies themselves, are continually 
framed by memories of the Second World War. The two conflicts must therefore be considered 
together for the sake of memory, as the comparison between them aids understanding of both 
periods in British cultural memory.  
As stated above, disillusionment today may partially account for this sympathetic portrayal, 
although a degree of sympathy for the characters is necessary for the audience to engage in the 
narrative. As Johann Wolfgang von Goethe stated, the passing of time enables new perspectives 
of past events and contemporary environments influence this.135 For example, the 
contemporary debates over Iraq, surrounding the release of the Cambridge Spies series, likely 
enabled viewers to understand the sentiment expressed by the spies in their loyalty to England 
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but not their government. When Bennett wrote An Englishman Abroad, he stated that 
controversies in the Falklands War, which included the British sinking of the General Belgrano, 
which killed an estimated 400 Argentinians, caused him to challenge his faith in the 
government, providing him with an understanding of the spies’ dual loyalties.136  As a result, 
Anthony Gardner has argued that ‘it is likely the Iraqi crisis will do the same for at least part 
of the Cambridge Spies’ audience’.137 Consequently, it may be possible that, like Bennett and 
the Falklands War, the Iraq War provided a modern audience with a new perspective and if not 
a sympathy for the spies, at least a potential understanding of their love for country but 
contempt for Government. Cambridge Spies actor Toby Stephens who played Philby added 
that he felt this “duality” was a symptom many people now share. Therefore, modern 
perspectives enable us to look at the past ‘anew’ and recent events can reshape or influence our 
perspectives and memories. Modern understandings of lacking faith in the government can 
therefore change and shape how people view the spies’ actions. Cold War espionage enables 
us to see how memories of the period have developed throughout the years, leading to the 
cultural memory expressed today. 
Further disillusionment is conveyed via comparisons and contrasts to the Second World War. 
The theme of British decline and continued notions of disillusionment are certainly at the centre 
of many Cold War espionage dramas, both those released during the Cold War and after 1989. 
These notions of disillusionment are emphasised not only by moles and double agents, but even 
the “heroes” of Cold War espionage, who feel detached from and disenchanted with the world 
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around them. It is in these themes that we see the most reference to memories of the Second 
World War, and the contrast shown between the two periods ultimately shapes memories of 
both wars.  
The Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy narrative perhaps captures this the most. Indeed, Oldham 
argues that the narrative and series ‘serves as a portrait of Smiley’s generation. These were the 
senior intelligence officers who had fought the espionage side of the Second World War only 
for their victory to be lost to ( … ) post-imperial disillusion’.138  Several references throughout 
the narrative refer to disenchantment; one being Smiley’s re-enacted interrogation of Karla. 
When telling Guillam of how he tried to “turn” Karla, Smiley resorted to finding fault in both 
East and West. In the novel, Smiley stated that he said to Karla, ‘I can see through Eastern 
values, just as you can through our Western ones ( … ) Don’t you think it’s time to recognise 
that there is as little worth on your side as there is on mine?’139 In the novel and television 
series, Smiley was saying this to Karla in an Indian prison. However, in the film, Gary Oldman, 
as Smiley, delivers this as a monologue to the camera, re-enacting his conversation with 
Karla.140 This technique has the impact of making Smiley’s comments far more chilling. That 
Oldman delivers this speech directly to the camera gives the impression of a confession, a 
suggestion of Smiley’s own disenchantment. It also gives the effect of interaction with the 
audience, making the audience question their system and the lack of ‘worth’ in all systems. 
Despite the audience not viewing the film in the context of the East-West Cold War divide, 
similar questions of worth and morality are present in today’s society. Notably, in 2010, the 
year prior to the film’s release, the Daily Mail published an article, by James Slack, a political 
journalist and editor who later became the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesperson and Director 
 
 
138 Oldham, Paranoid Visions, p. 91. 
139 le Carré, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, p. 243; See also, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, dir. By Tomas Alfredson. 
140 Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, dir. By Tomas Alfredson. 
138 
of Communications, reporting on a survey which declared that Britain was ‘in the grip of a 
‘deep institutional crisis’’.141 The article detailed the report’s findings that recent scandals such 
as Iraq and the expenses scandal, led to a severe lack of trust in British institutions.142 Smiley’s 
questions of the worth of the system could arguably resonate strongly with current sentiments, 
the film playing on this and again demonstrating its continued relevance in contemporary 
society.143 In addition to this, the much more chilling depiction of Smiley’s words in this scene 
can be said to reflect an overall far bleaker view of the world today. Post- 9/11, it would appear 
that society, and in turn popular culture, resorted to far bleaker and grittier narratives, this is 
particularly the case with the espionage genre. Tobias Hochscherf, in his study of Bond, for 
example, explored how the Bond character in the era of Daniel Craig has seen a far darker 
portrayal, stating that ‘there has never been as much emphasis on Bond’s psyche as there is 
now with the general paranoid state of affairs after 9/11’.144 This grittier, darker image is 
present in many of the recent Cold War espionage dramas, and thus a shift in perspective and 
state of affairs in today’s world can influence not only the narratives explored but how they are 
presented; in this case a much colder and chilling portrayal of Smiley and his thoughts. 
Therefore, the audience may be able to relate to these feelings of doubt and disenchantment 
that Smiley conveys, with the conditions of the present shaping the lens through which such 
questions are explored. 
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The Game also highlights feelings of disillusionment in both the traitors and the protagonists. 
The mole, Sarah, when finally caught and questioned by Joe Lambe, declares that ‘the 
establishment is rotten. Democracy is a confidence trick’.145 Yet Daddy, head of MI5, also 
displays some disillusionment with the state of the Cold War. Daddy states, ‘I thought my work 
would be a privilege ( … ) but instead we shovel shit. And when we get home, clothes are stiff 
with blood and sweat and grease. I miss the war. The other one. Chap knew where he stood’.146 
Disillusionment is evident here in the failures of Daddy’s expectations. The fact that he misses 
the ‘other’ war again points to the Cold War as the anti-wartime image. The confused state of 
play of the Cold War contrasts to the clarity of the Second World War. Consequently, there is 
much evidence of disillusionment and decline in these portrayals, creating this sinister image 
of the period in modern cultural memory. It is interesting to note, especially in Daddy’s 
comments, a similarity to the views of Cold War agents and writers themselves. Several of the 
well-known authors of Cold War espionage fiction were once part of the British Intelligence 
Services, including, le Carré and Graham Greene. Le Carré has openly discussed his own 
disillusionment in the service. In an interview, le Carré noted that he was born into ‘great 
dreams of England’, of British pride and greatness during the war. However, to this he added 
that ‘Because I bought the whole wartime package, it took years to unlearn its chauvinism and 
simplicities’.147 We can see this reflected in Daddy’s comments above and therefore there is a 
sense that throughout its development, the memory of the Cold War has continued to express 
disappointment and a lack of faith in the West or in the war being fought. These feelings of 
disenchantment also capture the contemporary sentiments explored above regarding a lack of 
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faith in the establishment and the wars being fought. The theme of disillusionment is therefore 
an incredibly dominant theme in Cold War espionage dramas. This is created using the Second 
World War memory to create a contrast and portray the Cold War as a turbulent period of 
corruption and decline. However, we can see that the Cold War can equally be looked to 
nostalgically in comparison to today’s world. As a result, modern concerns can be seen to 
influence the Cold War narratives that are returned to.  
3.4 The Appeal and Nostalgia for Cold War Espionage 
The cultural memory of Cold War espionage captured post-1989 is far from being uniform. 
Whilst the discussion above demonstrates a continued desire and emphasis to create and absorb 
narratives of a Britain in decline under the Cold War shadow, audiences and visitors are also 
continually drawn to narratives of Cold War espionage and spies. The appeal of Cold War 
espionage reflects a fascination with the genre and an increasing nostalgia and longing for the 
Cold War in British culture. Equally, the genre and characters represent a sense of British 
values and provide reassurance of Britain’s role and ability to act, while at the same time 
inhabiting an environment of corruption and betrayal. 
3.4.1 Appeal of Cold War Espionage  
The films and dramas used in this chapter highlight an ongoing fascination with espionage and 
this is further evident in more recent productions including, Bridge of Spies (2015),148 the 
remake of The Man from U.N.C.L.E. (2015),149 and the adaptations of le Carré’s Our Kind of 
Traitor and The Night Manager (2016).150 In the wake of this ‘revival’, as some have referred 
to it,151 people are questioning why espionage and in particular in this case, Cold War 
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espionage, is continually revisited. Jeremy Duns has remarked that we may be drawn to these 
narratives because ‘the Cold War era provides an interesting counterpoint to our own turbulent 
times’.152 That the espionage genre became so dominant in and synonymous with the Cold 
War, means that many of the tropes which developed in the genre during the Cold War have 
remained.153 Author, Olen Steinhauer, for example, has remarked that as a result of Cold War 
spy fiction, people ‘have become accustomed to seeing the flaws in our own system, and in 
ourselves’, however he added that the clear enemy of the Cold War has been replaced by the 
‘ambiguity of today’.154 Consequently, it is possible that Cold War espionage is popular 
because it offers a more clearly defined background for espionage and a clarity that is lacking 
in the world today. Although Cold War espionage is often portrayed as complex, this is made 
in comparison to the Second World War, whereas a modern audience watches Cold War 
portrayals through the lens of a turbulent present. As a result, there may also be a nostalgic 
element to returning to Cold War espionage. 
However, in addition to this, espionage dramas also remain popular because intelligence 
remains a part of modern life. The poisoning of Sergei Skripal and his daughter in 2018 and 
the poisoning of former FSB agent Alexander Litvinenko in 2006 sparked much widespread 
scandal, the Litvinenko story often being returned to, particularly most recently in 2015-2016, 
when a public inquiry into his death took place.155 Further to this, in 2010, Russian agent Anna 
Chapman, was arrested after reports that she had belonged to a spy ring responsible for passing 
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information to the Russian Federation.156 The popularity of espionage in popular culture may 
partly be a result of the continuation of spy stories in the news, providing intrigue into a secret 
world. That the above stories mirror Cold War tensions with Russia may also add to this return 
to the Cold War. Indeed, Whithouse, writer of The Game, remarked that Anna Chapman’s story 
reignited memories of the Cold War which he wished to explore, stating that her ‘story seemed 
to be beamed straight from the 1970s’.157 As such, modern stories such as this can have the 
effect of drawing the recent past into the present. It is therefore not surprising that Horn noted 
the popularity of spy stories in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, claiming that such 
stories ‘embody a social life that cannot do without secrecy and betrayal’.158 The interests and 
news in society therefore have an influence on which stories and memories are returned to, and 
with the Cold War being so synonymous with espionage, it is an ideal setting. The Cold War 
provides an ideal backdrop to explore scandals, moral ambiguities and conspiracies, as such 
themes were prominent during the period, and it also provides a way to explore similar concerns 
today, without having to face current anxieties.  
3.4.2 Nostalgia  
Much like the Cold War is influenced by memories of the Second World War, modern conflicts 
provide a further lens through which to view the Cold War. As a result, modern events can 
create a nostalgic sentiment for the period. In Casino Royale (2006) this is evident in M’s 
words, ‘Christ I miss the Cold War’, having suggested there was some sense of proper 
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behaviour then.159 The complex conflicts of Iraq, Afghanistan and the War on Terror, help to 
shape views of the Cold War as a simpler, at least more understandable, conflict.  
Whilst during the Cold War the world was divided and nuclear threats and proxy wars engulfed 
the globe, the division provided a clear world order, one primarily divided between two camps. 
Consequently, the Cold War provided a clear enemy, one based on ideological differences. 
Both Whithouse when discussing The Game and Colin Firth when discussing Tinker, Tailor, 
Soldier, Spy, remarked on the clarity and simplicity of the enemy. Whithouse stated, ‘remember 
when the bogey man wasn’t the suicide bomber or the EDL thug, but glamorous and ruthless 
Russian spies’.160 Here, Whithouse demonstrates his own nostalgia for the Cold War era, one 
not necessarily the past as it was but a distorted version of the Cold War past, influenced by 
the fears and uncertainties of suicide bombers and extremists. The fact that Whithouse paints 
the Russian enemy as ‘glamorous and ruthless’ suggests a sense of admiration for their work, 
despite them being the feared enemy of the West. Equally, Firth, when playing Haydon in the 
2011 version of Tinker, Tailor, Soldier Spy, declared that the Cold War was ‘somehow 
ideologically ( …) so simple’.161A review for the film reiterated this with the statement that ‘a 
red flag with a hammer and sickle made the ideological and political stakes clear’ during the 
Cold War and similarly in cultural portrayals of the period. The Soviet flag and its meaning 
having been entrenched in society throughout the Cold War means that its significance 
continues to be recognised and understood. The ideological divide is thus generally perceived 
as simple and obvious, whereas today conflicts and alliances seem far less clear. As Max 
Hastings argued on Question Time in 2015, ‘we’re still coming to terms with the problem of 
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non-state enemies ( … ) In the old days we knew who the enemy was’.162 The complexity of 
the modern world therefore creates a nostalgic lens through which to view the simpler times of 
the Cold War.  
In part, the appeal of British Cold War espionage narratives reflects a nostalgia for old British 
values. As stated above, Willmetts and Moran have addressed how the Cambridge spies in 
particular convey a narrative of British values, including Englishness and class, alongside 
treachery and decline.163 The same can be said for most of the post-1989 Cold War espionage 
films and dramas discussed. Significant attention is paid to the recreation of a British, or often 
typically English, setting to these narratives. In turn they capture a sense of quintessentially 
British values. This is primarily captured in the portrayal of class. Whilst the class narrative 
has been discussed above to capture betrayal and a resentment for establishment failings, this 
discussion will highlight that there is also an allure and charm to upper-class behaviours and 
notions of gentlemen, emphasising once more the ambiguous and conflicting memories of the 
Cold War. The post-1989 dramas and films focused on in this chapter capture different 
characters from differing backgrounds. On the one hand there is a focus on the aristocratic 
upper-class, or gentleman, spy, found in the treachery of the Cambridge spies but also in the 
endearing character of George Smiley. With the Cambridge spies, aristocracy is shown to be 
corrupt and ideals of class are broken. Yet there is also a portrayal of the men’s charm, and an 
unwavering love for their country, despite their espionage. The depiction of Burgess in An 
Englishman Abroad and his desperation to cling to his English class and identity despite his 
exile capture this. His incapability to belong in either England or Russia evoked a sympathy, a 
loss of identity to national heritage.  Burgess’ love for England and English values continues 
 
 
162 Max Hastings, Comment on Question Time, BBC, 19 November 2015, 22:40. 
163 Willmetts and Moran, ‘Filming Treachery’, pp. 51-52. 
145 
to be captured post-Cold War in the Cambridge Spies series, depicting Burgess looking back 
at England as he and Maclean board the ship to defect to Moscow.  
George Smiley represents the English gentleman and class quite differently. Though often 
depicted ambiguously, Smiley represents gentlemanly values. Toby Manning argues that 
Smiley serves as ‘the avatar of the national, the paradigm of Britishness’ in le Carré’s novels. 
Described as ‘a notably gentlemanly – and politically powerful – national everyman. Decent, 
compassionate, cultured, devilishly clever, perpetually modest and polite, Smiley is as 
reassuring a representative of Britain as James Bond’.164 However, whilst a gentleman and 
Oxford man, Smiley, John L. Cobbs argues, is ‘amorphous, declaring that ‘he often relates to 
working-class psychologies ( … ) and rebellious rejectors of their upper-class roots’. It is these 
character traits which distinguish Smiley from the others, ‘pigeonholed’ in clear class divides. 
165 Smiley’s troubled marriage to ‘Lady Ann’ and betrayal by Bill Haydon, a cousin to Ann 
and thus aristocratic himself, highlight Smiley’s ambiguous and awkward position in terms of 
class. This awkwardness in turn helps to capture the sense of a ‘national everyman’.  Indeed, 
in each version of the narrative, Smiley is seen to operate distinct from the Circus as he seeks 
the mole. Despite the stark differences between the flamboyant, womanising Bond and the 
quiet and calculating Smiley, each offers an archetypal image of Britain. Atkins has suggested 
that there is a strange nostalgia for the aristocrat, declaring that they ‘established a code of good 
manners, or decent behaviour, among equals’, resulting in a ‘soft spot in our hearts for them’. 
Atkins added that these spies and their gentlemanly values are often more ‘attractive’ than the 
spies that have since followed. 166 The appeal of these characteristics is also evident in non-
Cold War films such as Kingsman (2015), which though satirical, played up to the Savile Row 
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adorned, well-mannered gentleman spy, capturing a nostalgia for this character. While the 
Cambridge spies often highlight issues with class and the establishment, it is their betrayal of 
class and the ideals of gentleman which is highlighted. The allure of the gentleman spy may 
thus not represent a nostalgia for the days of empire or imperial masculinity but may offer an 
escape into a time where there was a distinct sense of Britishness and a British role in the world. 
As the rise in globalisation and increased interests in family history capture a diminishing sense 
of identity, the attraction of the British gentleman secret agent may too be symptomatic of the 
same struggle for identity. The allure of spies and Cold War espionage genre thus both capture 
the lack of trust in the establishment and present a nostalgic image of gentlemanly values. 
The espionage genre can also be seen to provide reassurance in the form of the hero. Much like 
the anti-hero, the spies in Cold War espionage are inherently flawed or face many challenges. 
Shadi Neimneh has argued that the anti-hero in the twentieth century resulted from challenges 
to ‘traditional values’, the two World Wars also damaging notions of the traditional hero. These 
anti-heroes instead face challenges and crises yet are also capable of doing good.167 In his 
discussion of le Carré’s Smiley, Steven M. Neuse declared that, ‘Smiley appears an ambiguous 
hero. He solves murders and uncovers spies, both at home and abroad; and yet he is betrayed 
and rejected constantly by his wife, his organization, and his adversaries’.168 Unlike the 
traditional narrative of Bond, Smiley conveys a more realistic and tragic hero. In the film 
adaptation of Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, Smiley is seen living in isolation. This is particularly 
captured in the sequence of shots during the opening credits, where Smiley is seen swimming 
and walking through the park alone, before returning to an empty house with a pile of letters 
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for his wife Ann, waiting to be opened.169 The betrayals on the part of his wife and Haydon 
work to create a lone hero, facing life’s struggles. However, Smiley ultimately solves the case, 
identifying Haydon as the mole and bringing about both order and justice. As Manning argues, 
‘Le Carré’s Cold War protagonists serve the British state in every novel and, after a period of 
denial and decrial, restore the state and the status quo’.170  
Similarly, in The Game, Joe Lambe is left hurt and isolated by his failure to save the woman 
he loves, Yulia, from being captured by the Russian spy Odin, later learning that she in fact 
betrayed him by working for the Russians. Much like Smiley, Joe is pictured as the lone hero, 
frustrated by his orders to work with DC Jim Fenchurch, we see his desire for isolation. 
However, whilst not belonging to the upper-classes or establishment, Joe too is the hero of the 
narrative, he identifies Sarah as the mole and the series ends with the MI5 team returning to 
their work, order restored. The spies, as heroes in this sense can be argued to offer the audience 
a reassurance. They provide a feeling of action being taken and justice delivered. Whilst the 
traditional portrayal of Bond during the Cold War also offered this, the likes of Smiley and Joe 
Lambe offer a more realistic hero, one flawed yet ultimately the victor of the narrative. The era 
of the Daniel Craig Bond demonstrates this further, the audience now witness Bond’s 
weaknesses, yet he continues to serve and capture the villains which threaten Britain.  
3.5 Conclusion  
The exploration of Cold War espionage through the films, dramas and exhibition discussed, 
has enabled an analysis of a range of Cold War memories. The espionage genre is suited to 
exploring issues of moral ambiguities and disenchantment, capturing the sense of decline and 
lack of trust in the establishment which grew throughout the Cold War period itself. The use 
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of mise-en-scène and museum design adds to this, emphasising scenes of distress to accompany 
the narratives of espionage and treachery. The selection and popularity of these narratives, 
however, has as much to say about the era they were produced in, revealing and relating to 
similar modern concerns. For the post-1989 portrayals, this would particularly seem to be the 
case post-Iraq War, which led to significant hostility towards the Government, and subsequent 
scandals seem to have further eroded any trust in the establishment. Modern issues can 
consequently be seen to influence which Cold War narratives are returned to and this 
subsequently shapes the memories that are created of the period. Memories of decline and 
change are further perpetuated in the depiction of shattered values of sexuality, masculinity 
and class, the era being portrayed as one where Britain’s role and values were fundamentally 
reassessed. That many of these themes are captured by the numerous retellings and adaptations 
of the Cambridge spy narrative, points to their centrality to both the espionage genre, as it 
developed during the Cold War, and the period in general. The spies embody immorality, 
treason, transgressions, and disenchantment and as such memories of them and the Cold War 
almost seem synonymous.  
The portrayal of these sentiments, however, is only possible via the overlapping memories of 
the Second World War, and the continual development of memory throughout the Cold War 
itself. The cultural memory of the period is thus complex, it feeds off comparisons to the 
“glory” of the Second World War, producing images and sentiments of decline and the loss of 
British dominance and values. As the Cold War progressed, these memories developed, the 
continual revelations of spies and double agents, not only highlighted betrayal and corruption 
but also Government failures. That the Cambridge spies’ narrative unravelled over forty years 
meant these failures were returned to, shattering trust in the establishment. The ability of 
modern audiences to relate to similar sentiments today both highlights the legacy of the Cold 
War, in fundamentally shaping the way today’s world is perceived, but also suggests that the 
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period is returned to and popular in culture, due to its similarities to the world today. The 
cultural memory of the Cold War is therefore not simply a memory constructed after the 
conflict but one which feeds off the gradual unravelling of events throughout the period itself, 
and the legacy of these events.  
Despite repeated depictions of decline, today’s world equally provides a new, more nostalgic 
lens through which to view the Cold War. Its rules and certainty, alongside ideas of British 
values and heroic figures contrast to the uncertainty and chaos of the world today. The complex 
and ambiguous cultural memory of the Cold War being positioned between this nostalgia and 
notions of decline. 
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4 Awaiting Apocalypse: Remembering the Nuclear Threat in the Cold War 
 
The most symbolic image of the Cold War is arguably that of the nuclear mushroom cloud. 
The image pervades cultural portrayals of the conflict, instantly recognisable as a symbol of 
the threat which hung over the Cold War. As David Lowe and Tony Joel have stated, ‘It acts 
as a visual mnemonic thread from 1945 ( … ) to the end of the Cold War’.1 The image captures 
the East-West divide and the dangerous arms race which was carried out between them. 
However, alongside capturing the dangers and fears of the Cold War, Jonathan Hogg comments 
that ‘While new types of nuclear threat emerged, older motifs such as the nuclear mushroom 
cloud dissolved into a harmless and kitsch icon of popular culture’.2 The mushroom cloud thus 
echoes this ambiguous memory of the Cold War and the consistent divide between 
remembering the Cold War as a dangerous and turbulent era and as a period which can be 
looked on nostalgically. As with espionage, the nuclear threat serves as a repeated theme and 
narrative throughout the films, dramas, and exhibitions assessed. This chapter explores the 
ways in which the Cold War nuclear threat is captured in cultural portrayals and how this 
reflects and shapes memories of the period. Similarly to espionage, there is not a definitive 
memory of the nuclear threat. On the one hand there is a narrative of terror, hinting once again 
to a turbulent era. Yet, on the other hand, questions must be raised as to what it is about nuclear 
narratives and sites that appeals to audiences and visitors. What do nuclear narratives provide 
or capture? These questions are explored through the analysis of modern exhibitions and 
nuclear bunkers which are open to the public, as well as films and dramas which address the 
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nuclear threat, such as Ginger and Rosa (2012) and The Game. Initially, the continued 
emphasis on apocalyptic images will be explored, analysing the atmospheres and memories 
created, in particular through the focus on ‘hot points’ to convey a narrative of crisis. The image 
of the mushroom cloud itself and how it is used will also be assessed. An acknowledgment of 
the many influences on these narratives, from their creators to the inherited memories and 
popular culture from the Cold War, will help to explore why the nuclear threat is remembered 
in a particular way and why attempts to convey the narrative may result in simplification. The 
chapter will subsequently move onto an exploration of why Cold War and nuclear narratives 
appeal to audiences and visitors. This will take into consideration both notions of nostalgia and 
literature on dark and nuclear tourism to suggest several reasons as to why these narratives hold 
such appeal. 
Following the Manhattan Project and the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, the world entered the nuclear age, the development of which monopolised the Cold 
War. The arms race between the USA and the Soviet Union caused the world to come close to 
nuclear confrontation on more than one occasion, providing ‘hot points’ such as the Cuban 
Missile Crisis (1962), but also necessitating a series of arms limitation talks and agreements 
throughout the conflict. Britain, originally a partner on the Manhattan Project, was forced to 
develop its own atomic weapons programme when they were excluded by the USA through 
the McMahon Act (1946) which restricted the sharing of information. Britain detonated its first 
atomic bomb in 1952, however, they were already far behind the USA who detonated their first 
thermonuclear bomb in the same year. With the entrance into the post-thermonuclear age, the 
devastating potential of the weapons resulted in an outpour of imaginings and cultural 
explorations as to what these new Cold War weapons meant for the world.  
As with Cold War literature in general, the cultural history of the nuclear threat has increased 
in recent years. Paul Boyer’s 1985 book, By the Bomb’s Early Light, was the first, and an 
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influential cultural study of America’s nuclear experience. 3 Other works by Kirk Willis, Jeff 
Hughes, Jonathan Hogg, and Christoph Laucht, have sought to define what is meant by nuclear 
culture. In 1995, Willis, commenting on the neglected topic of British nuclear culture, defined 
the concept as ‘the knowledge, imagery, and artifacts of applied nuclear physics’.4 Willis 
argued that nuclear culture and imagery pre-dated the 1945 attacks on Japan, stating that the 
development of nuclear technology entered press and culture through novels, comics and films. 
The British nuclear culture, Willis argued, was far more pessimistic than that in America.5 
Others, including Hogg and Laucht, have highlighted the complexity of the topic and need for 
further definition,6 while Hughes argued for a more critical and nuanced approach to the study 
of ‘nuclear culture’, stating that ‘There are many nuclear cultures, in many contexts’.7 There is 
far from one definition or method of analysis for nuclear culture, however in these works, 
British cultural responses to the Cold War, during the period, have provided an increased 
understanding of attitudes to nuclear conflict.  
Equally, the works of Tony Shaw and Jonathan Hogg have assessed cultural responses to the 
conflict and nuclear threat respectively. Hogg provided a detailed account of how British 
cultural responses to the development of nuclear weapons and the nuclear state changed over 
the twentieth century. In particular, Hogg argued that British nuclear culture was formed by 
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official and unofficial narratives, which increasingly clashed towards the end of the Cold War 
as state narratives were challenged more and more.8  
Other works have addressed responses to the threat and possibility of nuclear war. For instance, 
Matthew Grant and Benjamin Ziemann’s edited collection of essays, explored the ways in 
which nuclear war was imagined and anticipated, and how this influenced culture, as well as 
government strategies and policies.9 Grant’s chapter specifically focused on how nuclear war 
was imagined in Britain, noting the USA’s Pacific tests in 1954 and the entrance into the 
thermonuclear era as the moment ‘when the imaginative landscape of nuclear war in Britain 
changed forever’.10 The recent work by Jessica Douthwaite and Matthew Grant on the 
experiences of Civil Defence volunteers also demonstrates how volunteers viewed the work of 
Civil Defence and their view on the nuclear threat. These works detail the façade of Civil 
Defence or a difficulty in conveying experiences and the usefulness of the training.11  
These works collectively demonstrate the varied approaches to exploring the British nuclear 
experience and in turn the various responses to the nuclear threat which occurred throughout 
the Cold War. In regard to memory studies, Lowe and Joel’s chapter on the ‘Nuclear World’ 
provided an overview of several sites and practices of remembering the Cold War’s nuclear 
threat, from Hiroshima’s Peace Memorial Museum to museums and the restoration of nuclear 
bunkers. The sites highlight the many challenges in creating a narrative of the Cold War and 
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remembering the conflict.12 Equally, the work of Wayne D. Cocroft and Inge Hermann 
provides insight into the physical remnants of the nuclear threat and the afterlife and attraction 
of these sites in the post-Cold War world.13 
This chapter will provide a detailed exploration of Britain’s cultural memory of the Cold War’s 
nuclear threat, building on studies of culture during the Cold War itself and the limited work 
on Cold War memory. Yet, it also aims to provide suggestions and open discussion as to how 
and why these memories of Britain’s Cold War and nuclear experience have developed, how 
these are dependent on the given present of today’s world, and what this means for a more 
general cultural memory of Britain’s Cold War.  
4.1 Images of Apocalypse 
Despite the end of the Cold War, the rhetoric of apocalypse and images of nuclear annihilation 
have not left us. The nuclear threat is often in the background of modern depictions of the Cold 
War, dealing with fears of the bomb or moments of activism and protest, rather than actually 
imagining a nuclear attack itself. This is perhaps an indication that whilst still an existing threat, 
it is not as imminent as it used to be. Modern apocalyptic films tend to deal more with the 
effects of climate change or the takeover by advanced technologies. Karen A. Ritzenhoff and 
Angela Krewani have stated that since 9/11, apocalyptic films have dealt with terrorism, 
technology and ‘ecological disasters’.14 Consequently, we can see how modern, more relevant, 
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fears of the future, have replaced ideas of nuclear war. However, in the increasing number of 
cultural representations of nuclear war, there are recurring dark images of apocalypse.  
The idea of apocalypse finds its roots in the bible. Kim Newman argues, most cultures have ‘a 
vision of Apocalypse’,15 with shared language and imagery providing a collective 
understanding of what the apocalypse means. Ritzenhoff and Krewani have discussed the 
biblical roots of apocalypse and the story of the final judgement, in which God destroys the 
earth, punishing sinners, whilst the ‘good people are united with God’. This understanding and 
imagery, they argued, ‘provides a structure to express our fear of an ending and to give 
expression to politically threatening situations’.16 The concept of apocalypse therefore provides 
a way to understand and process threats. The threat of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, 
and the struggle to imagine their devastating effects, resulted in many apocalyptic images. 
There is, however, one crucial difference between the biblical story of apocalypse and the 
modern understanding of the concept. This, Ritzenhoff and Krewani argued, lies in the loss of 
‘the building for the New Jerusalem’, the saving of the good.17 In contrast, the modern 
understanding of apocalypse denotes mere destruction, providing a much darker image, where 
all hope is lost. It is this imagery that we find connected to the nuclear threat.  
In Ginger and Rosa, we see these themes of apocalypse, the narrative being imposed on the 
background of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the escalating fears and tensions which play out 
through radio broadcasts and discussions. Ginger and Rosa follows the story of two teenage 
girls, best friends, born in August 1945, with the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The 
film opens with the mushroom cloud over Hiroshima and flashes to the birth of the girls, 
contrasting ideas and images of life and death, and setting the tone for the nuclear threat. The 
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narrative follows the two friends through the struggles of adolescence and coming to terms 
with the threat of nuclear war. The girls, however, find inherently different ways to deal with 
these struggles. The main character, Ginger, finds comfort in protest, joining the Young 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (YCND), whilst Rosa seeks romance, and with none other 
than Ginger’s Romantic, idealistic father, Roland. Director Sally Potter allows the viewer to 
watch the unfolding events from Ginger’s perspective. As a result, much of the imagery and 
language conveyed to the audience is of apocalypse and impending doom – both from the 
destruction of the bomb and the destruction caused by Rosa and Roland’s relationship.18 
Consequently, we see scenes of wasteland, bomb-sites left from the war, yet symbolic of the 
apocalyptic ideas of the “nothingness” which nuclear war would bring. The scene is barren, 
void of life except the youthful children who play amid the ruins. In weaving the narrative of 
the nuclear bomb with the lives of two young girls, we are reminded that it is the future which 
is threatened. 
The imagery of apocalypse is further echoed throughout the film via Ginger’s reading and 
poetry. One excerpt is as follows:  
 I dreamed there was a wall of flame,  
 I screamed because I was to blame.  
 I looked around, no night, no day,  
 No sky, no ground, nothing to say.19 
The language used, the emphasis of ‘no night, no day’, evokes an idea of emptiness. We see 
here how Ginger imagined nuclear annihilation and these imaginings fuelled her need for 
action. Potter employs the universal language and understandings of apocalypse to convey this 
idea to the audience. The film, released in 2012, followed the ongoing debates over the renewal 
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of Trident, bringing a connection between the Cold War narrative and modern events. The Cold 
War and CND echo of justified and necessary activism, which is present within the film, 
therefore have continued relevance in today’s society. The film, according to Potter, represents 
a relatable uncertainty about the future, in regard to the ‘‘slow catastrophe’ of climate 
change’.20 Additionally, the film followed the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011, 
which witnessed a severe nuclear accident, raising debates over faults made by the plant 
operator. Ginger and Rosa was therefore also released amid debates surrounding the ongoing 
risk and dangers of nuclear accidents. Images of barren wasteland tap into the imagery of 
apocalypse be that the result of climate change, nuclear accidents or nuclear war. Modern 
audiences can therefore also see their own fears reflected on the Cold War past. Narratives of 
fear and apocalypse during the conflict may consequently serve as an ideal backdrop for similar 
concerns today, even if that be from new and different threats. Using historical narratives to 
reflect on current concerns may provide a sense of security as opposed to confronting today’s 
concerns directly. 
The Game similarly taps into apocalyptic language and sentiment. In episode five of the series 
the viewer is taken back to ‘one year ago’ when Joe and Yulia were walking in London. A man 
preaching of Armageddon, wearing a sandwich board reading ‘the end is nigh’, is visible in the 
background creating an ominous sense for the episode, amid fears that Soviet Operation Glass 
is a nuclear attack on the UK. At the end of the episode, having returned to the current time of 
the narrative, a bomb explosion results in scenes of bodies on the street floor, amid these is the 
body of the same preacher, with the sandwich board cracked and broken, emphasising this 
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message of “the end”.21 The Game ties in the plot of espionage and a mole within MI6, with 
fears of nuclear attack. Consequently, modern audiences through television and films, like The 
Game and Ginger and Rosa, get a sense of the Cold War as ridden with fear. As a result, the 
Cold War is often portrayed in this regard as an intense period where the world, as it was 
known, could end at any moment.  
This very much follows experiences, memories, and popular culture during the Cold War itself, 
though this memory took some time to develop. The bombing of Japan by America in 1945, 
brought to life the power and devastation nuclear technology and weapons could bring, ideas 
which up until then had only been imagined and hypothesised. However, despite the destruction 
and horrors following the bombings, both Shaw and Grant have argued that the British public’s 
response to the attacks was not a straightforward one of fear and concern. Indeed, as Shaw 
stated, the attacks on Japan by America both brought uncertainty about this new weaponry and 
technology, but were also seen by some to herald the end of the war and bring peace.22 
Similarly, Adrian Bingham’s work on the press’ response and portrayal of nuclear war in the 
early Cold War period, demonstrates that both the Daily Express and Daily Mirror, praised the 
achievements of Britain in being a part of the Manhattan Project as well as labelling the new 
weapon ‘‘the most fearful device of war yet produced’’.23 It is clear that there were therefore 
varied feelings about the bomb immediately post-1945. Grant has discussed the fact that 
following the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it was difficult to imagine the impact of an 
atomic bomb, particularly the effects of such an attack on Britain. Grant argued that this 
difficulty to imagine nuclear war meant many attempts to do so were based on recent 
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experiences of the Second World War and the Blitz.24 Both Grant and Shaw have highlighted 
that the anxiety post-Hiroshima and Nagasaki was relatively short-lived. Shaw even remarked 
that between 1945 and 1950, ‘only four British films touched on the subject’.25 Grant explained 
this decrease in anxiety via both international attempts to control atomic energy and the 
establishment of the Civil Defence Corps in 1949.26 Contemporary British attitudes to the bomb 
in the immediate post-war period can thus be located in the recent past experiences of the ‘Blitz 
spirit’ and future ideas of survivability, based both on these past experiences and the creation 
of the Civil Defence Corps. Whilst concerns about nuclear technology remained in the 
background, the immediate post-war period helped to diffuse feelings of an immediate threat.  
However, as Grant argues, this changed dramatically with the introduction of the hydrogen 
bomb. In particular, Grant points to the USA’s Pacific tests of the hydrogen bomb in 1954 
which brought to light the devastating effects of radioactive fallout. This became evident from 
the radiation induced illness and burns contracted by Japanese fishermen 82 miles away from 
the tests. The new known destructive power of the hydrogen bomb, ‘shattered the link between 
the experience of the Second World War and contemporary nuclear reality’, as asserted by 
Grant.27 Consequently, anxieties this time remained, and in the 1950s and 1960s there were 
increasingly apocalyptic imaginings of thermonuclear war in popular culture. Interestingly, in 
this period, both Grant and Shaw remark on an ‘imaginative void’, an inability to imagine the 
reality of a nuclear attack and its aftermath. As such, numerous films in the 1950s and 1960s 
that addressed nuclear war, focused on apocalypse and the end of the world, drawing on the 
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imagery of destruction and nothingness.28 Indeed, Dr Strangelove (1964) left it to the audience 
to imagine the effect of nuclear war, as the audience were merely left with the image of Major 
‘King’ Kong riding off with the bomb and the sequence of mushroom clouds after the activation 
of the Doomsday machine.29 Instead the film focused on the precarious nature of MAD and 
how easily the arms race could escalate to the point of producing the ultimate deterrent, in the 
form of the Doomsday machine which cannot be deactivated.30 As such it is clear, as Grant 
argues, that 1954 fundamentally shaped both how nuclear war was imagined and understood.31 
Whilst imaginings and understandings were still reasonably situated in the recent experiences 
of the Second World War and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the new understandings 
altered on the basis of the expectations of the future and the prospect of survivability. It is thus 
this inability to imagine a future or world post-nuclear attack that drastically altered 
contemporary nuclear perspectives post-1954. Though, as Grant has pointed out, this did not 
mean there were not people who continued to argue the survivability of thermonuclear war; 
indeed, the Civil Defence Corps was not officially ‘scrapped’ until 1968.32. The imagery and 
language of the nuclear apocalyptic threat during the Cold War has thus developed from 
throughout the period and explains its central role in post-1989 Cold War narratives.  
However, post-1989 depictions of the Cold War nuclear threat differ in that the threat, while 
still present, is far less than it once was. Hogg has argued that modern cultural portrayals of the 
Cold War have become depoliticised.33 Peter Watkins’ The War Game (1965) a documentary-
drama which sought to envisage life after a nuclear attack on Kent, was overtly critical of 
 
 
28 Grant, ‘The imaginative landscape of nuclear war in Britain, 1945-65’, p. 94, 102; Shaw, British Cinema and 
the Cold War, p. 132. 
29 Dr Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, dir. Stanley Kubrick (Columbia 
Pictures, 1964) [Motion picture]; Shaw, British Cinema and the Cold War, pp. 132 - 133. 
30 Dr Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, dir. Stanley Kubrick). 
31 Grant, ‘The imaginative landscape of nuclear war in Britain, 1945-65’, p. 111. 
32 Grant, ‘The imaginative landscape of nuclear war in Britain, 1945-65’, pp. 94, 106. 
33 Hogg, British Nuclear Culture, p. 161.  
161 
government responses to the nuclear threat and the continuation of Civil Defence, this criticism 
an act of activism in itself. The film was highly critical of the Civil Defence Corps and 
government plans for survival, to the extent of depicting interviews with Civil Defence 
members in the film. One of which stated ‘I think extra numbers would have made no 
difference at all to this’, while another remarked, ‘It was a title they had all wrong-call this 
defence?’.34 Particularly significant in the post-thermonuclear era, the film tapped into this 
increased distrust and disbelief in Civil Defence and government assurances that thermonuclear 
war could be survived. Indeed, the Civil Defence Corps was disbanded only a few years after 
the film was produced. In contrast, Ginger and Rosa, as a post-1989 portrayal, follows a 
teenager’s attempts to come to terms with the possibility of nuclear apocalypse and does not 
depict an apocalyptic scenario playing out. Equally, the inclusion of a nuclear narrative in The 
Game serves more to contextualise and frame it as a Cold War drama, the fear of nuclear threat 
today not being at the same level as in 1965. The knowledge that the Cold War nuclear 
apocalypse never emerged has removed fear as well as much of the political imperative to fight 
against government nuclear policy. Despite this, in Ginger and Rosa, Ginger’s activism does 
capture a refusal to believe government Civil Defence measures. The release of the film 
following the Trident renewal debates and Fukushima crisis, makes it far from depoliticised. 
These debates highlight that the nuclear threat still exists in the post-Cold War world, although 
somewhat diminished. The impact of the Cold War thus continues to influence present day in 
the existence of these weapons and technology, and the release of Ginger and Rosa coincided 
with renewed debates as to deterrence, non-proliferation, and the dangers of nuclear 
technology. However, the difference rests in the lack of proximity to the Cold War. Nuclear 
attack is no longer the same looming threat it was during the conflict. Ginger’s activism instead 
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can be seen to fight against the remnants of the Cold War and new threats such as the 
apocalypse which is threatened by climate change. As a result of perspectives following 1954 
and early Cold War popular culture such as The War Game, we can see why modern portrayals 
place the nuclear threat in Cold War narratives. Yet we can also understand how distance from 
the Cold War alters memories, fear of the nuclear threat no longer as present and thus narratives 
focus less on an apocalypse and more on framing the Cold War and fighting modern threats in 
a Cold War context. 
Whilst the cultural reflections and memories of nuclear war may have become less political or 
full of fear, some similarities and continuities remain. Both The War Game and Ginger and 
Rosa were set within the post-thermonuclear era with increasing questions over the possibilities 
of survivability and the struggle to imagine life post-nuclear attack. As Grant argues, early 
attempts to imagine nuclear war were heavily influenced by memories of and experiences in 
the Second World War.35 Despite its release in the post-thermonuclear world, The War Game 
demonstrated the continued reliance on memories and understandings of the Second World 
War. Comparisons to the war were made throughout, for example, portrayals of armed police, 
the burning of bodies and the collection of wedding rings as a way to identify victims, was 
followed by the narrative voiceover declaring that, ‘Everything which you are now seeing 
happened in Germany after the heavy bombing in the last war. It would almost certainly have 
to happen in Britain after a nuclear war’. Equally, at the end of the film, a statement appeared 
on the screen stating that ‘Much of the film that you have just seen was based on information 
obtained from the bombings of Dresden, Darmstadt, Hamburg, Hiroshima and Nagasaki’.36 
That Watkins and those behind the film drew on research of these events and used these to 
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forge imaginings of nuclear war, indicates that portrayals and imaginings of nuclear attack in 
the early Cold War period still drew on memories and images of wartime. This is likely because 
these wartime events were people’s only or most recent memories of war and devastation, thus 
understandings were inevitably based on these ideas. Similar comparisons can be seen in 
cultural portrayals today. However, this now serves more to exaggerate the terror and decline 
of the Cold War years in comparison to the ‘glory’ of the Second World War. Ginger and Rosa 
relies on images and a memory of wartime Britain; the narrative framed by the end of the war. 
In contrast to the nuclear threat Ginger seeks to survive, the wartime experiences of the older 
generations seemed survivable. As Ginger’s fear radicalises her to take further action, she 
begins to condemn Roland for being a Conscientious Objector in the war, and not contributing 
to the war effort. Ginger’s defiance regarding the need for action suggests an idealism of the 
Second World War, in that a refusal to fight or act was a luxury which could not be afforded 
in the nuclear age. Once again, this idyllic memory of the Second World War aids a portrayal 
and memory of the Cold War as a more threatening era. The Second World War thus continues 
to shape Cold War memory today, yet rather than a basis of understanding the impact of a 
nuclear attack, it serves to heighten drama and sense of a tumultuous period. Perhaps the lack 
of proximity to the Cold War and diminished fear of a nuclear threat results in the need to 
exaggerate and emphasise the Cold War as an era of terror. The use of Second World War 
memory aids this.  
Towards the end of the 1960s, as the Cold War headed toward a period of détente nuclear 
anxieties seemed to decrease. In 1963, the year following the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev 
and Kennedy agreed to the Limited Test-Ban Treaty. This limited the testing of nuclear 
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weapons to underground.37 Francis J. Gavin has argued that whilst the nature and success of 
this treaty was limited, it was a move towards greater non-proliferation agreements. Subsequent 
progress was made with the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, the fears of proliferation among 
non-nuclear countries being a growing concern of both the USA  and the Soviet Union.38 This 
coincided with a decline in the CND’s popularity, Grant arguing this was ‘perhaps as a result 
of Cuba’ and the successful negotiation and de-escalation of the crisis which, for many, 
demonstrated the effectiveness of deterrence. Subsequently, less people shared the CND’s call 
to ‘ban the bomb’.39  As a result, leading into the period of détente there was a lessening of 
tensions, subsequently resulting in a lesser focus on the idea of an imminent nuclear attack. 
Following the period of détente, the late-1970s and 1980s witnessed renewed tensions between 
East and West. This was reflected in Cold War, and particularly nuclear, culture. As Daniel 
Cordle has demonstrated, a series of events and rising international tensions created ‘a 
resurgence of nuclear-themed literature’, which was also present in film and television.40 It was 
in this period that Threads (1984), The War Game (produced in 1965 but not broadcast until 
1985) and When The Wind Blows (1987) were all broadcast,41 demonstrating direct responses 
to the growing fears and debates surrounding nuclear war.  Both The War Game and Threads, 
each publicly broadcast in the 1980s, provided chilling imaginings of what would happen in 
the event of a nuclear attack. Each provided a documentary style film, detailing the effects of 
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a nuclear attack on Kent and Sheffield respectively;42 Cordle arguing that The War Game was 
an influence on the creation of Threads.43 As noted earlier, whilst The War Game made some 
attempts at the end of the film to imagine life four months post-nuclear attack, Threads took 
this further. Threads attempted to imagine life up to thirteen years after a nuclear attack on 
Sheffield. Equally, When The Wind Blows followed the sad and terrifying effects of a nuclear 
attack, this time on a loving, elderly couple, James and Hilda Bloggs.44 The film was very much 
a criticism of the government and council advice in the form of videos and leaflets such as 
Protect and Survive, produced in 1980 under the Thatcher administration. Despite James’ 
attempts to follow the often-contradictory instructions, the couple still fell victim to radiation 
sickness. Their lack of awareness of the severity of a nuclear war highlighted their ignorance 
and innocence, their ideas of war shown to be rooted in their childhood experiences of the 
Second World War. It was this failed understanding of the bomb which made the film so tragic, 
providing an emotional insight into how ordinary people would be affected. These programmes 
were broadcast in a climate of renewed and increasing tensions. In 1979, the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan resulted in a new proxy war between the superpowers and indicated increased 
tensions and hostilities. Olav Njolstad emphasises that détente ‘received the fatal blow with the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan’.45 Equally important to the renewed animosity of the 1980s 
was the election, first, of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and then of Ronald Reagan in 1980, both 
of whom had campaigned on the basis of tough stances against the Soviet Union, particularly 
in the early 1980s.46 Beth A. Fischer has argued that the early 1980s saw a ‘confrontational 
 
 
42 The War Game, dir. by Peter Watkins; Threads, dir. by Mick Jackson. 
43 Daniel Cordle, ‘“That’s Going to Happen to Us. It Is”: Threads and the Imagination of Nuclear Disaster on 
1980s Television’, Journal of British Cinema and Television, 10.1 (2012), 71 – 92 (p. 73) 
<https://doi.org/10.3366/jbctv.2013.0122> [Accessed 16 December 2020]. 
44 When the Wind Blows, dir. Jimmy T. Murakami. 
45 Olav Njolstad, ‘The collapse of superpower détente, 1975-1980’, in The Cambridge History of the Cold War: 
Volume III Endings, ed. by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), pp. 135 - 155 (p. 151).  
46 See Cordle, ‘Protect/Protest’, p. 655. 
166 
policy toward the USSR’ on the part of the USA, this particularly surfaced with the 1983 
announcement of the Strategic Defence Initiative.47 As Fischer remarked, whilst the President 
saw this as a defensive measure, others saw it as confrontational and that if the system were 
successful it would upset the balance of the deterrent of MAD.48 The period thus saw a new 
peak in the arms race. This combined with the placing of US missiles in Europe, for example 
those at Greenham Common, sparked a revitalisation of anti-nuclear protest; the CND’s 
membership drastically increasing in the early 1980s.49 It is thus unsurprising that Cold War 
and nuclear culture resurged in this period. In particular, imaginings of life during and 
following a nuclear attack conveyed further criticisms of government policy.  
Post-1989 portrayals of the later Cold War often focus on the criticism of government 
preparations. In both TNA’s Protect and Survive and the IWM’s People Power: Fighting for 
Peace exhibitions, criticisms of government advice were central features of the narrative. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, the Protect and Survive exhibition captured this in an interview with 
Dr Matthew Grant who discussed the façade of Civil Defence. Equally, the constructed shelter 
displayed under the stairs within the exhibition demonstrated the rudimentary nature of 
government suggestions in their Protect and Survive leaflets and their limited effectiveness in 
the event of a nuclear attack. The People Power exhibition similarly captured criticism in 
protest against government advice, by including the publication of E. P. Thompson’s Protest 
and Survive in response to the government’s guidance.50 In addition to this, screenings of The 
War Game in the exhibition helped to emphasise this criticism, particularly as a result of its 
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delayed broadcasting due to its graphic nature. Furthermore, IWM’s Peace and Security 
exhibition also provided a space to display the When The Wind Blows book, once more 
emphasising its central role as a criticism of government nuclear policy in the 1980s.51 These 
criticisms and perceptions have become engrained from Cold War popular culture and people’s 
memories of the conflict. Post-1989 cultural portrayals therefore reflect many of these themes 
and criticisms about the survivability of nuclear war, continuing the use of apocalyptic images 
and reinforcing a narrative of a turbulent era. 
Cultural portrayals today which capture this latter period of the Cold War can be seen to reflect 
the criticism and questioning of government promises and guidance in the 1980s. We can 
therefore see how perceptions of the nuclear threat developed and changed from 1945, through 
the tensions of the 1960s and 1980s, and up to present day. As a result of cultural imaginings 
during the Cold War itself, many images and themes have been adopted by post-1989 
portrayals. As Hogg has argued, the increasing criticism of the state’s official narratives by the 
1980s explains the more graphic imaginings of the nuclear war. The more graphic portrayals 
in the 1980s attest to the growing awareness of the destruction of the bomb. From the cultural 
portrayals discussed, images of barren wasteland, notions of Armageddon and criticisms of 
government defence strategies continue to be reflected today. These criticisms and graphic 
portrayals emphasise the fear of a nuclear threat for modern audiences, now more distant from 
these fears. These are however also influenced by modern concerns. Current fears of 
apocalypse caused by climate change, technology or terrorism can be equally reflected onto 
this Cold War background, imposing current concerns on a more secure background of the 
past, as opposed to facing these fears in the present. Similarly, the legacy of Cold War nuclear 
weapons results in continued debates and criticisms of government reliance on the deterrent 
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and fears of nuclear proliferation. These debates in recent years have thus brought the Cold 
War and the nuclear threat back into significance. 
4.2 Images of Apocalypse in Nuclear Bunkers 
The imagery of apocalypse can also be found in Cold War nuclear bunkers which are scattered 
across the British landscape. These physical spaces offer a tangible aspect of Britain’s Cold 
War narrative, structures which shed light on an ambiguous history and memory. Whilst Ginger 
and Rosa and exhibitions convey the fears of an imagined war, the bunkers themselves are 
physical reminders that this imagined war was deemed a very real threat, the official 
preparations for apocalypse.52 It is this sense of threat which is often conveyed in the nuclear 
bunkers open to the public. Three are explored here, including Hack Green Secret Nuclear 
Bunker, Kelvedon Hatch Secret Nuclear Bunker and York Cold War Bunker. Hack Green 
bunker was purchased in 1995 by Rodney Siebert and is run by his family.53 Similarly, 
Kelvedon Hatch, located on a farm, was returned to the family from which it was originally 
purchased, and is now largely overseen by the original farmer’s grandson, Mike Parrish.54 In 
contrast, the third bunker, York Cold War Bunker, is owned and protected by English Heritage, 
now a registered monument.55 Due to their different owners the narratives and experiences 
created in each vary. However, their different Cold War roles and designs equally affect the 
narrative and memory each bunker conveys. Each of the three bunkers explored here have been 
transformed into museums and/ or registered heritage monuments. Recently, a special issue in 
the Journal of War and Culture Studies, explored ‘The Bunker’s Afterlife’, with authors 
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exploring the various states and uses of bunkers post-Cold War. As Luke Bennett in the 
introduction stated, the journal’s focus was ‘the cultural production and circulation of both 
symbols and artefacts of conflict’ and how groups, whether small or the wider public, produced 
a shared meaning from these artefacts.56 This thesis equally reflects on the creation of shared 
cultural memory and meaning generated through these bunkers and how they are presented in 
popular culture post-Cold War. 
The external appearances of the bunkers are very different. Hack Green bunker resembles a 
military building, with aged concrete, metal fencing and barbed wire surrounding it, creating a 
feeling of the site being secret and forbidden.57 This mirrors the stark, grey environments 
created in the espionage narratives, continuing the focus on dark and discomforting 
atmospheres. Hack Green was a Rotor surface design built in the 1950s, becoming a Regional 
Government Headquarters in the 1980s.58 As Wayne D. Cocroft and Roger J. C. Thomas 
highlight, despite attempts not to scar the countryside with military buildings and building 
bungalow structures instead, places including Hack Green ‘were dwarfed by massive R6 
operations blocks ( … ) destroying any pretence of concealment or aesthetics’.59 Kelvedon 
Hatch is also a surface structure, taking the form of the guardroom ‘bungalow-like buildings’ 
which had a hidden tunnel leading into the underground structure. The bungalow structure 
means there is not the same obvious feeling of it being a forbidden site. However, the secret 
entrance being a long tunnel underground, equally provides this idea of secrecy and 
trespassing.60 Kelvedon Hatch had also been a Rotor design structure from the 1950s period of 
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construction, however in 1961 it became a Regional Seat of Government.61 York Cold War 
Bunker is similar to that of Hack Green in that it resembles a military building, with metal 
fencing around it. However, in one crucial difference to both Hack Green and Kelvedon Hatch, 
the York Bunker is not secret or hidden in the countryside like the others. It is instead near the 
centre of the city, ‘behind Shelley House on Acomb Road’.62 The York Bunker is a semi-
sunken structure, meaning that while the main structure is underground visible ‘in the surface 
as a rectangular earth mound’, there is also ‘a projecting two-storey blockhouse’ above the 
mound.63 York bunker was built in 1961 as a Royal Observer Corps (ROC) Headquarters, and 
remained so until the ROC was disbanded in 1991.  
Despite their variations in ownership and appearance, each bunker, to varying degrees, play on 
a cultural memory of apocalypse and terror. The nuclear threat for many during the Cold War 
was an ever-present danger, a threat which loomed in the background to everyday life. The 
level of protest at high points during the Cold War demonstrates this level of fear and concern, 
driving people to take action. The building of a network of nuclear bunkers and monitoring 
posts equally highlights the very real potential of a nuclear attack that was felt, as the 
government sought to defend themselves and govern society from bunkers. As a result, a 
narrative of fear is inevitable. However, the bunkers both reflect, shape, and even exaggerate 
this memory of apocalyptic fear. The nature of the bunkers gives visitors a unique experience 
and memory of life prepared for nuclear apocalypse. The idea of authenticity provided by such 
heritage sites may, in part, be sought by visitors in their desire to understand the past. Ludmilla 
Jordanova discusses ‘the search for the authentic’ and notes a recreation of ‘Viking-age Jorvik’ 
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in the Jorvik Viking Centre in York, which recreates the ‘sight, sound and smell’ of the era. 
Jordanova uses this to demonstrate that the past cannot in reality be relived but that there is this 
illusion of the authentic, despite the selection process behind museums.64 Hermann also 
acknowledges the role of these physical sites in shaping experiences and memories ‘despite 
being governed by an authorised discourse’.65 The very nature of the bunkers, being real, 
surviving heritage sites of the Cold War means that they too play on the senses, and whilst 
visitors cannot fully experience what life would be like in an operational bunker, the play on 
the senses appeals to this desire for an authentic experience of a life underground in preparation 
for nuclear attack. Internally, the bunkers have largely white walls, with a somewhat clinical 
and regimental feel, reflecting their military and governmental role; and being underground 
there is also a strong damp smell, creating a discomforting experience. Another sense played 
on is sound, this is mainly focused on in Hack Green bunker, recreated for the purpose of the 
museum, many rooms have added soundscapes, often the whirring of  machines and incoming 
communications. The play on the senses creates this authentic experience for the visitor, within 
which they can become part of the experience themselves, learning about and in turn receiving 
or forming memories of the Cold War. In the surveys and interviews Hermann conducted with 
visitors to nuclear sites, questions as to their ‘experience of ‘being’ at the Cold War site’, 
revealed focuses on the site offering insight into government secrecy. In addition to this, the 
sounds, appearance, and smells of the site were noted. These ‘physical discomforts’, Hermann 
argues were matched by ‘social discomforts’, primarily from the inequality that bunkers 
represented that some would be saved whilst others would perish.66 These responses led 
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Hermann to conclude that the ‘process of passing on and receiving memories and knowledge 
within, and through, the physical reality of the place helped visitors to arrange, shape and 
negotiate a range of links and associations about who they ‘are’ and their ‘place’ in this 
world’.67 The experiences of the bunkers thus help to either recall memories of the nuclear 
threat for those who remember or help to construct memories for those who do not; the sights, 
sounds, smells and inequalities that the bunkers represent, creating a dark memory. 
That you are guided through each bunker also influences the visitor’s participation. Each 
bunker attempts to direct the visitor around the site. In Hack Green, the numbering of the rooms 
means that you start on the top floor of the bunker, gradually getting lower until you are in the 
heart of the bunker itself and return to the top on your way out.68 In contrast, at Kelvedon Hatch 
bunker you are guided from the bottom to the top, with the aid of an audio guide for 
information, the entrance to the bunker being via a disguised underground tunnel.69 York Cold 
War Bunker is the only one of the three in which you are part of a guided tour, allocated a time 
and shown round by a member of English Heritage staff.70 As some, such as Roger Silverstone, 
have acknowledged, the display, space and directions of museums all help to shape visitor 
experience.71 The nature of the bunkers being previously operational military sites, with each 
room and level having specific purposes, makes the control of visitor movement more logical, 
with the narrative of the bunker’s function unravelling as the visitor descends or ascends the 
bunker. However, the fact that the bunkers are heritage sites of previous secret operations, a 
fact which is focused upon in Hack Green and Kelvedon Hatch’s marketing in particular, also 
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gives the idea that the visitor must be carefully and strictly guided through what would have 
been the government operations in the event of nuclear attack. The experience of being guided 
thus almost adds to the prohibited nature of the bunkers, some areas also remaining off-limits. 
Despite these differences, in being able to visit and enter the bunkers you get a different 
experience to watching a film or attending a museum, instead you become part of the 
experience, imagining life underground during a nuclear threat. As a result, strong memories 
of the fact that the nuclear threat felt very real are created, or for those who experienced and 
remember the Cold War, relived.  
In acknowledging the active role and experience of the visitor, Jordanova has remarked on the 
visitor’s sometimes conscious and subconscious identification with objects on display, either 
through finding associations with that object or that object provoking ‘memories’ or 
‘fantasies’.72 Whilst the numerous individual objects on display in the bunkers, whether that be 
nuclear weapons, radios or communication equipment, may not generate memories themselves, 
collectively, the objects held within a real and authentic heritage site, can offer this same 
interaction and identification. We can particularly see this in the memory project at Hack 
Green, with a space provided for leaving comments and recollections of the conflict. Those 
who lived through the conflict, or Cold War “survivors”, noted their memories, stating that the 
tour of the bunker had caused a recollection of these memories and reminiscences. Many of the 
memories recount the fear the individuals used to feel, many being young or even children 
during the Cold War.73 As the bunker is a physical reminder of the real threat and war that was 
anticipated, the bunker as a heritage site and museum can also trigger identifications and 
memories of Cold War experience and that same fear and threat that was so real at the time. 
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This demonstrates the ability of museums and sites to recall and shape memories, 
acknowledging the active and interactive role of the visitor, based on their own knowledge and 
experiences.  
The Hack Green ‘Nuclear Shelter Experience’, affords visitors the opportunity to imagine what 
a nuclear attack may feel like underground. The experience takes place in a small, narrow room, 
filled with a bright and ominous red flashing light, and sounds of blasts vibrate and bounce off 
the walls.74 The experience helps to create fear and terror, that sense of danger which cultural 
representations of the nuclear Cold War are keen to emphasise. In providing experiences such 
as this, the bunker is shaping and creating memories for visitors by trying to get them to imagine 
and engage with what was, during the Cold War, a very real threat. The effort taken to 
emphasise and recreate this atmosphere, even at times exaggerate the fear, could again be an 
indication that there is an ambiguous memory of Cold War Britain. This may even extend to a 
lack of memory. The need to emphasise the fear and terror suggests a need to explain the 
purpose and the presence of the bunkers, particularly as a nuclear war never emerged. Yet it 
also provides a level of interaction and entertainment for the visitor, adding to the ‘family day 
out’. Andrea Witcomb, in her work on interactivity within museums, added however, that 
interactives are about more than mere entertainment, interactives also enable the visitor to be 
active in their experiences; though entertainment may be a factor with the bunker, it relying on 
admissions costs to run.75 This is equally evident in Hack Green’s inclusion of interactives such 
as sending your own Morse code message or sounding the warning alarm, which are dotted 
about the museum, allowing the visitor to shape their experience.76 These added experiences 
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therefore both allow the visitor to become engaged and active, yet also add entertainment value, 
to heighten notions of drama, and the thrill of being in the bunker, sending messages or 
experiencing a nuclear shelter.  
Further to providing thrills, both Hack Green and Kelvedon Hatch tend to focus on the macabre 
and some of the more chilling aspects of government planning. In each there is a medical room, 
in Hack Green, this is a relatively small first-aid room, whereas Kelvedon Hatch portrays a 
much larger room and operating theatre. In Hack Green, the first-aid room is one of the most 
disturbing for visitors, with children discouraged from entering, and is the last room of the tour. 
Inside is a hospital set up. A disturbing soundscape plays overhead of a woman, seen laying in 
a hospital bed, screaming in agony and the nurse standing next to her reading out the woman’s 
symptoms and condition, declaring that death was likely. The room also provides images and 
information of the horrifying medical effects of a nuclear explosion, burns and the effects of 
radiation sickness.77 That this is the last room visitors enter undeniably shapes memories and 
ideas of the Cold War and threat of nuclear war being very real and horrifying. Similarly, the 
operating theatre at Kelvedon Hatch also reflects sombre details of preparations including 
information on the audio tour regarding the cardboard coffins.78 As Phillip Deery remarked in 
his review of the bunker these coffins were ‘a chilling reminder of administrative 
resourcefulness during the hostilities’, the coffins designed to be ‘ejected’ outside when 
needed, yet when not needed could be tidily folded and tucked away.79 The focus of the bunkers 
is thus firmly centred on the horrors of nuclear war, again adding to the traditional British 
memory of the bomb as the harbinger of apocalypse. In contrast, York, being a ROC 
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Headquarters, did not have a medical room, only a first aid box in the canteen. As a result, 
York does not have or provide this same focus on the macabre.80  
In addition to this, both Hack Green and Kelvedon Hatch show screenings of Cold War nuclear 
films, adding to the experience and the creation of memories. Hack Green Nuclear Bunker for 
instance has a screening of The War Game, again young children are discouraged from 
entering.81 Undoubtedly, the bunker’s showing of The War Game adds to these memories and 
attempts to imagine a potential nuclear attack, cultural products of the Cold War themselves 
becoming the cultural memory today, as fiction and reality become merged in these sites. 
Equally, at Kelvedon Hatch, Lowe and Joel, on their visit, remarked on two video screenings 
of The Hole in The Ground and The Brink of Apocalypse, which are regularly shown within 
the bunker. When Deery visited in 2000, Kelvedon Hatch bunker was also showing The War 
Game.82 These imaginings of nuclear war build on the experience of the bunker, the feeling 
that everything you see would be going on above you. Whilst York Bunker does not show any 
films from the Cold War, it does screen an introductory video at the beginning of the tour. This 
video introduces the bunker and the roles of those who worked there, the purpose of the bunkers 
captured in the inevitable use of mushroom cloud footage, setting both the context but also 
setting the scene of nuclear threat. Whilst this video also contained some information on the 
effects of a nuclear bomb, its documentary-style did not create the same harrowing or 
personalised narrative.83 Whilst Hack Green and Kelvedon Hatch employ fictional narratives 
to create an atmosphere of fear, York bunker relies on a documentary-style introductory film 
to set out basic knowledge on the Cold War and the nuclear arms race. Despite their different 
approaches, however, it is clear that each bunker ensures that the nuclear threat is well 
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explained and clear, if not dramatised. Again, an emphasis on creating an atmosphere of terror 
may be indicative of the lack of proximity to the nuclear threat today and a need to demonstrate 
that it was a real threat despite a nuclear war never taking place. Furthermore, the need to 
explain the threat posed suggests an ambiguous, if not lack of, memory of Britain’s Cold War, 
helping to explain Britain’s uncertain relationship with its Cold War past.  
4.3 Influences on Apocalyptic Narratives 
We should, however, consider who is behind these portrayals of the Cold War period and 
nuclear war. The fact that Hack Green and Kelvedon Hatch are privately owned influences the 
narratives emphasised and created. Whilst each sets out to educate the visitor and provide 
information on the roles of these secret bunkers, we have also seen many attempts to emphasise 
the thrill and drama of the bunkers, adding elements for entertainment. For instance, both draw 
on the secrecy of the sites in their marketing to attract visitors. The Hack Green guidebook 
provides a good example of this. The guidebook is presented as a file with stamps of 
‘declassified’, ‘For your eyes only do not copy’ and ‘top secret’ stamped across the front.84 
The idea of being able to see a part of history which would have occurred behind closed doors 
is thus focused on. Both Hack Green and Kelvedon Hatch also host additional activities which 
entice visitors and in some cases serve as further sources of income. In Hack Green, a ‘Soviet 
Spy Mouse Trail’ is offered to children. This is advertised as a secret mission to detect and 
count the number of Soviet spy mice working for the Russian secret service E.E.K (Eastern 
European Kremlin) who are attempting to steal secret plans from the bunker.85 Again, the 
combination of a bunker narrative with activities of espionage is indicative of the appeal of 
secrecy, danger and intrigue of secret war plans and conspiracy. Equally, Kelvedon Hatch has 
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an adventure ‘High ropes’ course and hosts ‘nuclear’ races, playing on themes of action, 
danger, and thrills, attracting visitors and providing income.86 These additional narratives and 
activities work to shape visitors’ perceptions of the Cold War site. 
In contrast, York bunker is a designated monument owned by English Heritage, as such the 
reconstruction of the site and the availability of resources creates a very different experience. 
The site was carefully reconstructed with the aid of ex-ROC volunteers who had worked there, 
a resource that would not be available for every site. The majority of equipment in the bunker 
is also from the same year of 1961.87 That the equipment is of the correct period and that the 
plotted markings in the ops room are left from the last ROC volunteer exercise, creates greater 
authenticity for the visitor, the narrative more reliable, authentic and less flattened into a 
general Cold War narrative or one of terror.  
Hermann argues that a ‘relative lack of interest by dominant institutions such as the National 
Trust (NT) and English Heritage (EH)’, has resulted in ‘an impression of ‘accepted neglect’ of 
Cold War remains’.88 As a result, many Cold War remains and artefacts have, Hermann argues, 
been ‘‘collected’ and exploited by private owners and trusts for various and overlapping 
reasons’, including tourism. Hack Green provided as an example of both tourist site and ‘a 
facility for telecommunications purposes’.89 Hack Green in particular focuses on its museum. 
Over the years, the owners have collected a wide range of artefacts, including numerous Cold 
War weapons which are now on display.90 At times, however, these artefacts are grouped 
together, with little information as to their significance to the Cold War or the bunker, the 
bunker consequently offers an odd collection of ephemera and artefacts ranging from weapons 
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to Civil Defence badges and pamphlets.91 Kelvedon Hatch bunker instead has collected mainly 
equipment that would have been used in the bunker, focusing on the role and function of each 
room. However, some have remarked on a similar disjointed collection and portrayal of the 
bunker. Hermann has remarked that Kelvedon Hatch is ‘ambiguous’ in its representation of the 
different periods and uses of the bunker, which range from a RAF Rotor station, later becoming 
a civil defence base and then the Regional Government Headquarters. Lowe and Joel have also 
commented on the figure of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher among communications 
equipment from the 1960s.92 Hermann states that ‘this ambiguity seems to reflect a desire to 
turn away from the ‘official’ or ‘national’ representation and towards a more ‘personal’ and 
‘private’ proprietor explanation’. Subsequently, the focus of the bunker is on the narrative of 
the very real nature and anticipation of the threat of nuclear war.93  
Equally, the apocalyptic images in films and dramas are shaped by their creators. Director of 
Ginger and Rosa, Sally Potter, was very open, following the release of the film, of her own 
experiences and influence on the narrative. As Anthony Quinn, in a review for The Independent 
remarked, ‘Potter ( … ) is partially reliving her own back pages’.94 In several interviews, Potter 
remarked on her awareness of the nuclear threat from a young age, being born four years after 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and learning of the devastation.95 In another interview with Catherine 
Shoard for the Guardian, Potter mentioned her growing up during the Cuban Missile Crisis 
and attending ‘Aldermaston marches from the age of 10’. Within this environment, Potter 
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touched on her fears of nuclear war; ‘“I dreamed about it most nights’, says Potter, ‘I had 
recurring nightmares’”.96 In growing up during the Cold War, especially the tumultuous period 
of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Potter’s understandable fears in her youth were reflected in her 
film. We see the fear and threat of nuclear war through the eyes of a teenage girl, fearful for 
her future. It is perhaps not surprising that we receive these very apocalyptic, barren images 
and scenes of post-war austerity London, as Potter drew on her memories and fears of the time. 
Similarly, writer of The Game, Toby Whithouse, also remarked on his childhood memories of 
the Cold War. In a blog, remarking on his inspiration for the series, Whithouse stated that 
having grown ‘up in the 70s and 80s ( … ) we all assumed that sooner or later – probably sooner 
– we’d be obliterated by a nuclear bomb ( … ) at the time the threat seemed so great, so 
constant’.97 Again, although growing up in a later period to Potter, the late 1970s and 1980s 
saw the resurgence of Cold War hostilities, the arms race and nuclear fears. It is therefore 
evident how the writer’s own memories and fears can be seen to influence the portrayal of the 
Cold War and the nuclear threat, largely as apocalyptic.  
Following, Marnie Hughes-Warrington’s argument that we must look beyond the portrayal of 
the film or series itself, to consider the publicity and writers or director’s influence,98 the above 
indicates that it is Cold War “survivors” that are helping to create and shape modern memories 
of the conflict and the nuclear threat which dominated it. It is also interesting to note that both 
Potter and Whithouse discuss the memory of their fear of the bomb whilst they were growing 
up, suggesting the formative experiences this had. Ritzenhoff and Krewani have commented 
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on a rise in apocalyptic films over recent years, particularly in regard to these films reflecting 
‘social anxieties’.99 Peter Kramer specifically remarks on director James Cameron. Cameron, 
who has also commented on the effect of the nuclear threat on him growing up, went on to 
make several popular apocalyptic films including the Terminator films (1984 and 1991), Alien 
(1986) True Lies (1994) and Avatar (2009).100 Cameron’s films have been highly popular and 
successful, his case once again demonstrates the influence of the Cold War on these 
generations, who then go onto create and mould modern ideas of nuclear weapons, 
Armageddon and apocalypse. Kramer adds, that the popularity of Cameron’s films suggest 
‘that the concerns of his films resonated with those of cinema audiences at home and abroad, 
perhaps because they too had grown with the fear of nuclear war’.101 If we use these ideas to 
suggest that the current owners of Hack Green and Kelvedon Hatch in particular are also of a 
generation that “survived” the Cold War, it would seem that the generations of Cold War 
“survivors” both reflect and shape these representations of the nuclear threat during the 
conflict. We cannot consider modern memory of the conflict without acknowledging, first, that 
memories of nuclear war have formed throughout the conflict and second, that the generations 
who grew up during the conflict, reflect on past events and memories and also shape modern 
perspectives and memories of the period.  
4.4 Nuclear ‘Hot Points’ 
Apocalyptic images and atmospheres are often created by a focus on narratives of crisis, using 
‘hot points’ from the Cold War, particularly the Cuban Missile Crisis. This focus makes the 
memory of the Cold War and nuclear threat often appear centred on particular moments. As 
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Lowe and Joel question, ‘To what extent do the contours of the Cold War fall away, so that 
remembering becomes more episodic and necessarily grounded in localized 
circumstances...?’102 It is perhaps difficult for those generations who lived through the Cold 
War to see the conflict in its entirety as opposed to a series of particularly tense moments and 
specific threats. In looking at popular culture and museums, it would seem that many focal 
points for representations of nuclear war focus on specific events, the Cuban Missile Crisis 
perhaps being the most prominent among them.  
As previously mentioned, the Cuban Missile Crisis, provides the background to Ginger and 
Rosa. It is the rising tensions of the crisis that are used to reflect the crisis in Ginger’s own life, 
her friendship with Rosa and transition to adulthood. The narrative of the crisis presents the 
period of the Cold War as a tumultuous one, in which there were rising fears, particularly 
among younger generations. This combined with Ginger’s narrative, her transition from teen 
to adult, further notes the period and crisis as a point of change, one which it is uncertain 
whether it will be survived. Potter has spoken about her aims of the film in depicting this 
transformative period, stating that 1962 was not quite the ‘swinging 60s’ but had also moved 
on from the 1950s, claiming, ‘“It’s almost like an adolescence of the decade – a transitional 
point”’.103 Ginger’s growing fears of nuclear weapons inspire her activism, that Ginger 
survives the metaphorical bomb of revealing Rosa and Roland’s relationship, provides a further 
celebratory message of protest.104 The focus on the hot point of the Cuban Missile Crisis is thus 
used to demonstrate the threat and fear, justifying Ginger’s activism, but also works to mirror 
Ginger’s own personal crisis.  
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The Cuban Missile Crisis was equally focused on in the National Cold War Exhibition. One 
kiosk focused solely on the event and exuded feelings of danger and drama. This kiosk 
presented its narrative using real news footage and speeches from the unfolding events in the 
USA and Cuba. Visitors sat round a table in the centre of the kiosk, with news screens circled 
above. As the narrative began, an image of a bomb, with numbers counting down, followed by 
flashing red lights, immediately triggered the drama and ideas of a threat. The voiceover 
narrated the unfolding events of October 1962, the language used particularly being interesting 
for looking at how memory is formed in creating these ideas of danger. For example, the 
narrative used statements such as ‘the world trembled on the brink of nuclear war’ and ‘every 
nation looks on in fear - is it peace or is it the most horrifying war imaginable?’105 The use of 
this impending and apocalyptic language, combined with the use of real news footage, situated 
the visitor in the past, as if these events were unravelling around them, allowing the visitor to 
become part of the experience and engage with the exhibition. In doing so it aided the creation 
of memories of the event for visitors, as one where nuclear apocalypse was very nearly realised. 
This played on existing memories and ideas of visitors, largely depending on generation. For 
those with memories of the event it may have triggered past fears and memories, for those who 
grew up during the Cold War but in the aftermath of the crisis it may have recalled later fears 
of the 1980s arms race or added context to a fear that remained in the background of the Cold 
War; and for younger generations it portrayed a dangerous and fragile period, yet also in many 
ways, the depiction provided a sense of drama, even excitement. We see the use of similar 
language used in recent exhibitions as well as the 1998 Cold War series, emanating from press 
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reports and attitudes during the Cold War itself; demonstrating continuity as well as a persistent 
emphasis on the crises of the conflict.  
Throughout the narrative then, we see this persistent negative image of the bomb and its 
capabilities. With many post-1989 narratives focusing on ‘hot points’, the memory of the Cold 
War becomes flattened and simplified into a period of uneasiness with episodes of crisis which 
teetered on nuclear war. Instead, in Britain, the nuclear threat, though very present and though 
imagined by many, existed in the background of everyday life. Yet, ‘hot points’ and popular 
themes and motifs of apocalyptic images serve to create a cultural memory of a turbulent 
period. This is equally demonstrated in the consistent use of the mushroom cloud image. 
4.5 The Nuclear Mushroom Cloud 
The symbol of nuclear war, the mushroom cloud, is by far one of the most iconic images of the 
period. Despite the fact that, for Britain, nuclear war remained a largely ‘imaginary war’, the 
bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki provided a reality on which the imaginary was 
based. The rising mushroom clouds provided images of power, devastation, and obliteration. 
As Horn has noted, ‘The vision [of apocalypse] found its expression in a single image: the 
nuclear explosion’.106 Peggy Rosenthal has also stated that even years after ‘the nuclear 
mushroom cloud has been seen in real life, it remains the unchallenged symbol of the nuclear 
age’.107 Rosenthal’s article explored the many meanings and messages connected to the image 
and why the mushroom cloud has remained such an iconic symbol. Although the research 
centred on American relationships with the bomb, it is intriguing both for the inherently 
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national memories of nuclear war and the Cold War, as well as exploring potential meanings 
which the image is used to promote.  
Rosenthal categorised these different meanings and memories under categories of 
‘Procreational’, ‘Adolescent’, ‘Marketable’, ‘Mass Murderous’, ‘Military’ and ‘Aesthetic’ 
mushroom clouds. Whilst this is not the place to recount all these details here, Rosenthal 
summarised these aptly in declaring that the mushroom cloud can be seen as an image of 
‘science’s power over nature’, of the American achievement of being the first to create the 
bomb, it is also a ‘sign of military might’. Perhaps most significant to British ideas of the bomb, 
is that its destructive power means the image is also, a ‘symbol for our secular age’s placing in 
human hands the judgement once assumed to be in God’s’.108 This mirrors ideas of apocalypse 
and Armageddon, yet the idea perhaps that in human hands this power is purely destructive, 
lacking the saviour of the good and the awaiting utopia. 
The image of the mushroom cloud is a dominant feature of many cultural representations of 
the Cold War and its nuclear threat. In the National Cold War Exhibition, the mushroom cloud 
was used to convey the perceived Cold War threat as well as in some ways to convey the futility 
of survival in such an attack. In the National Cold War Exhibition, the image was printed on a 
large board and required little introduction or explanation and therefore the image stood more 
or less on its own. This version of the image was portrayed in colour, the central explosion 
being a mix of fiery red and yellow with a halo of red above, the surround was merely black. 
The contrast of colour not only served to emphasise the danger and fear reflected in the colour 
red, but the surrounding darkness equally tapped into the imagery of apocalypse, a sense of 
darkness and nothingness surrounding the destruction of the bomb. The limited writing which 
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accompanied the image, under the title ‘4 minutes’, declared that, ‘the image of a nuclear 
mushroom cloud and the fear of a four-minute warning were engrained in the minds of all those 
who lived through the Cold War in the United Kingdom’.109 This dramatic text reflected the 
idea that nuclear war forever lingered in the background of the Cold War and the fear of it was 
inescapable. For those generations who lived through the Cold War, particularly ‘hot points’ 
like the Cuban Missile Crisis or the renewed arms race of the 1980s, the image and 
accompanying text may spark memories of such fears, the post-1989 representation serving to 
both reflect and further shape and emphasise memories of fears and danger. For younger 
generations, the image carries forward this knowledge of fear, even if the threat of nuclear war 
is deemed no longer as prominent today. However, recent international relations between 
America and North Korea and Iran respectively could alter this, as we observe a slight return 
to Cold War rhetoric in the face of new nuclear threats and proliferation. The image for younger 
generations, however, also conveys a more distant and therefore dramatic and exciting period 
of history.  
In contrast, the images of the mushroom cloud which were used in both of the Imperial War 
Museum’s exhibitions People Power and Peter Kennard: Unofficial War Artist (2015-2016), 
as well as the film Ginger and Rosa, provoked clear memories and perspectives of anti-nuclear 
sentiments. This was largely a result of the aims of these representations and the influence of 
their creators. As discussed above, the footage of the mushroom cloud over Hiroshima which 
opens Ginger and Rosa set the scene for Ginger’s fear and her fight against the nuclear threat, 
channelling her fear into active protest.110 
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The People Power exhibition followed narratives of protest from the First World War to 
present day. The section on the Cold War, which was the largest section of the exhibition, 
opened the Cold War narrative of protest with a large poster of the mushroom cloud and the 
title ‘Ban the Bomb’. This again was a fiery image surrounded by darkness, continuing this 
idea of nothingness and apocalypse which we see from the early Cold War period. After a brief 
outline of Cold War anti-nuclear protest and activism, the text accompanying the image ended 
with the statement: ‘The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 signalled an end to the Cold War, 
but not of nuclear weapons’.111 The exhibition’s focus on the narrative of protest up to modern 
day thus chose to emphasise the continued nuclear threat. This in turn helped to shape memories 
by viewing Cold War protests through more recent examples of activism, including protests 
against the Iraq War and the march against the renewal of Trident. The continued action to ban 
the bomb and protests against unpredictable wars, find similarities to Cold War causes and thus 
the past both shapes and is shaped by modern events. The image set the scene for narratives of 
protest and anti-nuclear demonstrations. As the IWM Press Release for the exhibition stated, 
the Cold War was ‘a new age, dominated by the fear of a nuclear apocalypse’,112 the exhibition 
therefore tapped into this memory of apocalypse and protest and further shaped these memories 
through its displays. The exhibition balanced the fears and horrors of nuclear war with a 
celebratory message of protest, which is explored further in the following chapter. 
The IWM’s 2015-2016 Peter Kennard: Unofficial War Artist exhibition, similarly used images 
of mushroom clouds for the purpose of activism, many used by groups such as the CND.113 
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Kennard produced several iconic images during the Cold War through the use of 
photomontage, often containing mushroom clouds and nuclear missiles, frequently overlaid 
with skeletons and images of destruction; one of his more iconic images is a nuclear missile 
cut in half by the CND symbol.114 Kennard’s work spans from the Cold War to the present day, 
with many pieces depicting the atrocities of the war in Iraq. Again, Kennard’s activist 
background and the very purpose of the art means that these images of missiles and the 
mushroom cloud, and its connections to death and destruction, emit messages of anti-nuclear 
weapons and non-proliferation. In fact, as displayed in the later People Power exhibition, 
Kennard’s artwork was featured on placards from the recent 2016 Trident march.115 The 
continued use of such images and indeed the continued significance of debates surrounding 
nuclear weapons, as well as weapons of mass destruction following the Iraq War, demonstrates 
how the memories of the Cold War nuclear threat and Cold War activism continue to shape 
and inform the world today. Cold War memories will continue to be drawn upon whilst they 
remain relevant to current concerns. Kennard, as both an activist during the Cold War and part 
of the generation of “survivors”, is again shaping modern views of the nuclear threat and the 
Cold War through his artistic portrayals of the bomb’s destruction.  
Following Rosenthal’s work, we can therefore see the different meanings emitted by the use of 
the mushroom cloud image. Primarily, depictions of the mushroom cloud present the horror 
and devastation, as well as the power, of a nuclear bomb. These images of the bomb can also 
be used to portray different messages of either the effectiveness of deterrence or messages of 
non-proliferation. We can particularly see the influence of activists, such as Kennard and 
Potter, as influencing their portrayals of the Cold War and nuclear threat. However, despite the 
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horrors conveyed in the portrayals and uses of the mushroom cloud image, Rosenthal has also 
remarked on a possible nostalgia. Rosenthal stated that despite the negative aspects of the 
image, ‘the mushroom cloud at least projects its meanings loud and clear’, there is therefore an 
awareness about it, an understanding of all that it entails.116 She added further that as a result 
we may come to look on the image of the cloud with some sort of ‘nostalgia for what we could 
configure’; unlike perhaps, the invisibility of biological weapons from which Rosenthal drew 
a comparison.117 There is thus an echo of a complex memory, one of both horror and a period 
verging on annihilation, combined with a strange sense of nostalgia for what was certain or 
known in comparison to the lack of certainty or clarity today. 
4.6 Appeal and Nostalgia of the Cold War Nuclear Threat  
Whilst the previous section focused on the emphasis on apocalypse and turbulence in modern 
portrayals of the Cold War, there remains the underlying question of why people are 
increasingly drawn to the Cold War nuclear threat narrative. What is it that appeals to visitors 
and audiences? Does the narrative provide something they need? As Rosenthal remarked, in 
today’s world with the development of new deadly and sophisticated weapons, we may begin 
to feel a sense of nostalgia for the mushroom cloud and the Cold War, their reliability and 
predictability. We may equally see this nostalgia for the Cold War more generally, despite its 
nuclear threat, as we survived it against the uncertainty of today. 
The Cold War and its nuclear threat are not obvious moments to feel nostalgic about. However, 
the fluidity and overlapping of memories creates a complex cultural memory and relationship 
with the Cold War in Britain. Paul Boyer, in an article reflecting on the fortieth anniversary of 
Dr Strangelove, remarked on the complexity of the nuclear threat being both something in the 
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past, a feature of the Cold War, as well as a continued and present danger.118 Whilst Boyer 
focused on the American memory and relationship with the Cold War, he touched on aspects 
which can equally be applied to British memory of the period. 9/11, for example, is noted by 
Boyer as a pivotal moment in which nuclear and annihilation fears resurged.119 Despite being 
an attack on America, the event was felt with shocks and repercussions around the world, most 
notably for America and Britain, the invasion of Afghanistan. The threat of terrorism, and the 
extremes terrorists were willing to go to, created new fears in a post-Cold War world. As Boyer 
remarked, such new threats created almost a nostalgic appeal to the Cold War and the nuclear 
age. Fears of terrorists gaining access to nuclear weapons, reignited fears of potential nuclear 
threats. However, the nostalgic sentiment comes into play with the fact that there were rules 
and understandings during the Cold War, which in many ways seem to be lacking now. For 
example, as Boyer noted, the ‘Soviet Union ( … ) at least had a stable government’, which he 
contrasted to the regimes of Iran and North Korea.120 Interestingly, over fifteen years after 
Boyer’s article, the threat from North Korea and Iran have once again been in the headlines 
and we see increasing concerns and fears surrounding nuclear threats; fears that draw from 
those of the Cold War period. The difference with North Korea, and indeed now US President 
Donald Trump, is the unpredictable nature of the two leaders, forever taunting one another. In 
this then, and in Boyer’s comments, we see two issues in relation to modern views of nuclear 
war. In one instance we see renewed fears, and the use of nuclear rhetoric that harps back to 
the Cold War; memories and understandings of the bomb and the possible nuclear threat firmly 
entrenched in the Cold War mentality of nuclear apocalypse and annihilation. Yet, in another 
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instance, we can see glimpses of a Cold War and even nuclear nostalgia; the Cold War, with 
supposedly stable governments and the rules of MAD, appears almost as a safe haven in 
comparison with today. As a result of such complex feelings towards the bomb, Boyer noted 
that we are ‘torn between the temptation to relegate the bomb to the past and the recognition 
that a host of nuclear related issues, no less dangerous than those of earlier times, still confront 
us’.121 The continued relevance of the bomb, as well as the Cold War providing a suitable 
background to represent current fears and threats, may partly explain why these themes are 
returned to. 
Recent diplomatic relations between the USA and North Korea, have also seen an interesting 
reawakening of Cold War rhetoric and images in the press and the media. For example, in 2017 
there were headlines such as ‘Nuclear War has become thinkable again’ and straplines such as 
‘World holds its breath’.122 These followed the nuclear tests by North Korea and the very public 
feud between Kim-Jong un and Donald Trump; culminating in the infamous ‘I too have a 
Nuclear Button, but it is much bigger and more powerful’ tweet by Trump in January 2018.123 
Much of the concern around these tense relations has focused on the unpredictable nature of 
the two leaders. Indeed, in an article for the Guardian on 17 April 2017, Paul Mason made a 
somewhat nostalgic statement: ‘From the 50s to the 00s, we had – in all nuclear powers- 
military/industrial complex politicians who understood the values of multilateralism. All 
around us high politics is becoming emotion driven, unilateral, crowd-pleasing’.124 Whilst 
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statements like this arguably convey exaggerated fears, it captures perfectly a complex memory 
of the Cold War and the nuclear threat which dominated it. As Boyer remarked, we can see a 
conflicting memory of the Cold War. Many depictions portray the darkness of the Cold War 
and the danger and threat of nuclear attack. Yet, we perhaps also continue to return to the 
period, both in new cultural depictions and old, because the rules of the Cold War, and even its 
sometimes charismatic and powerful leaders, provide a sense of stability, which is lacking from 
terror states and tyrannical, unpredictable leaders today. We are drawn to expressing current 
concerns through past events for the feeling of safety and security. 
In capturing either a narrative of terror or a nostalgic reminiscence of the Cold War, narratives 
can become simplified. Hogg has argued that post-1989 as the nuclear threat decreased with 
the ending of the Cold War, British cultural portrayals of the nuclear state have become ‘static, 
depoliticized representations of the nuclear past’. This depoliticization, Hogg argues, aided the 
receding of the nuclear state in everyday life, rendering it ‘invisible’, ‘reinforcing the nostalgic 
appeal, harmlessness, or purely dramatic potential of nuclear weapons culture’.125 In the 
previous section the drama in cultural portrayals was demonstrated. However, the 
simplification of nuclear narratives through these sometimes-depoliticised images of the 
mushroom cloud into a harmless past, is an interesting point to consider further. Whilst, as we 
have seen, there is a tendency for nuclear narratives to become flattened into a narrative of 
terror, the simplification may have more meaning and purpose, Hogg also pointing to kitsch 
being ‘mobilized to recreate a lost and harmless past’.126 As argued above, this depoliticisation 
may simply be the result of distance from the conflict, and a lack of the same need to fight the 
Cold War through shocking imaginings of nuclear apocalypse. However, in simplifying Cold 
 
 
125 Hogg, British Nuclear Culture, pp. 164, 167. 
126 Hogg, British Nuclear Culture, p.172. 
193 
War narratives, the Cold War also becomes less complex than its reality and more digestible. 
A narrative of the Cold War as a time of looming nuclear threat can be understood alongside 
the Cold War rules of MAD, deterrence, and non-proliferation. In capturing the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, both Ginger and Rosa  and the National Cold War Exhibition, conveyed the turbulence 
and fear but equally conveyed the survival of this crisis, be that through the understanding of 
MAD or the effectiveness of protest. The simplifying of these narratives into recognisable, 
even kitsch, images such as the mushroom cloud, reflect a far safer and predictable world than 
the complexity and uncertainty of modern-day terrorism and new nuclear threats from 
increased proliferation. However, they also provide an opportunity to face current political 
concerns and threats imposed on a past background, exploring these fears at a safe distance. 
Thus, whilst there may be a degree of depoliticisation and sanitisation, this may represent a 
nostalgia but also a need to view a more predictable world and the ability to view similar current 
political fears as equally survivable. 
Beyond a nostalgia for the simplicity of the Cold War is an appeal to the drama and darkness 
of the nuclear narrative, as well as the ability to learn more about Britain’s Cold War past. An 
application of the literature on dark tourism, can help to shed light on the attraction of these 
narratives. The study of dark tourism has seen many competing and conflicting definitions, be 
that dark tourism, morbid tourism, or thanatourism, among others. In 1996, A. V. Seaton 
introduced the term thanatourism, taken from the word thanatopsis, defined as the 
‘contemplation of death’.127 In turn, Seaton defined thanatourism as a motivation of tourists to 
travel to sites where ‘actual or symbolic encounters with death’ can occur, especially, though 
not limited to, violent death.128 Through links to thanatopsis, Seaton argued that this fascination 
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with sites of death has long existed. Unlike Lennon and Foley who in 2000, argued that dark 
tourism is a product of post-modernism, particularly in regard to ‘global communications 
technology’, ‘anxiety and doubt about the project of modernity’ and a ‘commodification and 
commercial ethic’.129 Also in 2000, Thomas Blom explored what he defined as ‘morbid 
tourism’, as containing ‘significant elements of what might be labelled deviant, dubious, 
macabre and even frightening and is often linked with death and destruction’.130 This varied 
scholarship enables an exploration of people’s fascination with the darker narratives and sites 
of history. What fascinates people? And what draws them in?  
For Thomas Blom, ‘morbid tourism’ attracts those who wish to explore something ‘unknown’ 
or ‘frightening’. Blom articulated that security in the Western world may create a desire for 
these ‘unknown’ and ‘frightening’ experiences, a diversion from daily life.131 In her study on 
Cold War heritage and tourism, Inge Hermann also disclosed results from a survey of visitors 
of why they visited a Cold War site, with many seeing it as a day out, or something different.132 
This simple point of entertainment and distraction may thus partly account for an interest in 
Cold War sites and narratives. Indeed, in Ganna Yankovsk and Kevin Hannam’s article 
exploring dark tourism in Chernobyl, tour guides noted a generational divide with younger 
generations identified as wanting a ‘thrill’ from their visit to the exclusion zone. 133 Continuity 
with the theme of entertainment and drama found throughout cultural portrayals of the Cold 
War can be found here. In this sense, both film and television portrayals of the Cold War, 
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alongside the physical remnants, may be of interest to audiences and visitors purely because 
the secretive Cold War era, under the shadow of the bomb, provides a dramatic and exciting 
narrative from recent memory.  
Further to this sense of excitement, Blom stated that tourists ‘approach the unknown and 
frightening while not having to commit ourselves in any deeper sense since real personal 
nearness to the ‘‘attraction’ is lacking’.134 In this sense there is a secure distance between the 
visitor to Cold War heritage or tourism sites and the time they capture. There is a security in 
returning to a prior moment in history and exploring complex or turbulent narratives rather 
than having to face the turbulence of modern threats and concerns. Alongside mere 
entertainment, Cold War heritage and equally popular culture, provide something we need – 
an escape into a previous time to address threats and concerns we face without having to 
confront them in the real and present context. A fascination and rise in Cold War nuclear 
narratives thus provide both entertainment and escapism from the tumult of the world today.  
The idea that Cold War nuclear narratives, whether they are captured in visual media, 
exhibitions, or nuclear bunkers, provide something that people need or desire can be seen in 
the argument of Hugh Gusterson. Gusterson employs the argument of Robert Jay Lifton, that 
in a world of nuclear technology, there is a desire, to ‘“imagine the real”’.135 This we can see 
is a theme which has continued throughout and after the Cold War and is particularly relevant 
to nuclear sites. As Grant has argued, the difficulty to imagine the effects of a nuclear bomb or 
conflict in Britain, especially after the Pacific tests in 1954, went on to shape ideas and how 
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the nuclear threat was imagined (or not imagined) throughout the rest of the conflict.136 The 
lack of further nuclear attacks after Nagasaki continue to render the size and destructive 
capability of a nuclear bomb on a city or country virtually unimaginable. Gusterson uses this 
argument to explain tourists at the Fiftieth anniversary of the Trinity tests in Los Alamos. He 
argues that in visiting the site of where the tests took place, and scientists like Oppenheimer 
worked, visitors were enticed by the desire and possibility of imagining the real.137 Equally, 
Hermann points to the fact that nuclear bunkers offer a ‘physical reality’ to the narratives or 
images of the Cold War they may be aware of from media, memory and education.138 Hermann 
argues it is the ‘‘doing’’ of visiting the site that enables visitors to engage in a memory making 
process. As such, from responses to surveys undertaken, Hermann notes that ‘The legitimacy, 
validity or significance of the site as a ‘place of memory’ where visitors could negotiate and 
engage with the material culture ( … ) were important in exploring and experiencing Cold War 
history’.139 In this sense both Gusterson’s and Hermann’s studies highlight the physical space 
of Cold War sites as offering the chance for visitors to ‘imagine the real’ and feel an 
authenticity, aiding memories and understandings of the conflict. It is possible that the lack of 
a clear British memory of the Cold War, even as Hermann highlights by those who lived during 
the Cold War, with no physical, conventional conflict to remember, means that nuclear bunkers 
provide a tangible symbol of the Cold War and the nuclear threat. This in turn aids an 
understanding of this ambiguous conflict and a threat that whilst technically still present, does 
not loom in everyday life as it did in the Cold War. Again, Cold War sites and narratives can 
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4.7 Conclusion 
The memory of the Cold War nuclear threat is ambiguous and divided between a memory of a 
turbulent past and one we are continually drawn to either for entertainment or a nostalgic escape 
from the world today. Post-1989 cultural portrayals of the conflict emphasise imagery and 
language of apocalypse. Images of nothingness and contrasts between the future offered by 
youth and that denied by nuclear war, convey an atmosphere of threat and danger; one which 
draws several similarities with Cold War cultural imaginings. The focus of cultural portrayals 
on ‘hot points’ such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the continued use of the mushroom cloud 
emphasise horror and destruction but can also work to flatten the Cold War nuclear narrative 
into a depoliticised one of periods of crises and tumult. Whilst the nuclear threat was a fact of 
the Cold War, with many terrified of a possible nuclear attack, life also continued as normal 
for many Britons. The nuclear threat, like the Cold War, formed a backdrop to everyday life. 
A persistent narrative of constant terror thus simplifies, and at times exaggerates, the reality of 
the conflict. The need to emphasise this sense of terror may suggest a lack of Cold War memory 
in Britain, the distance from the conflict reducing the sense of fear from nuclear attack. That 
bunkers in particular go to efforts to explain the nuclear threat suggests a need to demonstrate 
the purpose of nuclear bunkers when no nuclear conflict emerged. 
However, increasingly these images are also used to convey varied messages of deterrence vs. 
non-proliferation. Whilst drawing on rhetoric and debates of the Cold War, these messages also 
closely reflect events and debates in today’s world. Debates surrounding the renewal of Trident 
and the Government’s continued reliance on a strategy of deterrence, highlights how the legacy 
of the Cold War continues to influence the world today. These debates, in turn, influence how 
audiences and visitors perceive and decode narratives of the Cold War nuclear threat. Rather 
than being entirely depoliticised, narratives as seen in Ginger and Rosa, the People Power and 
Peter Kennard exhibitions capture the use of the Cold War backdrop to voice criticisms of, and 
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question, the continued existence of nuclear weapons and the threat they still pose. Visitors and 
audiences of post-1989 Cold War cultural portrayals are thus able to construct memories of the 
Cold War via their experience and engagement with these narratives and the messages of 
deterrence vs. non-proliferation. Current memories of the conflict and the nuclear threat are 
further shaped by the producers of these cultural portrayals. The memories and experiences of 
Cold War “survivors” can be seen to feed into depictions of crisis and fear, as well as to 
promote messages of non-proliferation or deterrence. The given present of the post-Cold War 
world thus shapes memories of the conflict, influenced through previous imaginings of the 
nuclear threat and renewed tensions and debates, raising questions and concerns over potential 
future hostilities or nuclear accidents.  
Despite the horrors which are constantly reflected in modern cultural portrayals, people seem 
increasingly drawn to these narratives, with a rising number of films, dramas and exhibitions 
depicting the period. In one sense, much like narratives of Cold War espionage, the nuclear 
threat provides an exciting and dramatic narrative to attract and entertain visitors and 
audiences. In particular, Hack Green and Kelvedon Hatch are good examples of this. As both 
are privately owned and rely on income from tourists, they tend to emphasise secrecy and extra 
activities for families such as spy trails and adventure courses. These features demonstrate the 
attraction of nuclear narratives for intrigue, drama, and thrills; capturing once again these 
depoliticised and simplified nuclear and Cold War narratives.  
However, with recent events including nuclear testing by North Korea and the collapse of the 
Iran nuclear deal between Iran and the USA, the unpredictable nature of today’s world leaders 
and the absence of the bi-polar Cold War world with defined rules such as MAD, also results 
in a growing nostalgia for the Cold War and its nuclear threat. Further to this, the simplified 
narratives of terror which are often found in Cold War narratives, alongside messages of 
deterrence and non-proliferation, provide a background on which to project current concerns. 
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The depoliticised, flattened narratives equally reflect a need for simplicity or indeed the Cold 
War being viewed as far simpler and more predictable in contrast to the world today. With 
continued fears of proliferation this nostalgia for the Cold War may continue to increase. 
Today’s cultural memory of Britain’s Cold War is therefore caught between continued themes 
and motifs of apocalypse, from during the Cold War itself, though this often results in a 
flattened narrative; and a growing nostalgia for the simplicity and predictability of the Cold 
War conflict and its nuclear threat, shaped by modern concerns and fears for future nuclear and 
diplomatic relations. This simplicity providing both an escape and a need for simplicity in the 




5 ‘Ban the Bomb!’: The Memory of Cold War Protest  
 
‘Ban the Bomb!’, a familiar phrase used by anti-nuclear activists in the Cold War, perfectly 
demonstrates the close connection between the nuclear arms race of the conflict and the 
opposition and protest which accompanied it. This chapter explores how Cold War activism is 
remembered in modern cultural portrayals of the period. It will demonstrate the struggle in 
cultural memory to balance a celebration of Cold War activism with an acknowledgment of its 
faults and failings. It is this struggle for how to remember that produces variations in portrayals 
of Cold War activism, and, at times, simplified and celebratory narratives. It will initially 
explore the idea that a developing cultural memory of the constant and looming threat of 
nuclear war, provides a basis of portrayals of, and often a justification for, activism, enabling 
a more celebratory memory. However, alongside this celebratory message is often a 
questioning of the success of Cold War activism and whether it has achieved its goals. This 
struggle in how to remember, often leads to ambiguous and contradictory messages, pointing 
to Britain’s complex cultural memory of the Cold War. As shall be demonstrated, a common 
feature of cultural portrayals is to concentrate on key movements and campaigns; often those 
most famous and discussed during the Cold War itself and studied by academics since. From 
the late 1950s, with rising Cold War tensions, the detonation of Britain’s first atomic weapon 
in 1952 and the detonation of Britain’s H-Bomb in 1957 contributed to the formation of several 
organisations within the wider Nuclear Disarmament Movement and British Peace Movement. 
Those most famous organisations and campaigns which are focused on are Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament (CND), Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp, and to some extent 
the Committee of 100 (C100) and the Direct Action Committee Against Nuclear War (DAC). 
The focus on these campaigns serves to shape memories of activism in the period and this 
chapter will explore how these campaigns are remembered, and what about their narratives is 
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both included and excluded. This will enable a greater understanding of this struggle in how to 
remember Cold War activism and how to remember the Cold War more generally.  
5.1 Dependent on the Memory of Nuclear Threat 
Mark Phythian’s article, ‘CND’s Cold War’, raised an interesting point about the memory of 
CND in relation to the memory of the Cold War itself. Writing in 2001, Phythian remarked that 
the way in which CND is remembered will depend on how the Cold War is remembered more 
generally. At the time of writing, Phythian accounted for the fact that the contemporary 
historiography and views focused on the West ‘‘winning’’ the Cold War, and therefore focused 
on deterrence and the escalation of the arms race in the 1980s in bringing about victory. This, 
he argued, would result in CND becoming marginalised within the memory of the wider 
conflict, adding that if this was the way the Cold War continued to be remembered, CND would 
be seen as ‘more misguided’. However, Phythian also remarked that if the memory of the Cold 
War focused on the constant fear caused by nuclear weapons, then CND would be seen more 
favourably and ‘in a more noble light’.1 This argument could be applied to the wider Nuclear 
Disarmament Movement throughout the Cold War. As previously identified, it is evident that 
modern cultural portrayals focus on the looming threat of nuclear war and Armageddon; no 
matter how simplified or nostalgic this memory may be. Whether this focus is due to nostalgia 
or a sense of excitement and drama which serves to attract audiences, the portrayals explored 
certainly convey this continual threat as a focal point for memory. The cultural portrayals of 
the nuclear threat and activism assessed here, being produced in the last decade, indicate that 
the memory has developed from Phythian’s time of writing. There is instead an emphasis on 
the whole Cold War period as a turbulent one, with little attention paid to who “won” the Cold 
 
 
1 Mark Phythian, ‘CND’s Cold War’, Contemporary British History, 15 (2001), pp. 133 - 156 (p. 152), 
<https://doi.org/10.1080/713999421> [Accessed 19 May 2020]. 
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War, especially as nuclear weapons and concerns still exist. This sense of threat may partly 
account for the few, but rather positive, portrayals of Cold War activism in modern culture. 
Though far fewer than portrayals of Cold War espionage and the nuclear threat, the portrayals 
of Cold War activism assessed help to demonstrate that the memory of activism is relative to 
the wider Cold War memory and the recollection of a constant fear of nuclear war.  
In several instances, we see this relationship between the portrayed threat of nuclear war and 
the portrayal of activism. This is most evident in Sally Potter’s film, Ginger and Rosa. The 
film centres around Ginger’s aspiration to take action and ‘do something’ about the bomb.2 In 
fact, as one review for the Guardian noted, in the film ‘Ginger is riven with worry about the 
threat of annihilation; a threat that the film is careful to justify, if not quite vindicate’.3 In this 
sense Ginger’s activism is shown as necessary, demonstrating this connection between the 
memory of nuclear war and that of activism. Equally, both the People Power: Fighting For 
Peace exhibition at the Imperial War Museum London (IWM), and the National Cold War 
Exhibition at the RAF Museum, Cosford, situated their displays of Cold War activism within 
a narrative of the nuclear threat. Whilst the People Power exhibition captured the actions and 
power of anti-war protest from the First World War to present day, its largest section was on 
the Cold War. Within the Cold War section, the primary focus was that of anti-nuclear protest. 
Whilst other movements may have been briefly noted, including the protests against the 
Vietnam War and US involvement, the anti-nuclear movement provided the focus and 
dominant memory of this part of the exhibition. This highlights the dominance of the memory 
of the nuclear threat in modern culture, and portrayals of activism rely on this memory to 
 
 
2 Ginger and Rosa, dir. Sally Potter (Artificial Eye, 2012). 
3 Catherine Shoard, ‘Sally Potter: “I Dreamed about the Nuclear Threat Most Nights”’, The Guardian, 4 October 
2012  <http://www.theguardian.com/film/2012/oct/04/sally-potter-nuclear-threat-ginger-rosa> [Accessed 20 
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convey why anti-nuclear movements formed. The National Cold War exhibition only briefly 
captured Cold War activism in a silo-like display under the label of MAD. This display featured 
a voice-over narrative whilst parts of the display, of activists, protest signs and banners, were 
lit up. The narrative began by detailing MAD and the developing arms race during the Cold 
War, stating the idea that ‘full scale nuclear war’ would cause total destruction. It then led on 
to the narrative of the formation of CND, framing the establishment of anti-nuclear movements 
within a narrative of the nuclear threat and fear of devastation. 
These few portrayals demonstrate the correlation between a cultural memory of constant 
nuclear fear and the memory of activism which opposed such nuclear weapons. The memory 
of activism being dependent on the present-day memory of the nuclear threat, demonstrating 
the fluidity of memory and how this adjusts in relation to the given present. However, as 
discussed previously, the emphasis on the danger of the Cold War and nuclear threat could 
indicate a lack of memory. The emphasis on the dangers of the Cold War creates entertainment 
and drama, yet it also serves to explain why nuclear bunkers were built and why activism 
campaigns took place, despite a nuclear war never emerging. Distance from the Cold War and 
new generations may result in a lack of understanding of the conflict. In capturing Cold War 
threats and the fight against these threats, cultural portrayals help to explain, and sometimes 
exaggerate, the fears present during the Cold War. In doing so, the everyday of the Cold War 
period and the fact that, for many, life continued as normal, is omitted. Perhaps in creating 
these narratives of terror and activism, modern portrayals are seeking to carve out a memory 
of Britain’s Cold War which so far has failed to fully materialise.  
However, modern cultural depictions do capture a sense of a celebratory message for Cold War 
protest. Presenting activism in correlation with the nuclear threat serves to depict the cause of 
the Nuclear Disarmament Movement and, at times, to justify the cause of the Movement’s 
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various groups and actions; the fear enabling a characterisation of activism as noble and 
justified. 
5.2 Celebratory Memory 
Celebratory portrayals often convey activism as a noble and justified response to Cold War 
threats. A celebratory message of activism was evident in the IWM’s People Power exhibition. 
The title of the exhibition itself echoed a celebration of ‘people power’, a fight for peace 
conveyed as noble. Ginger and Rosa also serves as a clear example of this noble and 
celebratory message. With the looming threat of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the two best friends 
find different ways to cope with their fear. Whilst Ginger chooses activism, Rosa chooses 
romance. There are many ways in which Ginger’s choice is shown to be far more noble than 
that of Rosa’s. In one scene, Rosa meets Ginger in a café. Ginger tries to talk to Rosa about the 
Cuban Missile Crisis; however, Rosa confesses she does not know what Ginger is talking 
about. Ginger is shocked that Rosa can be so unaware of the events. Potter also ensures the 
audience feels this shock by including short radio broadcasts, narrating the rising tensions, 
throughout the film. This serves to emphasise Rosa’s distraction and obsession with romance, 
whilst Ginger anxiously listens to the news each day with fear driving her to activism. It is in 
this scene that Rosa dropped the figurative bomb of her pregnancy with Roland’s child.4 Rosa 
and Roland are thus portrayed almost as living in a dream world, unaware of how their actions 
are affecting those around them. In a sense, they become the antagonists of the narrative, in 
that they cause the explosion and the destruction at the end of the film, when Ginger finally 
reveals their secret relationship and the pregnancy. This leads to Nat’s, Ginger’s mother, 
overdose. Consequently, whilst their obsession with romance brings devastation, Ginger’s 
activism is portrayed as her method of coping, which later enables her to take action and reveal, 
 
 
4 See, Sophie Mayer, Political Animals: The New Feminist Cinema (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016), p. 96. 
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and survive, the news of their relationship.5 Sophie Mayer accurately conveys the moment of 
Ginger’s revelation:  
The bomb explodes – and is survived. In a meaningful sense, within the film’s narration, 
Ginger’s dramatic speaking of the truth - and her subsequent decision to ask Rosa’s 
forgiveness – are the direct actions that prevent the Russian and American missiles from 
firing. Speaking out ( … ) and forgiveness can and do change the future.6  
The narrative of the Cuban Missile Crisis and Ginger’s personal life run parallel throughout 
the film, and, as Mayer suggests, it is Ginger’s move to direct action which prevents danger 
both in the international sphere and her own family sphere. Ginger’s actions are thus at once 
both noble and worthy of celebrating.  
In conveying a celebratory message, modern portrayals of Cold War activism focus on the 
high-points and successes of activism. The People Power exhibition in particular focused on 
the successes of activism throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The Press Release 
for the exhibition declared that it was ‘the UK’s first major exhibition to explore the evolution 
of the anti-war movement from the First World War to the present day’.7 The stated aims of 
the exhibition were to address conflict from different perspectives.8 The depiction of a hundred 
years of protest is also significant as Lowe and Joel argue, that protesters are not often 
remembered by monuments, but more by social and oral histories and ‘museums recalling their 
peak moments’.9 This is precisely what the IWM produced in the People Power exhibition. In 
the narrative for the first half of the twentieth century, the focus was primarily on Conscientious 
Objectors; focussing on the stories of individuals and the formation of organisations and 
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<https://www.iwm.org.uk/sites/default/files/press-
release/People%20Power%20Fighting%20for%20Peace_Press%20Release.pdf> [Accessed 11 July 2018], see 
p. 1. 
8 People Power Fighting for Peace (IWM London: Press Release), p. 1. 
9 David Lowe, and Tony Joel, Remembering the Cold War: Global Contest and National Stories (London and  
New York: Routledge, 2013) p. 47. 
206 
networks such as the No-Conscription Fellowship (NCF), set up in 1914 and the Friends 
Ambulance Unit (FAU), set up by non-absolutist Conscientious Objectors. The narrative 
continued through to the interwar years, discussing a rising awareness and commitment from 
individuals following the First World War to not enter into or support further conflict. 
Organisations such as the No More War Movement (NMWM) formed in 1921 and the 
formation of the Peace Pledge Union (PPU) in 1935 were also covered, documenting the rise 
of strong activist organisations once again through individuals’ stories, protest banners, and art 
capturing the horrors of war. The exhibition and accompanying book, however, noted how the 
rise of fascism caused many to question or ‘soften’ their pacifist beliefs.10 The Second World 
War once again saw a large number of Conscientious Objectors, including actor Paul 
Eddington, whose national registration card was placed on display in the exhibition. Some 
connections were made from the First World War, detailing greater acceptance for 
Conscientious Objectors by the government, despite many still being ostracised by society. The 
Second World War section then progressed into that of the Cold War, connected by the 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, introducing the Cold War with an imposing image of a 
nuclear mushroom cloud.  
The Cold War section in particular focused on the most famous movements. The exhibition’s 
senior curator, Matt Brosnan, noted in an interview that ‘The Cold War period was dotted with 
real ( … ) high points ( … ) in anti-nuclear protest’, and he listed the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament, Aldermaston Marches, as well as adding, Vietnam, Civil Rights and the 
escalated protest of the 1980s.11 It is mostly these events and movements which the exhibition 
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itself prioritised. The Cold War section followed the same emphasis on the visual and audible 
power of protests and activist groups, with a central focus on anti-nuclear activism. The visitor 
was first walked through the bombing of Japan, followed by the formation of early anti-nuclear 
organisations such as Operation Gandhi (1952) and the Direct Action Committee Against 
Nuclear War. The exhibition traced the evolution of these movements, the DAC merging into 
the Committee of 100, set up in 1960. The formation and work of CND formed a central focus, 
as did the Women’s Peace Camp at Greenham Common, with numerous artworks, banners and 
ephemera exhibited to capture the colour and visual nature of protest; these are explored in 
more detail later in the chapter. While a small collection of posters conveyed anti-war and anti-
draft protests against the Vietnam War, the exhibition primarily focused on anti-nuclear 
activism, captured as the defining threat of the Cold War. Following the section on Greenham 
Common, the exhibition brought the visitor to the present day. This final section moved away 
from an anti-nuclear focus, although placards from the 2016 Trident march were hung from 
the wall, with captions such as ‘Cut War Not Welfare’.12 The exhibition demonstrated 
continuity with the statement that ‘Nearly 60 years on from the creation of CND, anti-nuclear 
protest in Britain continues’, drawing out continuity between recent financial arguments 
against the renewal of Trident and those of CND throughout its existence.13  
The exhibition, in celebrating the successes and ‘peak moments’ of activism, omitted the 
challenges of activists as well as public opposition to such groups. Public opinion during the 
Cold War was quite often divided between belief in the nuclear deterrent and the fight to ban 
nuclear bombs. In celebrating activism’s ‘peak moments’, some of the nuance of Cold War 
attitudes was lost. This simplification could be a result of the purpose of the exhibition in 
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celebrating ‘people power’. However, it could also be a reflection of the influence of modern 
day on Cold War memory. Narratives of successful activism capture challenges against the 
government and a fight against the status quo, creating a people vs government narrative. With 
a decline in trust in the government in recent years, particularly following the Iraq War, and an 
increase in activism, narratives of taking the fight to the government may be more popular and 
relatable in the post-Cold War world. This is reiterated even further by showing the 
development of protest from the First World War to modern day. The choice of a simplified 
narrative may thus be a reflection of the influence of the given present on Cold War memory.  
Furthermore, as one review by Andrea Needham for Peace News read:  
The huge opposition to the 1991 Gulf War and to ongoing British interventionism in 
the Middle East is ignored, as are the long years of protest against the arms trade. 
Decades of opposition to Trident are represented by five placards stuck randomly on 
the wall at the end. Although the huge march against the Iraq war is well documented, 
there’s precious little sign of any of the other activism that was going on at the time.14 
The narrative was therefore highly selective, recalling the most remembered moments 
throughout the century and today. It is not possible for everything from a century of protest to 
be covered. However, it is noteworthy that the selection of these narratives shapes the cultural 
memories created. In omitting or paying less attention to certain movements and links, some 
sense of continuity was lost. The structure of the exhibition itself, though logical, provided 
strict periodisation for activist movements when in reality many overlap and are linked. Instead, 
the exhibition conveyed a sense that First World War to Second World War centred around 
Conscientious Objectors, conscription, and anti-war protest, while the Cold War was primarily 
anti-nuclear protest, despite the Civil Rights movement, anti-Vietnam War protest and 
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Women’s Liberation Movement. Equally, the  present was focussed on conflict in the Middle 
East, despite other notable protest action such as that against climate change. In the case of the 
Cold War, this is a memory almost exclusively centred on anti-nuclear activism and a 
celebration of key and famous moments. This simplification inevitably carves out a large role 
for Cold War anti-nuclear activism in Britain’s cultural memory, omitting the intricacies of 
activist groups, their various causes, and divided opinion amongst activists and the wider public 
on the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent. It echoes the focus and fascination with the nuclear 
threat, emphasising the danger of the Cold War over the everyday. This more simple, 
celebratory memory may thus be a result of how the Cold War threat is remembered as well as 
an increase in activism in recent years. 
The sense of a modern audience finding Cold War activism admirable and relatable is further 
aided by the structure and content of the exhibition which enabled a celebratory and immersive 
experience. There was a significant emphasis on creating an immersive environment for 
visitors and to submerge them in the act and experience of protest. An introductory note as you 
entered the exhibition explained that soundscape was employed throughout. The notice read: 
‘We have woven together contemporary sound recordings from demonstrations, rallies and 
marches to give a sense of the atmosphere of anti-war protest through time. Listen for excerpts 
made by campaigners and the songs and music played at these demonstrations’.15 Matt 
Brosnan, the curator, remarked that the museum wanted to provide ‘an atmospheric experience 
of what it’s like to be involved in anti-war protest activity’.16 The exhibition was thus carefully 
designed not purely to inform but to provide an experience and to entertain. The visitor was 
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then an active participant to the exhibition, and the sounds undoubtedly shaped memories of 
the different periods of protest, the voices behind the acts and the feelings of activism, people 
power and inclusivity. As a visitor to the exhibition you could not help but become engaged in 
this atmosphere with the sounds of protesters and songs. It very much had the effect of pulling 
the visitor into the lives of the activists throughout different periods of history. In this sense 
there was a general celebratory and inclusive tone to the exhibition as you became engaged 
through this experience.  
It is worth noting that the National Cold War Exhibition, similarly to the IWM, also employed 
soundscape, with the sound of protest music and the noise of protesters, including the 
Greenham chant ‘take the toys from the boys’.17 This same immersive atmosphere drew the 
audience into the environment of Cold War protest, serving to create, rekindle, or further shape, 
memories of the Cold War and activism in the period. It is notable that many cultural portrayals 
of activism focus on very visual and audible content, particularly to convey a celebration of 
activism. In addition to sound scaping, this further indicates and recreates the power and 
vibrancy of this social and cultural history of protest. 
As with other exhibitions such as Peace and Security and films like Ginger and Rosa, the Cold 
War in the People Power exhibition was framed between the Second World War - and indeed 
earlier conflict - and the present day. Once again, perceptions and understandings of the Cold 
War can be seen to be influenced by memories of the preceding conflict and concerns in today’s 
world. The People Power exhibition in particular helped to demonstrate the evolution of 
activism over the last century. However, whilst narratives of espionage and the nuclear threat 
create images of a dark, secretive, and turbulent period, by contrasting the Cold War with a 
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nostalgic, idyllic narrative of the Second World War, modern cultural narratives of activism 
are generally celebratory. Instead, the celebratory image of activism is reliant on images and 
narratives of a turbulent Cold War, with far fewer comparisons to the idealism of wartime 
Britain. In the People Power exhibition, both Second World War and Cold War activism were 
generally celebrated as standing for peace and against nuclear weapons. In each instance, 
activism was portrayed as opposing dark forces either in fascism, fears of the blitz or fears of 
the nuclear bomb. The cultural memory of Cold War activism created today is thus a far more 
positive memory than those of espionage and the nuclear threat. However, this positive memory 
relies on the images and memory of a turbulent period in decline. Britain’s cultural memory of 
the Cold War is thus not one simply defined by terror and negativity. The role of activism in 
fighting the threats and government offer a more positive memory. This, as argued, is likely a 
result of the given present; the established cultural memory of a turbulent Cold War enables 
activism to be worthy of celebrating. Equally, with a lack of trust in government and an increase 
in activism in recent years, such narratives reflect modern understandings, shaping and 
potentially distorting memories of the Cold War. This complexity is further demonstrated in 
the questioning of activism’s success.  
5.3 Questions of Success and Failure 
Despite these celebratory messages, it is also common in cultural portrayals of Cold War 
activism to see a questioning of the success of the protest movement. This can lead to an 
ambiguous or even contradictory message. Lowe and Joel remark that commemoration and 
remembrance of movements, such as CND, have faced challenges due to ‘the lack of consensus 
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over their effectiveness’.18 Consequently, it is perhaps a case of people not being sure how to 
remember Cold War activism and activists.  
The best demonstration of this duality is the People Power exhibition. As previously discussed, 
the exhibition captured a largely celebratory portrayal of Cold War activism and activism in 
general. However, each portrayal of Cold War and anti-nuclear activism has to deal with the 
fundamental point that nuclear weapons still exist, and since the Cold War, more countries 
possess or could soon possess nuclear weapons. Recent news stories regarding North Korea’s 
testing of nuclear weapons and Trump’s reneging on the Iran Nuclear Deal, demonstrate this 
continued proliferation.19 In fact, the People Power exhibition ended with the recent 2016 
march and protest against the renewal of Trident, a further continuation and legacy of the Cold 
War fight against nuclear weapons. As visitors reached the end of the People Power exhibition, 
they were invited to add their views about the success of protest to a peace symbol on the wall. 
Some of the headings around the peace symbol included, ‘Is war ever necessary?’ and ‘Does 
protest work?’.20 This was preceded by a board headed: ‘Why Protest?’. It read: 
It is difficult to assess whether anti-war protest has been effective over the last hundred 
years. Mass protest has led to increased publicity and attention on particular issues. But 
real change is often more nuanced and gradual. 
(…) 
Anti-nuclear campaigners in the 1960s and 1980s could point towards the signing of 
international treaties imposing nuclear test bans and reductions in nuclear weapons. But 
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But perhaps it is not just about results. For many the act itself – of participating, of 
having the right to publicly voice an opinion and act on the basis of your own 
conscience – is what matters most.21 
The exhibition encouraged the visitor to consider whether protest throughout the last century 
has actually been successful or not. Many visitors had added their thoughts to the peace sign, 
demonstrating visitor engagement and the fact that visitors had considered the success of 
protest, having learnt about it throughout the exhibition. Although, as one review by Alison 
Wilcox comments, ‘[i]t might have been useful for this question to have been posed at the start, 
enabling visitors to adopt a critical view of the utility of protest before being introduced to the 
various peace campaigns of the exhibition’.22 The continued existence of nuclear weapons in 
today’s world, connects us directly to the Cold War and the period’s anti-nuclear activism. 
Perhaps it is, as the exhibition stated, ‘the act itself’ which is most significant here – the 
exhibition possibly captured a celebration of those who took action and the ability to do so, as 
opposed to a celebration of the success of activism itself. The emphasis being on the noble and 
courageous actions undertaken.  
Further questioning and doubt over the success of protest is captured in Ginger and Rosa. 
Whilst Ginger’s activism portrays her as brave and driven, it is also simply Ginger’s way of 
coping. The film does not end with the removal of nuclear weapons and with them the threat 
of nuclear war. Of course, this would be too simple and idealistic, as in reality the audience 
would be all too aware of the continued existence and development of nuclear capabilities. 
Perhaps the film is more a message of what activism could achieve if all were as driven as 
Ginger. However, the film ends on an ambiguous note. The audience, for example, is left 
without ever knowing whether Nat survives her overdose. The audience are merely witness to 
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the final scene of Ginger and Roland waiting anxiously for news. The film therefore leaves the 
audience in a state of suspension and unknowing. With an ending which leaves so many issues 
unresolved: Nat, Rosa and Roland’s relationship, and nuclear weapons, there is a sense of 
ambiguity. This ambiguity over the end of the narrative mirrors the ambiguity of the success 
of activism; Ginger does survive, but the challenge faced by both nuclear weapons and Rosa 
and Roland’s relationship remain. Writing on the early British Peace Movement in 1988, 
Richard Taylor remarked that up to 1965, ‘the Movement failed’ in its aims, adding further that 
‘even in the 1980s ( … ) the arms race has escalated ( … ) to a degree that was not imagined 
by most activists in the 1950s and 1960s’.23 Thus, even within the 1980s, before the end of the 
Cold War, the successes of the early Movement were being questioned, particularly given the 
rising arms race during the 1980s, under the Reagan Presidency. This further enhances this 
sense that whilst much of the currently portrayed memory of activism is celebratory about 
taking action, there has long been a developing questioning of activism’s success feeding into 
memories of the period, thus modern portrayals are not as celebratory about the success of 
protest itself. This ambiguity once more highlighting Britain’s difficult and dubious 
relationship with its Cold War past. 
The National Cold War Exhibition also conveyed failure. The narrative of the display on 
protest, that is mentioned above, ended on a rather sobering thought. The short narrative took 
the visitor right through to the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 
its concluding remarks the voice over commented that perhaps deterrence or MAD did in fact 
work as ‘we survived,’ yet adding ‘but so did nuclear weapons’.24 That the narrative ended here 
with the display turning dark, was highly evocative. It emphasised that the issue is ongoing and 
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there is thus a question over the achievements of the protest movements the visitor had just 
heard about. Once again, the visitor was provoked to question the protest movement, the 
effectiveness of deterrence, and the legacy of the Cold War more generally. This repeated 
theme of questioning reflects Lowe and Joel’s words, that there is often a challenge with how 
to remember activist groups, as there is a ‘lack of consensus over their effectiveness’.25 This 
questioning is thus symptomatic of this challenge; capturing an uncertainty, or perhaps a 
division, between wishing to acknowledge those who took action, whilst also having to 
acknowledge that the threat has not entirely left us.  
This parallel of celebration but also doubt was clearly captured in reviews for the People Power 
exhibition. In a review for The Telegraph, Alastair Sooke concluded:  
Perhaps the most heartrending thing, then, about this exhibition is the thought that, 
despite the aims and actions of the international peace movement over the past century, 
collectively, as a species, we have learned nothing at all ( … ) People often talk about 
the futility of war. Depressingly, the same could be said of the peace movement too.’26  
Sooke’s review and feelings towards the exhibition clearly reflect this doubt and questioning 
of what has actually been achieved throughout the last century of protest; capturing the 
disheartening truth that controversial wars continue, and nuclear weapons still exist.  
This questioning highlights the challenges of forming a clear cultural memory of Britain’s Cold 
War. With the questioning surrounding activism’s successes it raises further questions of why 
activism is celebrated at all. It could be argued that there is a desire to claim a role for Britain 
and ‘ordinary people’ in the Cold War. A sense of influencing change and taking action. The 
focus on, and celebration of, this active role of protest may serve, in part, to reclaim a role for 
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Britain; a role which contrasts to the narrative of Britain’s decline and loss of influence post-
war. The celebration of individuals and a social history equally provide a sense that, even if 
goals are not always achieved, collective action can have an influence and raise awareness. 
This hope perhaps being needed following the failure of the anti-Iraq War march.  
In a further review of the People Power exhibition in the Guardian, Lara Feigel remarked on 
the nostalgic appeal of the exhibition. Feigel commented, for example, on a ‘vision of lost 
innocence’ when mentioning the Aldermaston marches; adding that there seemed, in 1958, to 
be a sense of optimism which today now seems lost or at least deflated. The review linked this 
loss of optimism, in particular, with the post-Cold War march against the Iraq War in 2003, 
where, despite such widespread opposition, the war was not stopped or prevented. However, 
Feigel remarked that, ‘the exhibition is timely, because now we are on the march again. I’m 
part of a large cohort who hadn’t marched since the despair of 2003, but took to the streets 
once more for the Women’s March in January’.27 
Whilst recognising the fact that protest had not prevented the existence of nuclear weapons or 
the war in Iraq, Feigel noted that the exhibition tapped into a renewed hope in protest; ‘Though 
I can’t share the optimism of the eager crowds leaving Aldermaston, I have lost some of the 
hopelessness I felt in the wake of the Iraq March.’28 Feigel stated that particularly with Donald 
Trump as President, not only was there a new ‘opponent’ but also one who ‘seems to care about 
the size of crowds’.29 Perhaps in this, there is some new hope to be found in the possibility and 
reach of protest. As John Schofield and Mike Anderton stated, when writing in 2000, people 
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have become more interested in peaceful protest movements as they have become more 
common.30 From this it is possible to see that this tension between celebration and questioning 
success reflects modern attitudes to protest, despite failures such as that of the Iraq march, the 
belief in the power of protest and of giving people a voice continues. It would seem that an 
increased hope and faith in activism has resulted in a more positive attitude towards Cold War 
protest and in turn, a celebration of ‘people power’ during the period. The legacy of the history 
of protest can thus be seen today. Protest always has and will be controversial, yet the power 
of people taking action is often still celebrated. In an interview, Matt Brosnan, when asked if 
peace was ‘starting to become mainstream’, noted that he felt the head of the Stop the War 
Coalition, Lindsey German, would state that the Iraq march ‘encouraged a different kind of 
culture’, relating to the government and their approach to future actions.31 Writing in the 1980s 
about the earlier protest movement of the 1950s and 1960s, Taylor noted that despite the 
movement’s failure to achieve its goals, it created a culture and a common idea of peoples’ 
right to have a say, which, he remarked, continued into the 1980s.32 Equally, Taylor noted, that 
the early movement had changed politics in Britain and that since there had been multiple 
‘extra-parliamentary’ campaigns,33 moving politics away from the centre of Westminster.34 
The early protest movement of the 1950s and 1960s thus formed perceptions and ideas of 
protest which were later grounded in and built upon in the protest movement of the 1980s. Cold 
War protest leaves its legacy in the world today through this political culture of ‘extra-
parliamentary campaigns’. The memory of Cold War protest can therefore provide a recent 
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memory which is relatable to present day and can be tapped into at times of, and in the 
environment of, protest. Such mass protest has been seen more recently in the 2016 Trident 
march and the 2018 march against President Trump’s visit to the UK, as well as the now 
frequent and rising number of protests against climate change. Perhaps this gradual, yet 
seemingly increasing interest and portrayal of peaceful protest, and particularly the focus on 
Cold War protest, mirrors the rising hopes and beliefs in mass activism, as well as a possible 
nostalgia for activism in the recent past.  
Protest continues to play a key role in today’s political environment. Following the release of 
Ginger and Rosa, Mayer stated in her article ‘Bomb Culture’, that: ‘With the police shown 
kettling CND marchers in the film, 1962 and 2012 come together, giving the film a startling 
immediacy’.35 2012 saw much controversy over kettling with many court rulings on the use of 
the tactic on several occasions in the years previous. The largest of which was a ruling by the 
European Court of Human Rights that ruled that kettling was lawful in the case of Met Police 
actions during anti-globalisation demonstrations in May 2001.36  A later student march, against 
the rising tuition fees, in 2010, also witnessed the use of kettling. The issue of peaceful protest 
and kettling was therefore prominent in the years surrounding the film Ginger and Rosa. 
Questions as to the truth behind the freedom of protest arose with these controversial events.  
The film was thus released in a time of many public demonstrations, questions about the form 
these demonstrations took, and the responses to these by the authorities; all issues which were 
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addressed in the film itself in the form of Ginger’s journey to discovering protest and her role 
within the world. The film was consequently, both historic and yet relevant to today, the 
audience can feel a relatability to the topic of the film, and the questions it raised. We therefore 
continue to see issues and debates surrounding protest and its effectiveness. Yet, ultimately, 
protest or non-violent direct action, are today very much part of our political environment. The 
strong level of protest during the 1960s, portrayed in Ginger and Rosa, is a memory which can 
be revisited to reflect on current issues. This period would seem to be remembered as a high 
point for protest and subsequently can be recalled upon in the film’s contemporary climate of 
protest and questions surrounding activism. Cultural portrayals of Cold War activism such as 
Ginger and Rosa, not only provide a memory of mass protest but also reflect a political culture, 
of which mass protest and non-violent direct action continue to play a key part. The challenge 
of celebrating protest whilst questioning its overall success highlights Britain’s ambiguous 
relationship with the Cold War. However, as discussed there is a sense of recent exhibitions 
and films capturing a new hope in activism. A belief in the power of activism evident in the 
early Cold War years, a time which can be looked to, related to, and understood in today’s 
political climate. 
5.4 Key Movements and Campaigns: 
5.4.1 Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament  
Cultural portrayals of activism tend to focus on key movements and campaigns. This often 
results in the most famous movements and events dominating portrayals. A review of the 
People Power exhibition by Andrea Needham for Peace News, reflected that: 
the exhibition focuses heavily on the higher-profile campaigns while largely ignoring 
the real heart of the peace movement ( … ) Furthermore, if one didn’t know better ( … 
) one could reach the conclusion that the peace movement was essentially dormant 
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between the end of large-scale protests at Greenham in the late ‘80s and the protests 
against the Iraq war in 2003’.37  
Consequently, the exhibition’s focus on key moments tended to omit the sense that protest and 
the work of movements is gradual and ongoing, much like the focus on the Cuban Missile 
Crisis in the previous chapter, a focus on ‘hot points’ gives an impression of outbursts of 
activism as opposed to ongoing battles. It is clear that the focus on these key events has a strong 
influence on the memories and perceptions of protest and Cold War activism which are 
depicted in cultural portrayals. In focusing on ‘hot points’ and ‘peak moments’ cultural 
portrayals of the conflict tend to present a memory which does not capture the Cold War as a 
unified whole but as a series of events which have, most often, become the more memorable 
moments or features of the Cold War. On the other hand, focussing on these moments may be 
used to symbolise the period as a whole, but one far more simplified and dominated by 
moments of crisis and protest. It is the ambiguity of Britain’s role in the Cold War and its 
experience of the conflict which arguably leads to a focus on ‘peak moments’, those moments 
that create the sense of a more conventional conflict via intelligence gathering, military 
weapons and defences, and public opposition. The struggle with how to remember the Cold 
War thus contributes to a memory of turbulence and action, as opposed to the backdrop to daily 
life that it was for many in Britain.  
The main movement which attracts the greatest level of attention for the Cold War period, is 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), forming a common focal point for cultural 
portrayals. CND was established in 1958, following increasing concerns over the development 
of the arms race and nuclear weapons. Richard Taylor and Colin Pritchard have argued that 
four events in 1957 acted as triggers for the establishment of CND. The Soviet launch of 
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Sputnik in 1957, they argue, indicated the increasing technological and military might of the 
Soviet Union, and the superpowers generally. Taylor and Pritchard also pointed to George F. 
Kennan’s Reith Lectures in 1957 which called attention to the escalating dangers of any 
confrontation, but particularly nuclear confrontation, between the two sides of the Cold War. 
A further factor was Aneurin Bevan’s U-turn on the Labour unilateralist policy at the Party 
conference in 1957. This, they argue caused many unilateralists within and outside of the party 
to take action. 38 In reaction to this, J. B. Priestley’ s New Statesman article, formed a final 
catalyst, as the responses to the article led to a meeting of like-minded individuals. In January 
1958, the Executive Committee was elected, and CND was formally established.39 Members 
of the early movement included prominent figures and intellectuals such as, Bertrand Russell, 
J. B. Priestley, and Canon John Collins, among many others. The movement was effectively 
borne out of the National Council for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Tests (NCANWT). 
The NCANWT focused on ‘lobbying MPs’ as well as ‘peaceful and legal demonstrations’, 
choosing to focus on a single-issue with ‘elite influence rather than mass support’ for the 
movement. These points, Taylor argued, later formed the basis for CND.40 CND were the ‘first 
mass movement against nuclear weapons’,41 and figures estimate that national membership 
reached approximately 50,000 members in 1982, a peak period for the movement.42 As such, 
much scholarship has also explored the history, role, and achievements or failures of CND and 
the wider Movement.43 This focus has likely influenced and shaped how activism in the Cold 
 
 
38 Taylor and Pritchard, The Protest Makers, p. 6. 
39 J.B. Priestley, “Britain and the Nuclear Bombs”, New Statesman, 2 November 1957, referenced in Taylor and 
Pritchard, The Protest Makers, p. 6. 
40 Taylor, Against the Bomb, pp. 10 - 12. 
41 Taylor, Against the Bomb, p. 112. 
42 Appendix Two, ‘CND Since 1970 – some figures’, (information supplied by Duncan Rees) in, John Minnion 
and Philip Bolsover (eds.), The CND Story: The first 25 years of CND in the words of the people involved 
(London: Allison and Busby Limited, 1983) p. 150. 
43 See, Phythian, ‘CND’s Cold War’; Jodi Burkett, ‘The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and Changing 
Attitudes towards the Earth in the Nuclear Age’, The British Journal for the History of Science, 45. 4 (2012), 
625 –639 <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007087412001094> [Accessed 19 May 2020];  Kate Hudson, CND at 60: 
222 
War is remembered, and certainly which aspects are emphasised. The portrayal of CND in 
films and exhibitions therefore often forms a central focus as the first mass anti-nuclear 
movement and one from which other groups are portrayed in comparison. 
The portrayal of CND in the People Power exhibition demonstrated CND’s centrality to the 
memory of the Cold War and Cold War activism in particular. Both the Cold War section of 
the exhibition and the accompanying book, People Power,44 almost used CND as a focal point 
off which other events and strands of activism branch off. Indeed, in one review, Alison Wilcox 
remarked that particular events and groups of Cold War activists were portrayed within the 
exhibition, ‘with the overarching presence and campaigning of CND highlighted throughout 
the period’.45 CND were in fact mentioned from the very beginning of the exhibition’s Cold 
War section through to their involvement in the most recent event portrayed, the 2016 Trident 
march. As a result, CND not only featured in the Cold War narrative as a focal point for 
activism in the period, but their continued existence and campaigning ensured that their reach 
and significance extended to the modern-day display of activism and ‘people power’. This 
‘overarching presence’ thus served to demonstrate its prominence in the Cold War narrative of 
protest. The exhibition in this sense conveyed CND as a key aspect of Cold War memory, 
serving as a symbol and shorthand for Cold War anti-nuclear activism, and shaping the 
memories of visitors.  
The depictions of other movements are subsequently shown in comparison to CND. The 
Committee of 100, for example, is portrayed as a far more radical group. The C100 formed in 
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1960, in response to growing divisions and dissatisfaction, among some, with CND’s methods. 
The early CND focus on peaceful demonstration and lobbying, as well as the single-issue of 
focusing on the anti-nuclear cause, often resulted in divisions within the movement; primarily 
with those that deemed CND’s actions as not doing enough to create radical change. These 
divisions later manifested in the establishment of C100, when Bertrand Russell and other 
members formed a more radical group, which the DAC later merged into. The Committee 
therefore established itself and formed its programme of direct action – action which often 
bordered on or leant towards illegal activities.  
Ginger and Rosa draws on this comparison between CND and C100. In an early scene, Ginger 
and Rosa attend a ‘Ban the Bomb’ march with CND groups and others. The film shows the 
march to be strong with many people in attendance, capturing the early years of CND and their 
success. However, Ginger and Rosa hints towards the argument that CND were not necessarily 
radical or sufficiently active. During the scene of the ‘Ban the Bomb’ march, there are times 
where Ginger and Rosa look bored, merely walking along in a line of people. To emphasise 
this, after the march when Ginger is walking with her two godfathers Mark and Mark Two, and 
their American activist friend Bella, Mark Two comments on the politeness of British people, 
stating, ‘even the Ban the Bomb march was polite’.46 This comment, and portrayal of CND, is 
perhaps used to help demonstrate Ginger’s consideration, later in the film, to join the C100, 
believing that more direct action was needed than simply marching. Director Sally Potter 
therefore conveys Ginger’s hardening of views and drive for activism in her consideration to 
join the C100.  
 
 
46 Ginger and Rosa, dir. Sally Potter. 
224 
This change in Ginger’s commitment is equally driven by the strengthening relationship 
between Rosa and Roland. Ginger’s more radical beliefs and action highlight the rising 
tensions, not only with the nuclear threat and missile crisis, but also the tensions within her 
own personal and domestic sphere. As the narrative progresses and Rosa and Roland’s 
relationship intensifies, Ginger announces to her godfathers, Bella, and her mother Nat, that 
she is considering joining the C100, stating she agrees with Bertrand Russell that lawful protest 
was not enough. It is after the sit-in protest to block the gates of a military base with Bella, that 
Ginger, after being held in a cell, is taken home and finally pours out the truth about Rosa and 
Roland; as if more radical activism has enabled her to take the action necessary. Whilst the 
film does not go into detail regarding the divisions and tensions between the organisations, 
Ginger’s developing belief that lawful protest is not enough to ‘save us ( … ) from total 
extinction’, hints towards the different views and divisions which existed. CND therefore 
serves as the focus and other movements tend to be shown in comparison, the C100 shown 
very much to diverge from CND as more radical.  
The DAC and C100’s policy of non-violent direct action impacted upon people’s perceptions 
of the anti-nuclear movement more generally. Taylor has stated that the DAC’s, and later the 
C100’s, more radical protest methods ‘became synonymous in the public mind with the 
Movement as a whole (much to CND’s leadership’s distress).’47 The perception that the entire 
movement, and C100 in particular, was radical and regularly broke the law therefore likely 
shaped views of the movements in the press. From portrayals today, it is clear that this radical 
image has remained, despite memory often focusing on the CND narrative.  
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This radicalism was reiterated in the People Power exhibition. The exhibition dedicated a 
display to the actions of the C100, particularly emphasising their radical actions. One point the 
exhibition made was that C100 activists and supporters were willing to be arrested during their 
protests. The display contained a C100 legal handbook to emphasise the preparedness for this 
radical action. This was further reiterated with the inclusion of the ‘Wethersfield Six’. The six 
were arrested prior to planned C100 demonstrations, the main site of which being Wethersfield, 
resulting in chaos at these demonstrations. After the trial, each served a prison sentence ranging 
from 12-18 months.48 The inclusion of this key event was used to emphasise and reflect the 
radicalism of the group; highlighting the ‘people power’ and determination, as well as the 
controversy that surrounded C100. In this sense, differences and divisions between groups were 
acknowledged in the exhibition, yet seemingly, C100 featured as one aspect of the anti-nuclear 
story, whilst CND’s presence was made clear throughout.  
As well as CND being portrayed as central to the anti-nuclear narrative, the People Power 
exhibition also highlighted key moments and features of CND history and campaigning; many 
of which served to celebrate or acknowledge some of the more well-known campaigns by 
CND. In a video and article promoting the exhibition, the curator Matt Brosnan, highlighted 
the sketches of Gerald’s Holtom’s nuclear disarmament symbol, as one of the ‘five unmissable 
highlights’ of the exhibition.49 Gerald Holtom was introduced, in the exhibition, as the 
‘designer and artist’ who created the nuclear disarmament symbol for the first Aldermaston 
March in 1958, which is known more generally today as the peace symbol.50 The exhibition 
detailed how Holtom designed the symbol using the ‘semaphore for the letters ‘N’ and ‘D’’ 
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and did not seek to copyright the symbol, enabling its wide use throughout the Cold War and 
its continued use today.51 Much as Jonathan Hogg, and others, argue that the mushroom cloud 
has become an ‘iconic motif’ of the nuclear threat and the Cold War, the Nuclear Disarmament 
symbol has a similar familiarity and acts as an icon for activism.52 The symbol’s familiarity 
enables a short-hand for Cold War activism and as such it features heavily in cultural 
portrayals; the People Power exhibition being a prime example. CND in particular have used 
this symbol since its early years and it has continued to be their symbol ever since. The 
exhibition would seem to have tapped into symbols, images, and campaigns which are well-
known and familiar to visitors, reinforcing memories of the Cold War and activism, and 
framing these images and campaigns as dominant and central aspects of the period. 
Other key campaigns including the Aldermaston Marches were also focused on in the 
exhibition. The Aldermaston Marches began in 1958, becoming an annual feature of the Peace 
Movement calendar. The first march was actually organised by the DAC, CND dubious about 
its direct action, initially simply offered support.53 However, from 1959, the marches were 
reversed from Aldermaston to London, and organised by CND. The size and popularity of the 
marches likely accounts for their continued emphasis in modern cultural memory. Today, 
Aldermaston continues to be a prime site for anti-nuclear and peace activists due to continued 
weapons development at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE). The exhibition dedicated 
the majority of a display to ephemera from early Aldermaston Marches.  These included flyers 
promoting the march, signs and arm bands used, specifically containing the Nuclear 
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Disarmament symbol, and a sign for the DAC. Song sheets and lyrics of songs sung on the 
1958 march were also displayed along with a photograph of 1958, which saw up to 8,000 
people participate in the march.54 The display of these objects told the story of the Aldermaston 
Marches, and their early success and popularity. It is important to note that the exhibition 
focused on the early Aldermaston Marches of the late 1950s and early 1960s, and not those 
later, by which point Hogg argues, the ‘normalization’ of the marches had partly led to more 
negative press attention towards anti-nuclear demonstrators.55 The exhibition’s narrative thus 
served to map out the ‘peak moments’ which Lowe and Joel refer to.56 Once more, issues with 
seeing the Cold War as a whole arise in the focus on particular moments, the Cold War being 
captured as a series of ‘hot points’ as opposed to a unified whole. Consequently, the Cold War 
narrative is often flattened by these emphases. These marches, as a key, annual event for the 
Peace Movement were a crucial aspect of the Cold War anti-nuclear demonstrations. By 
including an entire display on the marches, the exhibition helped to reinforce their prominence 
in the memory of Cold War activism.57 The display, through these signs, arm bands, photos 
and song sheets, also highlighted the strong influences of art and culture within the protest 
movement, demonstrating again the very visual and audible portrayals of activism, as so much 
protest was conducted through various artforms and cultural platforms. The portrayals thus 
serve to perpetuate this memory of creativity and culture as central to the movement.  
Both the CND’s screenings of The War Game (1965) and the Protest and Survive CND 
publication, were also captured and celebrated in the exhibition. The exhibition’s inclusion of 
CND’s screenings of The War Game, after it was denied broadcasting in 1965, portrayed 
CND’s actions in ‘educating’ the wider public about the true horrors of nuclear weapons. The 
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exhibition included a short clip of The War Game, among other clips of broadcasts and 
programmes relating to government preparations and cultural portrayals of the perceived threat. 
The inclusion of the clip, not only enabled visitors to see part of the film and understand the 
fear that the nuclear threat caused, but, just as Ginger’s fear of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 
Ginger and Rosa serves to justify her activism, the clip also served to promote and highlight 
the CND’s cause in condemning the bomb, and fighting for the broadcast of The War Game to 
educate people about the threat. In this sense there was a rather positive portrayal of CND as a 
movement with a just cause. Consequently, here, we see a connection between the cultural 
memory of the nuclear threat serving as a basis, and justification for, the narrative and cultural 
memory of Cold War anti-nuclear protest. Their fight to screen The War Game was not 
necessarily a large or well-known campaign. However, the fact that The War Game has become 
widely known, in part for its controversy, and its harrowing depiction of nuclear war, enabled 
curators to play on this knowledge and emphasise CND’s role in the conflict. As with the 
screening of films in bunkers, The War Game becomes the cultural memory.  
Similarly, in 1979 the government pamphlet Protect and Survive was released following 
pressures from an aired Panorama programme pointing to the truth behind the government’s 
Civil Defence.58 Protect and Survive, gave British citizens instructions for how to protect 
themselves and their families in the event of a nuclear attack. These instructions included, 
blocking up windows and openings with sandbags, bricks, earth or furniture; creating an ‘inner-
refuge’ in the house, and painting windows inside with light paint, to reflect the heat flash 
resulting from the blast.59 In response and outrage at the release of Protect and Survive, E. P. 
Thompson wrote a counter-argument Protest and Survive, criticising the absurdity and futility 
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of these preparations. The work was also published by CND in 1980.60 This, as the People 
Power exhibition noted, helped to fuel the 1980s resurgence in anti-nuclear activism and CND. 
The exhibition’s inclusion of these key events and campaigns reflect Lowe and Joel’s argument 
that museums tend to concentrate on ‘recalling ( … ) peak moments’ of activist groups. In 
recalling the ‘peak moments’, however, the focus can provide a celebratory, even nostalgic, 
view of the success of the movement, yet the movement’s less successful moments tend to be 
more overlooked and forgotten.  
It is interesting that portrayals, particularly the People Power exhibition, tend to focus on high-
points and celebration, when in reality CND was often viewed as controversial and divided. 
The early success of CND as a mass movement inevitably led to many people being in favour 
of their cause, but there were also many against it. Negative views and portrayals of CND were 
particularly prominent in the press. Hogg has highlighted that in the 1950s, before the 
formation of CND, the press was generally supportive of the aims of contemporary anti-nuclear 
groups. However, Hogg adds that from the establishment of CND and particularly with the rise 
of anti-nuclear activism in the 1960s, press coverage of CND became increasingly negative.61 
Many criticisms centred on the ‘leftist’ and ‘elitist’ make-up of the movement. Particularly in 
the early life of CND, the group had a largely middle-class make-up in the leadership. As 
Taylor and Pritchard’s study on CND membership and members’ views twenty years after the 
organisation was established showed, of ‘403 respondents ( … ) [t]hey were predominantly 
middle class’, adding that ‘[b]y 1978, 73% of our respondents had either a degree or 
professional qualification’.62 The large majority of respondents also tended to vote Labour or 
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other left-wing/liberal groups.63 As Hogg’s study and contemporary press coverage show, this 
make-up led to much controversy particularly criticisms of ‘leftism’ and communism.64  
Whilst the film does not point specifically to criticisms, Ginger and Rosa, certainly captures 
this early middle-class make-up of the movement. The scene in which Ginger and Rosa attend 
their first YCND meeting captures a rather middle-class student group. Those that speak tend 
to be well-spoken, and likely well-educated. Whilst not hinting to this as a criticism, the 
memory of early CND as an intellectual and left-wing movement seems to be reiterated here. 
Taylor and Pritchard argued, in 1983, that the movement failed to build-up sufficient working-
class support, and yet that this was not a concern for the elitist leadership. They further added 
that, the image of the movement constructed in the press, which ‘centred on alleged 
promiscuity, drugs and irresponsibility’, created a ‘psychological barrier’ between them and 
the working-class.65 Criticisms in the press also tended to focus on the appearance of protesters, 
particularly portrayals of dirty individuals. These criticisms of ‘leftism’, dirtiness and also 
‘foreignness’, Hogg argues, suggested ‘that the idea of protest clashed with a particular British 
conservative sensibility’.66 Such criticisms continued during the 1980s, with protesters’ 
political messages often being ignored in favour of comments of condemnation.67  
Why then, despite these comments and perceptions of the movement, developing and 
increasing throughout the Cold War, do we see many positive and even celebratory portrayals 
of the organisation’s ‘peak moments’? In one obvious sense, the People Power exhibition itself 
had a clear message of the power of individuals engaging in protest, inclusion of, or a focus 
on, the hostility towards the movement would therefore have affected this message. This is not 
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to say that the exhibition completely ignored criticisms of the various groups, there were 
occasions within the exhibition when animosity was captured in an attempt to convey this 
controversy and ambiguity in the memory of activism. One example of this was the inclusion, 
in the display of the Aldermaston marches, of a letter and envelope from Spring 1959, which 
was sent to the organisers, stating the disapproval of their actions and that the letter had been 
sent without paying for the postage ‘‘in the hope that it will deplete your fund’’.68 Aspects of 
animosity were therefore captured, but the focus was very much placed on ‘peak moments’ of 
CND and the wider movement, reflecting the exhibition’s message of ‘people power’. There is 
also the fact for portrayals more generally, that a message of ‘people power’ and action, can 
only be achieved if complexities, hostilities, and divisions are side-lined. The narrative of CND 
fighting for a justified and noble cause of a world without nuclear weapons, fits into a wider 
narrative of the history of protest. The history of protest predominantly focuses on causes which 
are deemed to be good, for instance causes which seek peace or social advancement. The 
‘people’s’ role in protest is therefore often portrayed to capture the ‘other side’ of conflict and 
to fit ‘within a wider history from below’.69 In this, we can also recognise the IWM’s aim to 
present different perspectives of conflict via the People Power exhibition. 
In addition to the animosity towards CND being less central in recent portrayals, other 
omissions have shaped memories of the movement. One such omission is the complexities and 
relationships between the different groups within the wider peace movement. Although we 
have seen some of the differences between CND and C100’s actions, it is the intricate 
relationships and differences which are not so explicit or detailed. The complex relationship 
between the Labour Party and CND, for instance, is also often omitted from the narrative. This 
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relationship was an important part of CND, particularly its early hopes for a unilateralist policy 
from the Labour left; sections of the Labour Party offering a support base for CND and the 
chance for CND’s policies to be put forward, following their tactics of lobbying MPs and 
providing petitions.70 That many of these more intricate details are omitted results in a 
predominantly positive image of activism without numerous divisions and complexities. 
Whilst the balancing of different views is at times attempted and achieved, the focus on the 
‘people power’ message in many cultural portrayals demonstrates an attempt to reconcile the 
tensions, complications, and contradictions of Cold War activism. Yet the result is a very 
selective and specific memory.  
As discussed previously, this reflects the wider narrative of protest movements, acknowledging 
the role of the ‘ordinary people’. Perhaps this positive attitude also reflects a sense of nostalgia 
for protest, the early movement in the 1950s and 1960s particularly is seen to have changed 
politics in Britain and therefore provides an example, and even nostalgia, for the success or 
optimism placed in protest.71 As mentioned above, Schofield and Anderton have noted that 
there is more of an interest today in non-violent protest as it has become a common part of our 
political culture.72 A renewed hope and increase in activism today may also trigger a nostalgia 
for the protest movements of the Cold War and even earlier. The legacy of the Cold War can 
therefore be seen here, whilst memories of protest and protesters were often critical during the 
Cold War, the early movement had changed the political climate and practice even by the later 
movement in the 1980s.73 Britain’s decline and the increasing loss of faith in the British 
government which had firmly been established by the second wave of activism in the 1980s, 
also meant that it was the people’s role in challenging and questioning the government that 
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could be emphasised. As such the voices of ‘ordinary people’ stand out and can be celebrated 
in the sense of people taking action. Previous protests and the mass movements of the Cold 
War can be drawn on as a memory of these values. 
5.4.2 Portrayal of The Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp 
Much like CND and C100, cultural portrayals of the Greenham Common Women’s Peace 
Camp recall the ‘peak moments’ of the campaign. A ‘peak moment’ which is particularly 
emphasised in portrayals is the ‘Embrace the Base’ campaign in December 1982. In both the 
People Power and National Cold War exhibitions, photos and details of the ‘Embrace the Base’ 
campaign were used to represent key moments, both of the peace camp in particular, and in the 
National Cold War Exhibition’s brief display on activism, key moments of Cold War protest 
in general.74 The prominence of this campaign in portrayals of Greenham Peace Camp and 
Cold War protest, points to its prominence and significance to the memory of Cold War 
activism. This is likely due to the scale of the campaign which saw approximately 30,000 
people join hands to surround the Greenham military base. The size and symbolism of the 
campaign lends itself to the message of ‘people power’ and unified action which represents the 
protest movement at Greenham. In particular, the photos capturing the event served to 
encapsulate and reflect these messages, hence their prominence in recent cultural portrayals. In 
both these exhibitions, photos of the ‘Embrace the Base’ campaign stood out. A photo by 
Edward Barber of ‘Embrace the Base’ was enlarged and used as a backdrop to the Greenham 
Common display in the People Power exhibition, the size of the photo provided a focal point 
for visitors, and in doing so conveyed images of collective action.75 Similarly, the display of 
placards with photos, symbols and slogans of Cold War anti-nuclear protest, in the National 
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Cold War Exhibition, featured another photo from ‘Embrace the Base’.76 Both were powerful 
images and examples of the strength of individuals united in their cause. In focusing on this 
event and the visualisation of the campaign, the message conveyed was one of ‘people power’ 
and the power of action. Once again it is the visual nature of the displays which add to and 
influence memories of the vibrancy and celebration of Cold War protest.  
In the People Power exhibition, the Greenham Common Women’s Peace camp display was 
particularly celebratory. The Peace Camp section was tucked behind a recreated section of 
metal fencing, such as that which would have surrounded the Greenham Common airbase. The 
Camp is remembered in part for its decoration of the airbase fence, particularly on large protest 
occasions such as the ‘Embrace the Base’ event. The women often adorned the fence with 
belongings and pieces of art, creating a patchwork of art around the base. The People Power 
exhibition tapped into the environment of Greenham Common and some of the activities that 
took place there. The information card next to the recreated fence stated that ‘the perimeter 
fence was a focus of division, but also creativity. Protesters often cut the fence and tried to get 
through it, while also decorating it with daisy-chains of artwork and webs of thread’.77 The 
exhibition was also therefore connecting to the significance of creativity and symbolism that is 
often related to Greenham Common. Below the description of the fence on the information 
card, visitors were encouraged to take ribbons provided in a box and decorate the fence 
themselves. Again, as active participants, visitors were encouraged by the exhibition to recreate 
the symbolism and creativity of the protest at Greenham Common. This echoed the rather 
celebratory tone of the exhibition towards protest. Whilst the exhibition attempted to portray 
balance, visitors were greeted with stories of defiance and bravery, as well as creativity and 
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inclusivity. In joining in and recreating moments of Greenham Common, the visitor was able 
to be active in celebrating the Greenham protest; the activity helped to provide a memory of 
life at the Women’s Peace Camp and the demonstrations they were involved in. It is also 
arguable that this interactive activity aided the creation and shaping of memories regarding the 
importance of symbolism at the Women’s Peace Camp. In this recreation, however, it was the 
creativity, which was prioritised, creating a nostalgic sense of the power of this symbolism at 
Greenham Common.  
Yet, this focus very much excluded the real day-to-day life on the camp. Whilst this was pointed 
to briefly in the display with the comment: ‘Conditions were primitive, with protestors living 
in tents or under plastic sheeting’ and some footage of the camp,78 at the centre of the exhibition 
stood the fence as a celebration of creativity, beauty and inclusivity, again prioritising the ‘peak 
moments’. Equally, in the exhibition’s accompanying book by Lyn Smith, artist Peter Kennard, 
whose artwork featured in areas of the exhibition, was quoted as saying, that the fence was 
‘‘One of the greatest art works of the twentieth century ( … ) this eight-mile perimeter collage 
( … ) an extraordinary creative work. You got all this life and humanity on one side and this 
blank on the other’’.79 Kennard’s comment evokes a celebration of ‘life and humanity’ against 
the cold and plain military side of the base. The inclusion of Kennard’s quote in the book and 
the prominence of symbolism and creativity in the Greenham section of the exhibition, helped 
to echo further, the celebration of Cold War anti-nuclear protest. Greenham Common Women’s 
Peace Camp is thus a dominant feature of Cold War activism portrayals. 
An exploration of how the Peace Camp is remembered, is particularly interesting due to the 
dual narrative which inevitably accompanies it. As Lowe and Joel have remarked, the Women’s 
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Peace Camp ‘became a beacon for activist feminism as well as the anti-nuclear movement, a 
dual symbolism that also shapes its remembering’.80 The Women’s Peace Camp was set up in 
1981 after the Women for Life on Earth group had marched from Wales, to demonstrate and 
demand a discussion with the government over the proposed siting of Pershing II Cruise 
missiles in Britain, including the military base at Greenham Common. When this discussion 
was rejected, a camp was set up which remained throughout the 1980s, with some protesters 
even remaining until 2000. Whilst the early stages of the camp included both male and female 
protesters, a decision was taken in 1982 to make the camp ‘women-only’.81 In their book, 
Barbara Harford and Sarah Hopkins stated that this decision ‘was primarily a tactical one - and 
a gut reaction by some to what was happening at the camp at the time.’82 This tactic was to do 
with the camp’s chosen method of peaceful protest, believing that the absence of men may aid 
this, as well as their aim of challenging the patriarchy of the military and arms race, and creating 
a new society. The women-only initiative saw the equating of nuclear weapons and violence 
with a patriarchal system and male domination. As Harford and Hopkins noted in 1984: ‘Over 
the months, Cruise has become a symbol of nuclear terror, male domination and imperialist 
exploitation.’83 The decision caused much controversy and hostility, however, it enabled the 
camp to encompass this dual-meaning and dual-symbolism which remains today, and provided 
women with a place which symbolised women taking initiative and providing inspiration to 
others.84 Consequently, portrayals of the Women’s Peace Camp have to juggle this dual-
narrative and meaning.  
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Greenham Common, due to its multiple and controversial histories is undoubtedly a difficult 
past to portray. This difficulty, it would seem, has resulted in different focuses and emphases 
in cultural portrayals, as well as different levels of detail. The National Cold War Exhibition, 
for example, dedicated a small section of the exhibition to protest and activism during the Cold 
War. Due to the size of the display, protest groups and movements were dealt with more 
collectively than separately, to convey a general idea of protest. A collection of placards and 
large badges formed the display, along with a figure of Bertrand Russell sat on the floor. The 
voice-over narrative told the story of Cold War protest, mentioning the formation of CND, the 
Aldermaston marches, anti-Vietnam protests, alongside the development of a culture of protest 
in music – the accompanying soundscape capturing some of this. The narrative then moved 
onto a description of Greenham Common accompanied by the soundscape of chanting: ‘Take 
the toys from the boys’.85 The display did therefore capture, briefly, the significance of the 
women’s protest at Greenham, yet the primary focus of the display was a collective narrative 
and broad picture of anti-nuclear and anti-war protest throughout the Cold War period. 
Similarly, in the People Power exhibition, the section on the Cold War predominantly focused 
on anti-nuclear protest, though Vietnam was mentioned very briefly, it was the larger anti-
nuclear movements which were focused on. Within this section, the Greenham Common 
Women’s Peace Camp formed a prominent part of the narrative. There was a focus on the 
creativity of the peace camp, as well as the collective action of women. This exhibition did 
present more detail in regard to the controversy of the women-only initiative, and the 
significance of Greenham as a women’s movement. This was primarily captured through the 
inclusion of personal stories and ephemera, including video clips of experiences and life at the 
peace camp. The exhibition stated that the decision did result in ‘some hostility’ but that the 
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women-only initiative also gave the protest a ‘distinct sense of identity’.86 However, at the 
same time, the Greenham Common section was situated within a wider narrative which 
predominantly focused on anti-nuclear protest, and thus Greenham Common was primarily 
shown as part of this anti-nuclear movement, whilst also being women-only. It would seem 
that in the two exhibitions discussed, although to varying degrees of detail, the anti-nuclear 
movement was the central focus. This could link to the idea that our memory of activism is 
linked to our memories of the threat and fear of nuclear war, inevitably shaping the focus and 
emphasis of portrayals of protest.  
The Greenham Cold War Experience tour at Greenham Common, however, did capture, to a 
greater extent, the aim for a new society and the feminist focus. The power of the women-only 
initiative was conveyed through re-enactment and immersive theatre. Press and promotions for 
the event focused on the concept of immersive theatre and, as the promotion on the Greenham 
Trust website stated, a ‘Journey back through time to the 1980s’, adding that the tour aimed to 
‘bring the Cold War of the 1980s to life’.87 Other reviews used similar language such as, 
‘recreate life on the airbase’.88 Interested members of the public were thus presented with this 
step back in time and an ‘experience’ of the past. The tour was very much about this immersive 
experience and trying to inform the visitor about life at Greenham Common, whilst also 
entertaining them. On the tour, the visitor or, primarily in this case, audience, were guided to 
several ‘acts’ where actors and actresses immersed the audience in their recreations of life at 
Greenham Common during the 1980s. One act, included a glimpse of life in the Indigo camp 
of the Women’s Peace Camp. The act involved the characters Pat and Elsa, Pat having been at 
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Greenham for three years and Elsa having just arrived. Pat explained several aspects of life at 
the camp, including the decoration of the fence, but also the increasing number of police raids 
and arrests, and the mess they left afterwards, meaning they had to start again after the police 
had removed their possessions.  
Alongside details of everyday life on the camp, a point was made to emphasise the women-
only initiative. When Elsa arrived, she asked who was in charge. Pat smirked, claiming there 
were ‘no leaders, no hierarchy, we are all equal’.89 The inclusion of this scene helped to capture 
and stress the significance of the women-only camp, the rejection of patriarchal systems and 
the idea of a different and equal society, separate to the one of military hierarchies and 
regimental life on the other side of the fence. Further to this, Pat asked the audience if their 
families were alright with them being at the camp, explaining that whilst her husband was 
accepting, her mother no longer talked to her. Elsa, who had travelled all the way from Holland 
to join the camp, stated that she had left a three-year-old son behind with her husband, arguing 
that she was fighting for his future. Here the significance of women-only was further stressed 
in the particular role of motherhood. It was as a result of this conversation that Pat turned to 
the audience and said, ‘see what we’re trying to do?’; making a declaration of their cause and 
their commitment to a future without nuclear weapons, and the specific role of women as 
mothers and symbols of peace. Finally, near the close of the act, the audience were told to 
spread the word about the camp, that they were welcome back, and the women in particular 
were welcome to stay, leaving a lasting impression of the significance and importance of the 
women-only movement.90 In this sense, this particular scene within the Greenham Cold War 
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Experience, emphasised the women’s initiative of creating a new society and the significance 
of women leading this protest against the masculine military.  
The personal narratives of Pat and Elsa not only captured the women-only initiative but 
provided an empathetic experience to further enhance the visitor’s understanding of the 
Women’s cause, making the experience more tangible and memorable. The use of immersive 
theatre to emphasise this message provided the audience with a personal insight into the aims 
and cause of the Women’s Peace Camp, as well as the sacrifices they made. Jenny Kidd, in her 
article on the Performance, Learning and Heritage project at the University of Manchester 
2005–2008, remarked that, ‘An ability to empathise with or feel ownership over the narratives 
being portrayed ( … ) made that sense of the past more urgent, tangible and, for our 
respondents, memorable’. This ability to empathise and try to understand more the experience 
of the particular past being portrayed was evident in the Greenham Cold War Experience. As 
Kidd comments, when a performance ‘strikes a chord with visitors’ own memories and 
experiences’, it can enable this empathy and memorability.91 This is applicable to the 
Greenham Cold War Experience, as the majority of visitors lived through the Cold War and 
would therefore likely be able to recall memories of the events at Greenham Common, and also 
the controversy surrounding the camp; many of them also being local to the community.  
In addition to the dual narrative of feminist activism and anti-nuclear protest, lies the further 
duality of a military narrative and a narrative of protest and the anti-nuclear movement. Sophie 
Campbell, a columnist for The Daily Telegraph, framed this in an article dated September 2011, 
reviewing tours of the Greenham Common site, stating that ‘For anyone over 30, the words 
“Greenham Common” mean two things: cruise missiles and the women’s peace camps of the 
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mid-Eighties.’92 Schofield and Anderton conducted a study of the archaeological remains at 
Greenham Common in 2000. In their assessment of the site they concluded that, ‘For a site of 
such significance, in social, political, military, strategic, and technological terms, some symbol 
of the power and of the contradictory and conflicting stances the site represented in the later 
twentieth century should be retained’.93 As a result of this complex narrative, Veronica Fiorato, 
in her archaeological study of Greenham Common, adds that ‘In truth it is essential to study, 
record, and where feasible retain elements of each, [military and protest remains] as the story 
of Cold War Greenham cannot be told without looking at the archaeology on both sides of the 
fence.’ This, Fiorato stated, is a real challenge for those now managing the common.94   
Whilst the Greenham Cold War Experience did, through its immersive theatre, emphasise the 
significance of the peace camp being about creating a different society, the rest of the tour 
provided a predominantly military focus. The Greenham Cold War Experience followed a 
successful performance in 2017 of Greenham: 100 Years of War and Peace, marking the return 
of the common to the public in 1997.95 One article in the Guardian, promoting the event, 
however, also highlighted that the renovation of the Control Tower and immersive theatre 
events, were very much community focused. The presence of the Peace Women at Greenham 
Common was highly controversial during the 1980s, particularly for local residents. Catriona 
H. Jardine Brown’s article on the memory of the landscape of Greenham and Crookham 
Commons, explored the memories of locals via their ‘cognitive maps’ of the Commons. In this 
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exploration Jardine Brown found that those who lived in the area prior to the Cold War did not 
acknowledge the Common today as having been restored because it was too different from 
their childhood memories; the Cold War restrictions on the Commons as a result of the 
American air base, fundamentally changed what the Commons meant to them as a free and 
open space. Whilst those that moved there during or since the Greenham Peace Camp came to 
associate the Commons with the air base and the protest, previous inhabitants rejected this.96 
The People Power exhibition, but specifically the accompanying book, also mentioned this 
hostility and the formation of local groups against the camp, including Ratepayers Against the 
Greenham Encampment (RAGE), amongst others.97 Chris Moores’ article, ‘Opposition to the 
Greenham Women’s Peace Camps in 1980s Britain’  analyses RAGE as part of the wider ‘new 
right’ and Thatcherite period. Moores states that the use of the term ‘ratepayer’ emphasised an 
‘inclusivity’ of all ratepayers but also excluded and looked negatively on those who were not, 
the term matching Thatcherite rhetoric.98 In contrast, Greenham women ‘were characterised as 
scroungers’ and threatening sexuality and ‘normative gender modes’, Moores arguing that 
RAGE went beyond simply economic causes, instead wider social concerns also fuelled 
animosity.99 It is therefore hardly surprising that nearly twenty years after the last women left 
the site, much hostility towards the camp still exists. Within the Guardian article, Rosemary 
Richards of the production organisers, Fete Day, remarked that debates from the 2017 event 
revealed these hostilities, ‘“We found, and it was not difficult to find, a fair amount of angst 
and anger in the community. We wanted to give some space for the animosity that is still in the 
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local community about the peace camp”’. The article also quoted a local parish councillor who, 
the article stated, ‘has long been opposed to celebrating this part of the town’s history’.100 The 
event was thus a clear response to these feelings and as such formed a key community project. 
It is perhaps because of this hostility, or at least in part, that the acts which formed the 
Greenham Cold War Experience would seem to primarily have focused on the military 
operations of the base. They also provided space, in the Q & A act with the base Commander, 
for criticisms of the peace camp; providing some balance but also a ‘space for the animosity’.101 
If this was the case, it would certainly demonstrate the influence of current perceptions on the 
portrayal of the Common and the base during the Cold War. In fact, it demonstrates the impact 
that memories from during the Cold War itself, of the base and camp in the 1980s, have had 
on shaping and creating future memories – both for Cold War “survivors” and younger visitors 
to the site. In turn, Cold War memory has continued to form and develop throughout the Cold 
War, and after, to influence these current perceptions.  
The press Q&A was also an immersive act and centred on ‘second-person interpretation’, 
where the visitor adopts a character.102 This involved some audience members playing specific 
roles as members of the press, from various national and local newspapers. These audience 
members were handed clipboards to form a role in the act, where they asked set questions, 
followed by the mostly scripted answers by the actors. This enabled the audience to become 
part of the scene and interact, learning about the history of the base and perspectives of the 
peace camp from the American military, via the questions asked.103 Ultimately, this engaged 
visitors and also provided space for the American perspective to be heard, as well as some local 
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animosity to the peace camp; reflecting the dual memory of the military and the feminist 
activism. 
The military focus in the Greenham Cold War Experience was further added to with the act 
involving the sites’ decontamination suite. Within this act the audience was greeted by the 
character Marjorie, the wife of the American Commander, Colonel Robert Thompson. Marjorie 
welcomed the audience, to the ‘Family Orientation Day’, which, like the Press Q&A, was 
supposedly organised to ‘dispel the myths’ which the protest had created about the base. 
However, Marjorie’s welcome was interrupted by sirens, followed by two men approaching in 
overalls, face masks, and shouting through megaphones, warning the audience to stay still, as 
they had been contaminated and had to proceed through the decontamination suite. Whilst 
Marjorie’s flamboyant character offered humour, the men themselves created a somewhat 
sinister experience for the audience, who were shouted at ‘this is not a drill, I repeat, this is not 
a drill’ and then were corralled into the decontamination suite where visitors were walked 
through several rooms and the process of decontamination.104 This experience was highly 
informative of the process of decontamination, giving the audience some idea of the severity 
of the process, whilst also providing much entertainment for visitors.  
However, whilst the suite did exist on site during the Cold War and was tested multiple times, 
the audience were informed that it was, thankfully, never actually used. One might therefore 
question why this scene was included in the tour. Interestingly, in the same article by the 
Guardian, Rosemary Richards from Fete Day, was quoted as declaring that, ‘“We have decided 
to use the decontamination suite, although it is not part of the main cold war story. It started 
out as a bit of a sideline, but now, since the attack in Salisbury, it suddenly seems a lot more 
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relevant”’.105 This connection with the recent poisoning of Sergei Skripal and his daughter 
Yulia in Salisbury in March 2018 was emphasised within the act itself. When one of the men 
was shouting from the roof, he read out a list of chemicals, the audience had been exposed to. 
An emphasis was placed on noting the nerve agent Novichok. Following the attack in Salisbury 
several months previous to the event, this would have been immediately recognisable to the 
audience, who would then be able to link the two events together, the main idea which was 
ultimately perpetuated was that of a chemical attack on ‘the West’. The inclusion of this scene 
and of Novichok provides an obvious example of the influence of contemporary events on 
cultural portrayals and memory. The use of Novichok and pointing to the events in Salisbury 
provided some form of relatability for the audience, and, arguably, would immediately trigger 
thoughts and perceptions of a Russian attack by Russian hostiles, influencing the cultural 
portrayals and the memory created. In this sense, we can see that recent events have shaped 
portrayals and memories but that these are also very much based on memories and cultural 
perceptions from during the Cold War itself, of a Russian enemy likely to attack.  
This influence of recent events could also be said to provide a disjointed memory of the Cold 
War. As Rosemary Richards noted, the decontamination suite was only minor in the Cold War 
story of the base, and yet recent events would seem to have suddenly made it more relevant. 
The portrayal and memory were therefore shaped by this, demonstrating the fluidity of memory 
and its reactionary relationship to the present. It also, however, demonstrates a partly limited 
and simplified memory of the Cold War, reduced to the narrative of a Russian enemy, radiation 
scares and the drama of such processes, despite the fact that the decontamination suite was 
never actually used or needed. Consequently, not only does the inclusion of the 
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decontamination suite actually reflect contemporary events but also a somewhat simplified and 
nostalgic memory of the Cold War period.  
In addition to the varying focuses of portrayals of the Greenham Peace Camp, there are several 
omissions. Among the omissions in the narratives of Cold War activism is that despite the 
prominence of Greenham Common within displays, other contemporary peace camps are 
rarely, if ever mentioned. Portrayals of Cold War activism, thus seem to focus on the larger or 
more press-covered movements and events, further perpetuating their prominence and 
significance in cultural memories of Cold War protest. Greenham Common Women’s Peace 
Camp is perhaps remembered most due to the controversy that it created, particularly in 
response to the women-only initiative. As Schofield and Anderton remark, ‘Greenham was 
different, in being consciously and deliberately women only (unlike contemporary peace camps 
at Faslane and Molesworth), and its agenda was wider as a consequence’.106 That the Greenham 
Peace Camp represented a space and inspirational model for feminist action and women across 
the world, as well as a centre for anti-nuclear protest and non-violent direct action, meant that 
its reach was broad. It is thus likely the controversy over the women-only initiative and their 
actions sparks a vivid and also powerful memory of different aspects of Cold War protest. 
Ironically, however, as seen with the community-focused project at Greenham Common itself, 
this controversy can at times also mean that the focus on the peace camp is downplayed to 
allow space for the controversy and criticism which still exists. Again, reinforcing dominant 
memories over others, portrayals often simplify the wider reach of the peace and anti-nuclear 
movement in general.  
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A further omission results from the focus on Greenham as primarily an anti-nuclear protest. 
Whilst there are brief mentions of the women-only movement, the situating and main focus of 
the narrative is in one of anti-nuclear protest and military narratives. The activism and context 
of the wider Women’s Liberation Movement (WLM) greatly influenced Greenham Common. 
For example, June Hannam has highlighted how the WLM or Second Wave Feminism focused 
on questioning social constructions of femininity, and that ‘autonomous women’s groups’ were 
key in the WLM, providing women with a space and opportunity to find their voice, with a 
further emphasis placed on the discarding of hierarchies.107 Equally, Jill Liddington highlights 
the importance of non-violent protest to the WLM, whilst Margaret L. Laware adds that the 
WLM placed great emphasis on the use of images and symbols.108 Each of these features of 
the WLM and Second Wave Feminism can be found at Greenham Common, from the rejection 
of men on the site, to the discarding of hierarchies and most visibly the powerful use of 
symbolism at events like Embrace the Base. The influence of the WLM on Greenham is 
therefore unmistakable, yet in limiting the information and focus on this, the People Power 
exhibition, and other portrayals, flattened the narrative to a primarily anti-nuclear one. The 
modern cultural memory of the Cold War as a turbulent era and the nuclear threat as one of 
looming apocalypse thus further shape the memory of activism. The memories and images of 
turbulence causing a focus on the anti-nuclear protest, excluding the broader context of 
feminism and protest in the era. The memory of the Cold War as a whole is thus shaped by this 
negative and nuclear focus, shaping not only which narratives are recalled but how they are 
recalled and what is omitted to maintain this narrative. 
 
 
107 June Hannam, Feminism (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2012), pp. 81 - 83. 
108 Jill Liddington, The Long Road to Greenham: Feminism & Anti-Militarism in Britain since 1820 (London: 
Virago Press, 1989), pp. 202 - 212, 235 - 236; Margaret L. Laware, ‘Circling the Missiles and Staining Them 
Red: Feminist Rhetorical Invention and Strategies of Resistance at the Women’s Peace Camp at Greenham 
Common’, NWSA Journal, 16. 3 (2004), pp. 18 - 41 (p. 18), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4317078> [Accessed 
19 May 2020]. 
248 
5.5 Conclusion 
The portrayals of Cold War activism explored here, present a rather dichotomous memory of 
activism; one divided between a celebration for anti-nuclear protest and having to acknowledge 
the Nuclear Disarmament Movement’s failure to fully achieve its aims. This dichotomy 
represents a tension in how to remember Cold War activism and the Cold War more generally. 
As Lowe and Joel have stated, remembrance of groups such as CND has proved difficult due 
to issues surrounding the ‘effectiveness’ of the movements.109 Consequently, this tension has 
resulted in variations in portrayals.  
As has been demonstrated, portrayals of Cold War activism tend to focus on the anti-nuclear 
protests throughout the period. The centralisation of anti-nuclear protest over the Civil Rights 
movement, anti-Vietnam protests, WLM and student protests, demonstrates the significance of 
the memory of the nuclear threat, and Cold War opposition to that threat, in Britain’s cultural 
narrative of Cold War history. The development of a cultural memory of the looming nuclear 
threat thus aids these portrayals, often providing a justification for the actions taken by anti-
nuclear activists. This justification, in turn, allows for a more celebratory message, building on 
Phythian’s argument that a memory of nuclear fear would enable a view of CND and others as 
more ‘noble’.110 We see this most evidently in the film Ginger and Rosa, where Ginger’s 
activism was not only justified as a response to the nuclear threat and the impending Cuban 
Missile Crisis, but was also the tool Ginger uses to survive her own domestic turmoil in the 
form of Rosa and Roland’s relationship; Ginger’s survival of which provides the central theme 
of the power of activism.111  
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Celebratory portrayals also capture the vibrancy of the protest movement during the Cold War. 
The inclusion of artwork, soundscape, and immersive experiences such as decorating the 
Greenham fence or taking part in participatory performances, creates an atmosphere of 
inclusion and of being submerged in the culture of activism. Despite many portrayals including 
some detail of controversies or divisions, the methods and approaches used to portray the 
narratives of Cold War activism in exhibitions, lend themselves to these more celebratory 
notions. In addition to this, the numerous depictions not only of culture but of specific 
individuals, their artwork, their role, and their personal experience, serves to highlight the idea 
of “ordinary people” taking action and having a voice. The narratives thus follow closely the 
general structure of the history of protest, through exploring social history and a ‘history from 
below’, providing a different perspective to periods of conflict.  
The dominant movements and campaigns of Cold War activism form a further focus in cultural 
portrayals. This generally follows a pattern of mapping ‘peak moments’,112 as opposed to 
presenting the complex reality of the Nuclear Disarmament Movement, its weaknesses, 
divisions and failures. This, however, echoes the tension between celebrating the actions of 
movements and individuals and acknowledging their faults. In focussing primarily on the ‘peak 
moments’, portrayals in films and exhibitions can attempt to accommodate this dichotomy or 
deal with its challenges. The uncertainty of how to remember Cold War activism can thus lead 
to more simplified, even rose-tinted, nostalgic and celebratory messages.  
However, whilst the majority of portrayals are predominantly celebratory, this uncertainty over 
memory is also reflected in some portrayals providing a space to question the success of the 
anti-nuclear and peace movements. We saw this particularly in the People Power exhibition, 
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where visitors were openly invited to consider the success of protest over the last one hundred 
years. This questioning alongside such positive portrayals demonstrates the challenge of how 
to remember Cold War activism. Whilst there would appear to be a desire to acknowledge the 
actions of groups and individuals, there is an underlying tension that nuclear weapons continue 
to exist, and that controversial wars continue to be fought. 
The portrayals explored in this chapter have also demonstrated attempts to include criticisms 
and voices against the protesters in order to accommodate the memory of, and even continued, 
animosity towards some of the movements and campaigns of the Cold War. This is most 
evident in the Greenham Cold War Experience, where much of the performance revolved 
around the military base, and only one act reflected the perspective of the Greenham Women’s 
Peace Camp, to accommodate continued local animosity towards the camp.113 It is therefore 
clear that perceptions from the Cold War continue to influence cultural portrayals today and 
very much shape how Cold War “survivors” and younger generations view campaigns such as 
that at Greenham Common. The persevering controversy surrounding Cold War activism thus 
acts as a further contributing factor to the tension within cultural memories of Cold War protest.  
Alongside existing Cold War memories, recent post-Cold War events can be seen to have 
influenced the cultural memory of Cold War activism and the conflict in general. This can be 
seen in the distortion of memories through the merging of recent events and Cold War events 
such as the emphasis on Novichok and the decontamination suite at the Greenham Cold War 
Experience. Equally, renewed hope in the power of protest in recent years enables a more 
celebratory and nostalgic memory of Cold War activism. The cultural memory of the Cold War 
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and Cold War activism being shaped by the relationship between the past and future in the 
given present.  
These various portrayals, with narratives of celebration and the power of protest, alongside a 
questioning of the true success of Cold War activism, capture this struggle of how to remember 
the conflict. This inherently reflects wider questions for the memory of the Cold War more 
generally. Was the Cold War won? Are there moments of the narrative to celebrate? Or is the 
Cold War increasingly seen as a period of British decline where both the “ordinary people” and 
British Government increasingly had little say in the global events surrounding them; and a 
period of a continuous, looming threat of nuclear war, a threat which arguably still exists today? 
These questions inevitably shape and influence cultural portrayals and memories of the Cold 
War, and the complexity and tensions within this memory can be seen in the dichotomy, of 




6 Conclusion  
 
In 2019, the Protect and Survive exhibition captured the divided and ambiguous memory of 
Britain’s Cold War. From its dramatic portrayal of a “turbulent era” to a celebration of Cold 
War culture, the exhibition demonstrated the wide reach of the Cold War both in military and 
political spheres, as well as everyday life. Consequently, the key questions it evoked were: how 
was the Cold War lived and experienced? And can the Cold War be celebrated or simply 
remembered as a time of fear and turmoil?  
The analysis of exhibitions, films and television dramas in this thesis has demonstrated that 
there is no clear consensus on how Britain’s Cold War should be defined or remembered. The 
ambiguity of Britain’s cultural memory of the period is evident in the diverse narrative 
frameworks in post-1989 films, television series and exhibitions. There is a persistent 
dichotomy between conveying a dark, turbulent era versus a sense of nostalgia for the Cold 
War. The memory of the Cold War as being ridden with terror and fear is particularly created 
in the nuclear narratives conveyed. The instantly recognisable and symbolic power of the 
nuclear mushroom cloud is employed across portrayals, from the mushroom cloud which opens 
Ginger and Rosa, to the enlarged mushroom cloud images which featured in the National Cold 
War Exhibition, and People Power exhibition. It is this imagery which helps to convey and 
justify the fears and actions of activists and protesters during the period. Equally, the macabre 
environments often created in nuclear bunkers open to the public, specifically those run 
privately by individuals, emphasise the bleak prospects facing the nation and the “ordinary” 
person in the event of nuclear attack. In particular, the nature of nuclear bunkers being secret 
military buildings, often underground, create cold, dark, and damp environments. The arena of 
articulation being especially relevant in creating this notion of a stark and troubled period. The 
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emphasis and even exaggeration of the Cold War as a dark period, creates entertainment but 
may also reflect a lack of memory, a need to highlight why bunkers were built and why activists 
campaigned. A lack of clear memory and distance from the period makes this necessary for 
modern audiences. A narrative of turbulence is equally reflected in portrayals of espionage, 
particularly regarding the Cambridge spies. The values which the spies shattered, from those 
of class to masculinity and sexuality, and breaking away from the wartime and pre-war values 
of gentleman bred for empire, symbolise and reflect the economic and political decline of 
Britain post-1945. The upheaval of such values is emphasised in post-1989 cultural portrayals, 
often with the Cold War being compared with the ideal and myth of Second World War bravery 
and heroism. 
In contrast to these dark images of nuclear devastation and social and political upheaval, there 
are also clear connotations of a growing nostalgia for the Cold War in post-1989 portrayals. 
Despite the creation of several negative images and atmospheres, there is often also a sense of 
the certainty and order that came with the bi-polar world of the Cold War. In chapter two, the 
discussion of reports in the press of the unknown post-Cold War world reveal that a sense of 
nostalgia and uncertainty were predicted with the collapse of the Cold War order. This sense 
of nostalgia has been increasingly captured since the end of the conflict in portrayals of the 
Cold War. The espionage chapter for example demonstrated the appeal of spies taking action 
and, in the cases of George Smiley and Joe Lambe, bringing about justice despite their own 
character flaws and flaws in the system. Equally, the nuclear chapter revealed a strange 
nostalgia for the bomb. As Peggy Rosenthal declared, unlike modern weapons there was a 
visibility and certainty about the bomb. Today weapons such as biological weapons can be 
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invisible, the unknown danger being that much more threatening.1 Lastly, post-1989 portrayals 
of Cold War activism, even whilst questioning activism’s success, convey a sense of hope and 
celebration for activism, a hope that can be tapped into today in the increasing number of 
popular protests against Trident, President Trump or climate change. The Cold War was of 
course a time of fear for many, this fear lingering in the background to everyday life, the fear 
that a nuclear war may break out between the superpowers. However, a nostalgia is possible as 
a result of looking back on the Cold War from the given present. Current events including 
increasing proliferation in countries like Iran and North Korea, in addition to the unpredictable 
nature of tyrannical and populist leaders, creates an uncertain world. Whilst some fears remain, 
those of nuclear threat, the lack of established rules and understandings such as MAD, can 
result in the Cold War appearing safer, more orderly, even quaint in comparison to today’s 
threats. Fears today thus make it possible to look on the Cold War with a rose-tinted view. 
Further to this, the unknown and nationless enemies facing the world today in the form of 
terrorism provide further uncertainty in contrast to the known enemy of the Cold War. Today’s 
cultural memory of Britain’s Cold War is thus dependent on the given present, shaped by past 
understandings and the developing memory throughout the Cold War and fears for the future.  
The past equally influences the cultural memory of Britain’s Cold War today as Cold War 
“survivors” themselves create, shape, and reflect particular memories of the Cold War. Both 
Sally Potter and Toby Whithouse indicated that their childhood experiences of the Cold War 
in the 1960s and 1980s shaped their perceptions and memories of the period. These perceptions 
now being reflected in their films and dramas, shaping and moulding the memory of the Cold 
War for younger generations. Through the experiences of writers and others behind the 
 
 
1 Peggy Rosenthal, ‘The Nuclear Mushroom Cloud as Cultural Image’, American Literary History, 3. 1 (1991), 
pp. 63 – 92, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/489733> [Accessed 19 May 2020], p. 89. 
255 
production of Cold War portrayals, the significance of the past being drawn into the present is 
evident. This thesis thus builds on and adds to the literature on Cold War memory through 
acknowledging the many time layers and influences on Britain’s memory and experience of 
the Cold War, how this has developed and continues to be re-formed.  
In employing Koselleck’s theory of time layers this thesis has illustrated the futility of strict 
periodisation in relation to the Cold War. It is not possible to fully understand the legacy and 
memory of Britain’s Cold War without acknowledging how memories have formed and 
developed throughout the Cold War and to present day. This approach enables an awareness 
of how the given present of the post-1989 world continues to shape and even distort cultural 
perceptions of the Cold War; allowing for a more comprehensive knowledge of why particular 
themes and narratives continue to be drawn on and emphasised.  
Further to the influence of the given present and recent events, a resistance of strict 
periodisation highlights the influence of the Second World War, and more specifically the 
national memory of the conflict on the Cold War. Throughout the portrayals discussed there 
are often distinct comparisons between the Second World War and Cold War period. These 
comparisons often serve to convey the Cold War as a period of decline and turbulence in 
contrast to the victory of wartime Britain. For example, in the espionage chapter it was 
demonstrated that in Cold War espionage dramas produced after 1989, spies themselves often 
shared their disenchantment with their work and the system. In The Game both Daddy and Joe 
Lambe are shown to be disillusioned. Daddy in particular longs for the clarity of the Second 
World War, whilst Joe seems isolated and disconnected with little trust in anyone or anything.2 
Equally, in the remake of Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, George Smiley’s disillusionment 
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continues to be captured, yet with more exaggerated emphasis on Smiley’s darker, grittier 
monologue about the decay in the East and West.3 Further to the examples in espionage, the 
sweet and innocent attempts of Hilda and James Bloggs to survive a nuclear attack as they did 
the Blitz  in When the Wind Blows, captured the devastating complexity and danger of the Cold 
War and Cold War weapons in contrast to the Second World War.4 The memory of wartime 
Britain is played upon and utilised to create these negative depictions of the Cold War, the 
memories working alongside one another and shaping how each conflict is remembered. The 
two memories need to be considered together in order to fully understand the fluid and 
developmental nature of memory and the legacy of each conflict in today’s world. Strict 
periodisation prevents an understanding for how memory of the Cold War has developed over 
the years and the many influences which construct, shape and re-mould that memory. Britain’s 
strong national memory of the Second World War enables a more negative, contrasting 
memory of the Cold War. However, this negative memory is increasingly challenged by a 
nostalgia for the period, and as an escape from the uncertainty of the present and the future.  
In addition to the dichotomy of turbulence and nostalgia, the cultural memory of Britain’s Cold 
War is further complicated by the division between conveying the Cold War as a conflict or a 
period as a whole. The National Cold War Exhibition and indeed the Cold War series in 1998, 
both attempted in many ways to convey the Cold War as a whole and as a conflict, one which 
also influenced culture and society through propaganda. These narratives did however focus 
on similar ‘hot points’ such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, Berlin, Greenham Common or the 
CND.5 In contrast, the most recent exhibition explored in this thesis, the Protect and Survive 
exhibition at TNA, balanced a military narrative with one on everyday life during the Cold 
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War. This exhibition differed from many other portrayals in emphasising the infiltration of the 
conflict into everyday life and its impact on the “ordinary” person. The exhibition thus placed 
much emphasis on the Cold War as a whole period.6 The IWM’s Peace and Security exhibition 
differed yet again in capturing a series of events and ‘hot points’ under the umbrella of the Cold 
War yet framed as post-1945 conflicts.7 The post-1989 films and television series which 
portray the Cold War also pay much attention to capturing a particular decade or Cold War 
aesthetic, capturing the period itself. Once again, the fact that there is no uniform framework 
for presenting the Cold War heightens the ambiguity surrounding its cultural memory in 
Britain.  
As a result of this ambiguous memory, narratives are often simplified. As demonstrated with 
the People Power exhibition, the complexities of CND in regard to criticisms of the movement, 
divisions within CND or its relationship with the Labour Party had been omitted. In doing so 
this prevented the narrative becoming too complex for visitors, but also ensured the ‘people 
power’ message that the exhibition wished to convey. Equally, the limited information on 
decolonisation after the war and Britain’s role resulted in complexities of the Cold War being 
simplified into “other global conflicts”. Yet this lack of information also contributes to the 
uncertainty surrounding Britain’s role in, and experience of, the Cold War. This simplification 
was also found in the 1998 Cold War series, the Cuban Missile Crisis episode being criticised 
for conveying the event as a sudden outburst as opposed to a build-up of tension. These 
examples of simplification may be symptomatic of the complexity of the Cold War narratives 
and the challenges faced by those who attempt to convey the period or conflict. Consequently, 
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similarities in the themes and topics presented are evident across post-1989 cultural portrayals, 
from the Cuban Missile Crisis in the National Cold War Exhibition and Ginger and Rosa, to 
the emphasis on Greenham Common and the CND in the Greenham Common Cold War 
Experience and People Power exhibition. The structure of this thesis demonstrates that the 
themes of espionage, the nuclear threat and activism form central focuses and ‘hot points’ for 
post-1989 portrayals. The cultural memory of Britain’s Cold War and the Cold War generally 
is centred on these topics, they have become the key moments and episodes of the Cold War 
in cultural memory. These moments are often moments of crisis and therefore drama. The 
repetition of these themes in portrayals therefore generates a dramatic narrative, both exciting 
and entertaining for visitors and viewers. As entertaining narratives these themes serve to 
attract visitors and viewers, their success at attracting people likely accounting for their 
continued employment and emphasis in Cold War narratives today. The entertainment aspect 
is key to consider here, as museums, films and dramas have to entice visitors and viewers. 
Certain aspects of the Cold War are inevitably exaggerated or emphasised to meet this, 
particularly the creation of dramatic scenery and spaces to draw out the turbulence of the era. 
The cultural memory generated is thus equally shaped by the financial needs of producers and 
museums; museums and bunkers often having to balance entertainment with education.  
The cultural memory approach employed in this thesis has enabled a focus on cultural objects 
and institutions, and how these each influence the cultural memory of Britain’s Cold War in 
the narratives that they choose. As Erll declared ‘the medium is the memory’.8 The fact that 
museums are now often sought as places of entertainment as well as education, we have seen, 
has some influence on how narratives are told and displayed. The active role of the visitor in 
engaging in the narrative, such as decorating the Greenham fence in the People Power 
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exhibition or experiencing a fallout shelter in Hack Green Nuclear Bunker, add to the 
immersive and entertaining experience. These moments both enable visitors to get a sense of 
the period they are learning about but can also distort or dramatise memories of the period. 
Equally, film with its ability to capture aesthetics and convey complex plots can create 
emotions and atmospheres that draw the audience in. These again can shape memories in their 
dramatic and emotional portrayals of betrayal, corruption, and fear. In exploring the temporal 
heterogeneity of these films and exhibitions, through interviews and reviews it has been 
possible to identify the influences surrounding the encoding and decoding of the portrayals, 
identifying how events such as the Iraq War, Trident debates and the Skripal poisoning can re-
shape, re-frame and even distort the cultural memory of Britain’s Cold War. 
In acknowledging the complexities and many influences on cultural memory of the Cold War, 
this thesis has demonstrated how the cultural memory of Britain’s Cold War has developed 
from the beginning of the conflict itself and been reshaped in each given present. As we have 
seen, the nuclear threat following 1945, at first dissipated in Britain, but from 1954 became 
increasingly looked to as an unimaginable threat with few portrayals in the 1950s and 1960s 
attempting to imagine life post-nuclear attack.9 However, following Hogg’s argument, the 
1980s saw increasing attempts to imagine the devastation that would follow an attack and 
increasing criticisms of the government’s emphasis on deterrence.10 These criticisms and the 
debate between deterrence versus non-proliferation continue to be seen today. This was 
particularly evident in the 2016 debates surrounding the renewal of Trident. Cold War debates 
and rhetoric thus have their legacy in today’s world, bringing the Cold War back into 
 
 
9 Matthew Grant, ‘The imaginative landscape of nuclear war in Britain, 1945-65’ in , Understanding the 
Imaginary War: Culture Thought and Nuclear Conflict, 1945-90, ed. by Matthew Grant and Benjamin Ziemann, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), pp. 92 - 115, (pp. 94, 101 - 103); Tony Shaw, British Cinema 
and the Cold War: The state, propaganda and consensus (London: I.B Tauris, 2001), p. 132. 
10 Jonathan G. Hogg, British Nuclear Culture: Official and Unofficial Narratives in the Long Twentieth Century 
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), pp. 8 - 11. 
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significance. As such this in part explains an increase in Cold War narratives as proliferation 
issues and nuclear deterrence debates continue to fill headlines. The Cold War not only 
provides an understanding of these discussions but also provides an outlet to air debates from 
today’s world without necessarily facing them directly. In Ginger and Rosa for instance, 
Ginger’s activism can be interpreted as a criticism of inaction both during the Cold War but 
also today, as the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant proved that 
nuclear dangers continue to exist.  
Similarly, whilst activism during the Cold War itself was often controversial with many 
criticisms of CND and the women at Greenham Peace Camp, for either being too left-wing, 
“foreign” or irresponsible, post-1989 portrayals of Cold War activism convey a narrative of 
celebration and ‘people power’. As discussed, this falls in line with Phythian’s argument that 
if the nuclear conflict was portrayed as a looming threat then activism would be seen as a more 
noble cause.11 The memory of nuclear weapons generated today thus equally shapes and 
influences the memory of activism. Even though activism’s successes and effectiveness are 
questioned in cultural portrayals, the narrative is primarily one of celebration and has 
developed to suit the ideals and perspectives of today’s world. Protest and activism have 
become a key part of Britain’s political climate since the Cold War. A recent sense of renewed 
hope in activism after the failure of the anti-Iraq War march in 2003, brings the power of Cold 
War activism into significance as something that can be drawn on. Equally, a lack of faith in 
the government following Iraq ensures that a people vs government narrative is relatable in 
today’s world. Once more the conditions of the given present shape and determine both how 
the Cold War is presented today and how it is interpreted.  
 
 
11 Mark Phythian, ‘CND’s Cold War’, Contemporary British History, 15 (2001), pp. 133 - 156 (p. 152), 
<https://doi.org/10.1080/713999421> [Accessed 19 May 2020]. 
261 
Narratives of espionage both during the Cold War and since have often focused on the 
Cambridge spies and narratives of decline and betrayal, with the exception of James Bond who 
restored faith in British prowess. In this sense espionage narratives continue to follow similar 
themes, the modern espionage genre developing during the Cold War itself. However, certain 
aspects have new meanings as a result of being produced and decoded in the given present. For 
example, the notion of homosexuality as an indication of treason is now out of date, instead 
homosexuality in the 2011 remake of Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy and Cambridge Spies series 
is used to emphasise the secret and disjointed lives of the spies, unable to be their true selves. 
Furthermore, following the Iraq War it has become possible for more people to understand the 
spies’ position of love for country but their contempt for and betrayal of government. As 
reviews and interviews surrounding the Cambridge Spies series demonstrated, the 
contemporary debates surrounding Iraq enabled a more sympathetic interpretation of the spies’ 
actions. It is thus possible to see how the given present of the portrayal’s production and 
viewing, or encoding and decoding, has influenced and reshaped memories of the Cold War, 
with new conflicts providing a lens through which to view and compare previous conflicts.  
In more general terms the changes in Cold War memory have seen an increase in nostalgia. 
Whether that is for the clearer order during the conflict as a result of rules such as MAD or a 
known enemy, or for the hope placed in protest which can be drawn on today, or even a 
sympathy for those deemed traitors of Britain as perspectives have changed. It is clear that both 
the simplicity of the Cold War in comparison to today and the increasing relevance of these 
themes and debates in today’s world have brought the Cold War into significance, with recent 
events shaping perspectives and memories. The increasing number of exhibitions, films and 
series produced about the Cold War highlight the rising fascination and relevance of the topic, 
yet also a rising interest in understanding the conflict and Britain’s experience of and role in it.  
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This thesis has contributed to the growing analysis of Cold War memory, yet there is still much 
to be understood about the impact of the Cold War in the world and in Britain. It will be 
particularly interesting and necessary to explore how this cultural memory continues to develop 
and re-form in the coming years. In particular the events of Brexit and Britain’s uncertain 
position in the world may bring yet more relatability with the Cold War. Equally, the recent 
global turmoil caused by the Coronavirus pandemic will inevitably provide a new pinpoint in 
national and global history, one which will likely provide new perspectives for past events and 
particularly the security that the recent past can provide. The fluid nature of memory ensures 
that there will never be a definitive ‘Cold War memory’, yet continued analysis is required to 
understand the legacy of the Cold War in shaping the world around us and the place of the Cold 
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